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Introduction and Motivation 1
1 Introduction and Motivation
Implementation theory is concerned with the question of which (social) choice corre-
spondences can be implemented by the use of certain mechanisms in a certain environ-
ment. Although there were some earlier contributions to what is today known as the
theory of implementation, Hurwicz [18] is widely seen as the classic and seminal paper
which started the implementation literature.
Standard implementation theory considers situations that can be described (in the
sense that all relevant aspects are captured) by an environment consisting of
(i) a set of entities and their corresponding interpretations: a designer, a set of
agents, a set of feasible outcomes, a set of types for each agent, a set of possible
type profiles / states, a type-contingent preference relation or utility function
over the set of feasible outcomes for each agent, and a set ofmechanisms available
to the designer, each specifying the agents’ possible actions and their respective
outcomes in the form of an outcome function (which must be independent of
states as a consequence of the assumptions outlined in (ii) and (iii)),
(ii) assumptions on the information structure: in particular, the designer does not
know/observe the actual state,
(iii) assumptions on the enforcement structure: for any available mechanism, the
designer is able to force the agents to participate in this mechanism according
to its rules and is able to enforce the elements of the outcome space as prescribed
by its outcome function as a consequence of all agents’ actions, and
(iv) assumptions on the behaviour of the agents: the agents play according to a
certain noncooperative solution concept,
and a (social) choice correspondence for the environment, which specifies, for each pos-
sible type profile (reflecting the agents’ preferences over the set of feasible outcomes),
the (socially) desirable outcomes for this state of the environment.
In the remainder of this paper, we will call such an environment, i.e., an environment
consisting of (i) to (iv), a classical environment.
Given a classical environment and a (social) choice correspondence for this environ-
ment, the theory of implementation is concerned with the question of whether or not
there exists a mechanism available to the designer that implements the (social) choice
correspondence with respect to the noncooperative solution concept under considera-
tion, i.e., whether or not there exists a mechanism such that, for each possible type
profile, the agents’ actions that conform with the noncooperative solution concept re-
sult in desirable outcomes for this state of the environment.
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Throughout this paper, we will always assume that there is complete information and,
in particular, no asymmetric information between the agents, i.e., all agents are in-
formed about the actual state of the environment. We briefly discuss the incomplete
information case in Chapter 6, which is concerned with concluding remarks and ideas
for future research.
In many situations, however, there are additional relevant aspects which are not cap-
tured by the assumptions of the standard theory. In other words, the assumptions are
too restrictive to make the theory applicable. The situation in question may, for exam-
ple, inherit commitment or credibility issues, or may not comply with the assumptions
on the enforcement structure outlined in (iii) above.
The latter issue is raised in Hurwicz’s [19] “Implementation and Enforcement in In-
stitutional Modeling”. Hurwicz [20] uses the following words: “. . . in general, there
is nothing in a specific game form, prescribing particular strategy domains and out-
come functions that would prevent players from resorting to ‘illegal’ strategies, nor is
there automatic assurance that outcomes specified by the outcome function will occur
unless the required apparatus is in place.” Hurwicz suggests “to embed the ‘desired’
game form in” what he calls “the ’natural’ game form, including all feasible behaviors
(and not merely those that are ‘legal’ according to the desired game form) and their
natural consequences as the ‘natural’ outcome function.” He uses “the term ‘genuine
implementation’ to refer to the procedures to make . . . an institutional arrangement
effective.”
The idea that something has to be enforced in the absence of an external enforce-
ment institution/mechanism/authority (such as a court) is often referred to by the
term “self-enforcement”. Self-enforcement issues are addressed, for example, in the
literature on contracting, constitutional (rules) economics, international (negotiated)
agreements (in particular, international environmental agreements), and on decision-
making in international organizations. The usual approach in this literature, to analyse
the decision possibilities within the appropriate time horizon, includes the considera-
tion of expected future payoffs, or the problem embedded into an infinitely repeated
game (e.g., cooperative behaviour sustained as an equilibrium of an infinitely repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma type of game).
Within his discussion of “Ex Post Individual Rationality, Renegotiation, and Credibil-
ity”, Jackson [22] uses the following words: “At several points I have mentioned that
various forms of implementation rely on the belief that the outcomes of the mecha-
nism will be enforced, even if they are ‘bad’ from society’s point of view ex-post. This
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can be problematic, to the extent that the positive results depend on such outcomes
being used by the mechanism and such beliefs holding. If, for example, a mechanism
is constructed to assist bargainers in reaching an efficient agreement, then it is ques-
tionable to assume that highly inefficient outcomes will be allowed to stand off (or on)
the equilibrium path.” Two references mentioned by Jackson as being concerned with
credibility or commitment issues are Baliga, Corchon and Sjo¨stro¨m [3], and Baliga and
Sjo¨stro¨m [4]. Both articles consider “interactive implementation”, i.e., implementation
“when the planner is a player” (quoting [3]).
Commitment issues are recently addressed, for example, in the context of auctions,
contracting/principal-agent analysis, and mechanism design. Vartiainen [55], for ex-
ample, analyses “auction design under the hypothesis that parties do not have any
commitment power: the seller is allowed to change rules of the auction mechanism
at any stage of the game without any cost, and the buyers cannot ever be forced to
participate (the value of their outside option is fixed).” Skreta [49] “characterizes the
optimal auction in a two-period model under non-commitment. In the first period, a
risk-neutral seller designs a mechanism to sell an indivisible object. If no trade takes
place, the seller cannot commit not to try to sell the object in the second period.”
Mitusch and Strausz’s [30] “paper studies the role of mediators in a principal-agent
problem with ex ante hidden information when the commitment power of the principal
as contract designer is limited.” Bester and Strausz’s [8] “paper provides a modified
version of the revelation principle for environments in which the party in the role of the
mechanism designer cannot fully commit to the outcome induced by the mechanism.”
Their “results apply to contracting problems between a principal and a single agent.”
Bester and Strausz [7] consider the multi-agent case.
In this paper, we analyse the implementation of (social) choice correspondences in en-
vironments with limited enforcement power, i.e., in environments in which the outcome
space is not fully enforceable by the designer, and in which enforcement capabilities on
outcomes can be expressed as a function of (and only of) all coalitions of individuals,
thereby making the outcome function of a mechanism dependent upon the environ-
ment. In such environments, the designer may not be able to fully enforce the outcome
functions of those mechanisms he can enforce the agents to participate in (according
to its rules). It is in this respect that we deviate from the assumptions of the standard
theory, and that we extend the applicability of the theory of implementation.
Enforcement limitations on the side of the designer may be due to non-verifiability. See,
for example, our comments concerning Trockel’s [52] approach to the implementation
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of cooperative solution concepts in the remainder of this chapter.1 They also may be
due to a non-existing or non-effective official legal system (combined with non-available
private intermediaries). This may be the case, for example, in transition economies,
and holds true for many agreements between sovereign states and for international
contracts. A third reason for enforcement limitations may be property rights. In the
words of Jackson and Palfrey [24a], “a . . . source of difficulty with enforcement relates
to property rights that are exogenous to a mechanism and impose state-contingent
constraints on a social choice rule. In many settings individuals have inalienable rights
that guarantee them some outcomes in some states of the world.” Similarly to property
rights, decisions of many legislative bodies and international organizations are based on
some voting system (which may depend on the type of issue under consideration).
Consider, for example, the case in which two or more parties find themselves in a sit-
uation that could be represented by a bargaining game (or a cooperative game), and
in which these parties consult a ‘specialist’ or ‘mediator’ in order to help them solv-
ing their decision problem. Then, it might be reasonable to assume that they agree
to participate in some mechanism designed to assist them in their decision problem.
However, they might not be willing to commit themselves to actually implement the
outcome suggested by the mechanism. Or, there might not be an institution that could
enforce such a commitment (maybe due to non-verifiability).
These parties could be the different member states of the European Union and their
respective representatives within the Council, facing a decision on how to divide the
benefits and costs of a public project. Different (sub-)divisions within a firm with a
decentralized decision structure could face a decision on how to divide the benefits and
costs of a certain project. A married couple could face a divorce and thus a decision on
how to divide their belongings. Further examples include international environmental
agreements (e.g., the Kyoto Protocol), bilateral conflicts between countries through-
out the world, wage negotiations between a trade union and employers (of a certain
branch), and the (re-)consideration of a specific reform package which has to be ap-
proved by the German Bundestag and Bundesrat (in which different parties may have
different majorities).
The idea to express enforcement capabilities as a function of the coalitions can be
found, for example, (indirectly) in Gardenfors [13] and (directly in) Moulin and Peleg
[35]. Gardenfors defines a “rights-system” as a set of “rights” (satisfying certain con-
ditions) and a right “as a possibility for a group G of individuals to restrict the set of
1See also Hahmeier [15], Chapter 7 (on remarks and ideas for future research).
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social states to a subset X of S.” Similarly, Moulin and Peleg’s “effectivity function”,
a correspondence E (satisfying certain conditions) from the set of coalitions to the set
of subsets of the outcome space , “specifies for every coalition T of agents and subset B
of outcomes whether or not T is effective for B, i.e., can force the final decision within
B”.2 In other words, B ∈ E(T ) allows for the interpretation that coalition T can force
the outcome to be an element of B. An effectivity function (and also a rights-system),
however, differs conceptionally from our enforcement structure, which is a correspon-
dence from the set of coalitions to the outcome space, specifying, for each coalition,
the set of outcomes that this coalition is able to enforce. In particular, the concept of
an effectivity function is ‘richer’ than our concept of an enforcement structure in the
following sense. For every enforcement structure e, there exists an effectivity function
E which completely ‘reflects’ e. The converse is not true in general.3
In environments in which the outcome of a mechanism is not necessarily enforceable
by the designer, agents’ beliefs (conjectures/perceptions) about the future become im-
portant aspects of their decision-making. Our analysis is based on the assumption that
each agent has beliefs about what will happen if an outcome suggested by a mechanism
is not being implemented. As we will explain in more detail in Section 3.1, these beliefs
are in terms of preferences. In other words, our analysis is based on each agent’s ordinal
2Peleg [38] offers “an axiomatic approach for the investigation of rights by means of game forms.”
He “introduces a definition of constitution which is a generalization of Gardenfors’s definition of
rights system”, and shows “how a constitution leads in a natural way to an effectivity function which
describes the ‘distribution of power’ in a given society as a result of the assignment of rights . . .”.
Peleg analyses mechanisms (“game forms”) that “represent” a constitution in the sense that the
effectivity function associated with the mechanism (as introduced by Moulin and Peleg [35]) coincides
with the effectivity function corresponding to the constitution. Peleg and Winter [40] and Peleg,
Peters and Storcken [39] analyse “constitutional implementation”, i.e., the implementation of a social
choice correspondence by a mechanism (“game form”) in Nash Equilibrium such that the effectivity
functions, the one associated with the social choice correspondence and the one associated with the
mechanism (as introduced by Moulin and Peleg [35]), coincide. The effectivity function associated
with the social choice correspondence is interpreted as specifying or representing a constitution, e.g., in
the sense of Peleg [38]. In the words of Peleg and Winter, “. . . constitutional implementation roughly
requires that the implementing game form will induce the same distribution of power as that of the
implemented SCC, which we assume to be compatible with some pre-specified constitution.”
3Consider an outcome space X and a set of agents N ≡ {1, . . . , n}, n ∈ N. Given an enforcement
structure e : P(N)\{∅} ⇒ X, the effectivity function Ee : P(N)\{∅} ⇒ P(X)\{∅} defined by
Ee(S) := {X} ∪ {{x} | x ∈ e(S)} ∀ S ∈ P(N)\{∅, N}, Ee(N) := P(X)\{∅}, completely ’reflects’
enforcement structure e. On the other hand, an enforcement structure cannot ‘reflect’ an effectivity
function E satisfying {x1, x2} ∈ E(S) for some (x1, x2, S) ∈ X ×X × P(N)\{∅}.
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evaluation of the (unknown) future. Beliefs may differ from one agent to the other, and
even if agents have common beliefs on outcomes, these beliefs are solely beliefs and are
respected for in a different way than outcomes actually implemented by a mechanism.
Reconsidering our bargaining example, the two parties (individuals/firms/countries)
might share the (pessimistic) belief that, independent of the outcome suggested by the
mechanism, they will end up at the status quo if the suggested outcome is not being
implemented. Our assumption is that the decision of whether or not to implement the
suggested outcome is based on these beliefs once and for all. This implies, in particular,
that beliefs remain constant until an implementation decision is realized or contracted
upon in a binding manner.4
A main part of this paper, Chapter 3, is devoted to an analysis of the implementability
of (social) choice correspondences in environments with limited enforcement power,
our focus being on sufficient and necessary conditions for the implementation in Nash
Equilibrium, on an extension of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, and on a compar-
ison of these environments to their corresponding classical environments. In particular,
we show that no general implication on the implementability of a (social) choice corre-
spondence between a limited enforcement environment and its corresponding classical
environment can be drawn. Our discussion at the end of Chapter 3 will indicate to
what extent the implementation decision of the agents following a Nash Equilibrium of
a strategic mechanism can be ‘copied’ by a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium analy-
sis of this mechanism followed by an appropriate extensive decision procedure. Note,
however, that these two alternatives require different assumptions, in particular, on
the behaviour of the agents.
Chapter 4 is concerned with the notion of implementation that arises for classical en-
vironments in which the designer is able to impose an enforcement structure on the
agents and to influence their beliefs by specifying the outcome that will be realized in
case that the suggested outcome is not being implemented (by a coalition that is able
to do so). In environments with delegative enforcement power the designer can, in line
with classical implementation theory, force the agents to participate in one of a certain
set of mechanisms, and is able to enforce each of the feasible outcomes. In addition,
and in contrast to standard implementation theory, we now assume that the designer
is able to impose one of a certain set of enforcement and default structure assignments
(EDS assignments) on the agents, thereby capturing applications in which the stan-
dard analysis of strategic and extensive game forms does not reflect the enforcement
4Nonverifiable outcomes may have an equivalent which can be contracted upon in a binding manner.
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capabilities of the designer and the behaviour of the agents.
Consider, for example, a firm (with a centralized decision structure) in which several
(sub-)divisions find themselves in a situation that could be represented by a bargaining
(or a cooperative) game, e.g., resulting from a decision on how to divide the costs and
benefits of a certain project. If relevant information is dispersed among these divisions
and not known to the management, a mechanism designed to assist the management
in its decision process could impose an enforcement structure on the divisions.5
Besides briefly stating the simple counterparts of our sufficient and necessary conditions
from Chapter 3 to environments with delegative enforcement power, specific attention is
paid to (what we will refer to as) replica environments.6 If all possible EDS assignments
are available to the designer, the number of available assignments increases in the num-
ber of agents at an increasing rate. Our necessary condition for the implementability
of (social) choice correspondences in these environments is independent of any replica
agent, thereby reducing the maximum number of assignments that have to be checked.
Chapter 4’s final section compares environments with delegative enforcement power to
their corresponding classical environments with respect to the Nash-implementability
of (social) choice correspondences. In particular, we show that delegative enforcement
power can positively affect the Nash-implementability, and that even the availability of
all EDS assignments might not be sufficient for the Nash-implementability of a (social)
choice correspondence in environments in which all mechanisms arising from strategic
game forms are available to the designer.
In Chapter 5, as an application (referring to our example above), we discuss impli-
cations of limited enforcement power on the implementation of cooperative solution
concepts, i.e., on the question of whether or not there exists a mechanism that ‘imple-
ments’ a certain cooperative solution concept in a cooperative game situation the exact
characteristics of which are not known to the designer. Approaches to the implemen-
tation of cooperative solution concepts from the literature can be divided according
to whether they are based on a purely welfaristic outcome space or whether they re-
quire some addititional structure. We concentrate our analysis on one approach of
5Within the literature on contract theory/principal-agent analysis, several papers address the del-
egation/decentralization of decision-making authority (or contracting rights) in organizations, e.g.,
articles concerning the design of jobs in firms. See, for example, Aghion and Tirole [1], who develop
“a theory of the allocation of formal authority (the right to decide) and real authority (the effective
control over decisions) within organizations”.
6The idea to consider replicas, in the context of general equilibrium theory or cooperative games,
can be found, for example, in Debreu and Scarf [10], Shapley and Shubik [47], and in Wooders [57].
8 Introduction and Motivation
each group. Trockel’s [52] approach is based on traditional cooperative games that
specify the utility profiles available to each coalition, and belongs to the first group.
Dagan and Serrano [9] consider games explicitly specifying “physical outcomes” that
each coalition can achieve and that agents can evaluate according to some rational
preference relation (over these “physical outcomes”).7
Whereas Trockel’s approach leads to a rather positive result, which, in particular, has
positive implications for the implementability of the Nash Bargaining Solution concept
and (as we will show) of the Core concept, Dagan and Serrano come to a rather negative
result in the form of a necessary condition, which, in particular, and in contrast to the
Core concept, affects the implementability of the Nash Bargaining Solution concept.
Defining a set of single-valued solution concepts as the outcome space, Trockel’s ap-
proach placed in classical environments implies that the designer can enforce agents to
realize a single-valued solution concept without knowing the actual cooperative game
— an assumption which might not be an adequate description of many real-world sit-
uations. During our analysis in this part of the paper, we will approach the question
to what extent, i.e., for what assumptions on the structure of beliefs, Trockel’s positive
result and its implications extend to environments with limited enforcement power, in
which the designer has no enforcement power on solution concepts. The final section
of Chapter 5 is devoted to a discussion and an extension of Dagan and Serrano’s result
to environments with limited enforcement power.
The most recent research related to our paper is by Jackson and Palfrey [24a], who “fo-
cus on remedying a specific, but critical, weakness of implementation theory: its use of
implausible outcomes off the equilibrium path to enforce equilibrium behaviour and/or
to ‘break’ undesirable equilibria (i.e., assure that undesired strategy combinations are
not equilibria). The implausibility stems from the assumption that the outcome func-
tion is fully enforceable, which is not the case in many applications.”
Jackson and Palfrey (Section 2 and 3) extend Maskin’s results on sufficient and nec-
essary conditions for the implementation in Nash Equilibrium to an environment in
which the outcome of a mechanism is converted in a state-contingent way via some
commonly known “generalized reversion function” G, formally a function from states
and outcomes into outcomes. They also present examples showing that a generalized
7For a discussion of these two approaches and a third approach by Bergin and Duggan [6], who
“suppose that each coalition has some non-empty set . . . of conceivable joint plans of action” and
allow for the “feasibility” of a coalition’s joint plan to depend upon the joint plan of the remaining
players, see Hahmeier [15].
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reversion function can affect the Nash-implementability of a (social) choice correspon-
dence in both directions. Our concept of implementation is based on Jackson and
Palfrey’s [24a] notion of “G-Nash implementation”. As part of our analysis, we show
how their results extend to environments with limited enforcement power.
As a special case of a generalized reversion function, Jackson and Palfrey consider (the
consequences of) “voluntary implementation”, i.e., implementation in environments in
which each individual, after the mechanism has been played, is allowed to veto the
outcome suggested by the mechanism. In case of a veto, an exogeneous and com-
monly known state-contingent “reversion function” then determines the final outcome.
Jackson and Palfrey mention two possible generalizations of voluntary implementation
“within the framework of the G-function”: an outcome-contingent reversion function,
and (more general and) state-contingent “blocking coalitions” (e.g. “majority rule ap-
proval of the outcome of the mechanism”). The idea that each agent or, more general,
blocking coalitions (although not state-contingent blocking coalitions) are allowed to
veto the outcome suggested by the mechanism, finds its counterpart in our concept
of an enforcement structure (cf., in particular, our comments in Section 4.1). Jackson
and Palfrey suggest “natural applications” of voluntary implementation “to problems
in which there is a fixed status quo outcome that any agent can revert to.” An exam-
ple mentioned is that of exchange economies, where “it is often natural to assume that
each individual can protect their initial endowment.” However, after the mechanism
has suggested an outcome, each players’ only choice is to either accept the suggested
outcome or to veto and change to the outcome determined by the reversion function.
Their concept of voluntary implementation does not cover applications in which the
agents, at this stage of the mechanism, have more options available. And, since these
additional options might have an influence on each agent’s decisions in the mechanism,
they should be respected for in the analysis. In the case of an exchange economy, for
example, in which any exchange requires (and requires only) the agreement of all agents
participating in this exchange, the agents might, after the mechanism has suggested
an outcome and a veto has occured, still face the same situation as before, with the
same exchange possibilities.
In Section 4 of their paper, Jackson and Palfrey address this issue as follows: “If an
individual vetoes . . . it is unnatural to suppose that the world stops at that moment.
For example, in a pure exchange environment, if an agent vetoes . . . and the endow-
ment results, the individuals in the economy could simply play the mechanism again.”
Referring to “how game theorists have modeled bargaining”, Jackson and Palfrey point
out “that the notion of voluntary trade implies that if there are still gains to trade to be
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exploited, the agents involved will continue playing some game.” Jackson and Palfrey
“endogenize the generalized reversion function” by analysing a model that allows each
individual to either accept the outcome suggested by a strategic mechanism or to veto
and thereby forcing the mechanism to be replayed.8
Of course, Jackson and Palfrey’s reversion function could, in principle, be interpreted
in terms of beliefs about the future along our lines outlined above: the outcome de-
termined by the reversion function evaluated at a certain state represents the outcome
that, in this state, all agents believe to end up with, if the outcome suggested by the
mechanims is not being implemented by a coalition that is able to do so. However, this
interpretation entails three restrictive aspects. First of all, the agents are restricted to
have beliefs in terms of outcomes (which, for example, does not allow for probabilistic
beliefs in outcomes or discounting). Second, the agents are not allowed to have dif-
ferent beliefs. And third, the notion of implementation does not differentiate between
outcomes suggested by the mechanism on the one hand and outcomes interpreted as
common beliefs on the other hand.
Other papers that address issues related to our research include those already men-
tioned by Jackson and Palfrey [24a] (and Jackson [22]): Ma, Moore and Turnbull [25],
Maskin and Moore [27], and Jackson and Palfrey [23].
In the words of Jackson and Palfrey [24a], “Ma et al. . . . were the first to point out the
importance of imposing an individual rationality constraint both in and out of equi-
librium.” Ma, Moore and Turnbull analyse a one-principal–two-agents setting which
allows each agent to sign an enforceable contract on some production/payment sched-
ule with the principal or to refuse to sign the offered contract, in which case the agent
expects a certain reservation utility level.
Maskin and Moore use the following words: “Unfortunately, what happens out of
equilibrium can profoundly affect what outcomes can occur in equilibrium. In the ab-
sence of renegotiation, we might be able to sustain an outcome as an equilibrium by
threatening agents with dire consequences should any of them deviate. But if an agent
forecasts that those unfavourable consequences would ultimately be renegotiated, he
might no longer have sufficient incentive to conform.” Maskin and Moore examine im-
plementation in an environment in which the outcome of a mechanism is converted in a
8Jackson and Palfrey analyse “the game form where in a given period the mechanism is played,
then agents are called on to veto sequentially, and the process terminates . . . if there is no veto and
starts over in the next period if there is a veto” with respect to Markov Perfect Equilibria “where
agents do not veto when indifferent”.
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state-contingent way via some exogenous “renegotiation process” (formally a function
from states and outcomes into outcomes), which is assumed to be common knowledge,
Pareto-efficient, and individually rational (with respect to the mechanism’s outcome).9
In their Theorem 5, Maskin and Moore present an extension of Maskin’s results on suf-
ficient and necessary conditions for the implementation in Nash Equilibrium to their
environment. As Jackson and Palfrey [24a] already point out, Maskin and Moore’s
renegotiation function is an example of a generalized reversion function.
Jackson and Palfrey [23] examine implementation under endogenous individual ratio-
nality constraints by analysing a dynamic environment in which, in the first of a finite
number of discrete periods, “buyers and sellers are randomly matched into pairs and
then play a bargaining game”. Both the buyer and the seller can reject to trade at
the price suggested by the mechanism, in which case there is no trade and “each is
randomly rematched with a new potential trading partner in the next period”, except
for the last period. And, in the words of Jackson and Palfrey [23], “this places a natural
individual rationality, or voluntary participation, constraint on the process: no buyer
or seller will consummate a trade that leaves him or her worse off than the discounted
expected value of their future rematching in the market.”
The remainder of our paper starts with some definitions and results from the stan-
dard implementation literature in Chapter 2, and concludes with some remarks and
suggestions for future research in Chapter 6.10 A graphical illustration of the abstract
relationship between the different environments considered throughout this paper can
be found in Appendix K.
9Building on the work of Maskin and Moore, Segal and Whinston [46] provide a “first-order charac-
terization” of implementable social choice rules in specific two-agents environments with renegotiation,
“paralleling Mirrlees’s (1971) first-order analysis of standard mechanism design problems.” Segal and
Whinston do not constrain renegotiation to the set of possible outcomes of a mechanism. Agents
have “induced utilities over the pre-renegotiation outcome prescribed by the mechanism (taking the
renegotiation process into account).” It is in this freedom with respect to utility, that our approach is
more closely related to that by Segal and Whinston than to that by Maskin and Moore. Similarly in
this aspect, an article by Schwartz and Watson [45] “adds contracting and renegotiation costs to the
standard ‘mechanism design with ex post renegotiation’ model (Maskin and Moore, 1999; Segal and
Whinston, 2002).” For a critical assessment of Maskin and Moore’s model, see Watson [56]. Wat-
son studies “how renegotiation opportunities interact with the productive technology of contractual
relationships” and relates his research to Hurwicz [20] who, in the words of Watson, “speaks of the
importance of incorporating institutional constraints into design problems”.
10Note that our presentation of definitions and results in Section 2.1, 2.2, 5.1, 5.4.1, and 5.2.1 is
similar to that in Hahmeier [15].
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2 Implementation in Classical Environments
2.1 Definitions
Throughout, let Nk denote the set {1, . . . , k} ∀ k ∈ N := {1, 2, 3, . . .}, N0 := N ∪ {0}.
Throughout this chapter, let n ∈ N, n ≥ 2. The following definitions are standard.11
2.1.1 Games in Strategic Form
Definition An n-person game in normal form (or strategic form) is a tuple
(N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜i}i∈N), where
N := {1, . . . , n} is the set of players,
Si 6= ∅ is player i’s strategy/action set, and
u˜i : S1 × . . . × Sn → R is player i’s utility function, representing her rational
(i.e., complete and transitive) preference relation over the set of possible
strategy profiles.12
Note that each player i’s utility function is defined to have an ordinal interpretation.13
An n-person normal form game is said to be finite if its set of strategy profiles S :=
S1 × . . .× Sn contains only a finite number of elements.
For a strategic n-person game form (N, {Si}i∈N), we denote by Cnnfg({Si}i∈N) the set
of n-person normal form games that share game form (N, {Si}i∈N).
2.1.2 The Dominant Strategy Equilibrium Concept
Let Γ ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜i}i∈N) be an n-person normal form game.
Definition A strategy profile s ∈ S := S1 × . . .× Sn constitutes a Dominant Strategy
Equilibrium (DSE) of game Γ if, for every player i ∈ N , si is a dominant strategy for
player i, i.e., u˜i(si, sˆ−i) ≥ u˜i(sˆ) ∀ sˆ ∈ S.
Let DSEnnfg denote the DSE concept for the class of n-person normal form games, i.e.,
DSEnnfg(Γ) := {s ∈ S | s constitutes a DSE of game Γ}.
11See, for example, Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green [29], Osborne and Rubinstein [37], Jackson
[22], Moore [32], and Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m [28]. Note that our usage of the term ‘game form’ is not
in line with most of the literature, which requires an outcome function to be part of a game form.
12Note that, throughout this paper, we restrict our analysis to rational preference relations that
can be represented by a utility function. A rational preference relation is representable by a utility
function, for example, if it is continuous (e.g., if the relation is defined over some finite space).
13Since different utility functions can represent the same preference relation, we can identify two
different games in this respect.
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2.1.3 The Nash Equilibrium Concept
Definition A strategy profile s ∈ S constitutes a Nash Equilibrium (NE) of game Γ if,
for every player i ∈ N , si is a best response to s−i, i.e. u˜i(s) ≥ u˜i(sˆi, s−i) ∀ sˆi ∈ Si.14
Let NEnnfg denote the NE concept for the class of n-person normal form games, i.e.
NEnnfg(Γ) := {s ∈ S | s constitutes a NE of game Γ}.
2.1.4 Games in Extensive Form
In extensive form games, a set of histories H describes the possible sequences of players’
actions, satisfying the following properties:
(i) The initial history, denoted by ∅, is an element of H,
(ii) if (ak)k=1,...,K ∈ H, then (ak)k=1,...,L ∈ H ∀ L ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1},
(iii) if (ak)k∈N ∈ H, then (ak)k=1,...,L ∈ H ∀ L ∈ N, and
(iv) if (ak)k∈N satisfies (ak)k=1,...,L ∈ H ∀ L ∈ N, then (ak)k∈N ∈ H.
A history h ∈ H is said to be terminal in a set of histories H, if h 6= ∅ and either it
is an infinite sequence or it is a finite sequence h ≡ (ak)k=1,...,K and there is no history
(bk)k=1,...,K+1 in H such that a
k = bk ∀ k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
For a set of histories H, we let ZH denote the set of terminal histories in H and AH
denote the set of all possible actions in H.
Definition An n-person game in extensive form (with possible simultaneous moves) is
a tuple (N,H, p, {u˜i}i∈N), where
N := {1, . . . , n} is the set of players,
H is the set of histories (satisfying properties (i) to (iv)),
p : H\ZH ⇒ N is the player assignment, p(h) 6= ∅ denoting the set of players
who act simultaneously after history h for every h ∈ H\ZH , and
u˜i : ZH → R is player i’s utility function, representing her rational preference
relation over the set of terminal histories.
For an n-person extensive form game Γ ≡ (N,H, p, {u˜i}i∈N), player i’s strategy set is
SΓi := {si : Hi → AH | si(h) ∈ AiH(h) ∀ h ∈ Hi}, where Hi := {h ∈ H\ZH | i ∈ p(h)}
denotes the set of nonterminal histories after which player i has to move, and, for each
nonterminal history h ∈ H\ZH and each player i ∈ p(h), AiH(h) ⊆ AH denotes the set
of possible actions for player i after history h:
{ (ai)i∈p(h) ∈
∏
i∈p(h)
AH | (h, (ai)i∈p(h)) ∈ H } =
∏
i∈p(h)
AiH(h).
14In particular, each DSE of game Γ constitutes a NE of game Γ.
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Each strategy profile s ∈ SΓ := SΓ1 × . . .×SΓn determines a terminal history O(s) ∈ ZH
and a utility level u˜i(O(s)) for each player i.
Note that each player i’s utility function is defined to have an ordinal interpretation.
An n-person extensive form game is said to be finite if its set of histories contains only
a finite number of elements. An n-person extensive form game is a game with perfect
information if its player assignment is single-valued.
For an extensive n-person game form (with possible simultaneous moves) (N,H, p), we
denote by Cnefg(H, p) the set of n-person extensive form games that share game form
(N,H, p).
2.1.5 The Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium Concept
Let Γ ≡ (N,H, p, {u˜i}i∈N) be an n-person extensive form game.
The subgame of game Γ that follows history h ∈ H\ZH is the extensive form game
Γ(h) := (N,Hh, ph, {u˜hi }i∈N), where
Hh := {h′ | (h, h′) ∈ H},
ph : Hh\ZHh ⇒ N is defined by ph(h′) := p((h, h′)) ∀ h′ ∈ Hh\ZHh , and
u˜hi : ZHh → R is defined by u˜hi (h′) := u˜i((h, h′)) ∀ h′ ∈ ZHh .
Definition A strategy profile s ∈ SΓ ≡ SΓ1 × . . . × SΓn constitutes a Nash Equilib-
rium (NE) of game Γ if s constitutes a Nash Equilibrium of the normal form game
(N, {SΓi }i∈N , {ui}i∈N) (the strategic form of Γ), where, for each i ∈ N , ui : SΓ → R is
defined by ui(s) := u˜i(O(s)) ∀ s ∈ SΓ.
Definition A strategy profile s ∈ SΓ constitutes a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
(SPNE) of game Γ if, for every nonterminal history h ∈ H\ZH , the strategy profile
(sh1 , . . . , s
h
n) constitutes a NE of the subgame Γ(h), where, for each strategy si ∈ SΓi ,
shi denotes the strategy in game Γ(h) that is induced by si, i.e., that is defined by
shi (h
′) := si((h, h′)) ∀ h′ ∈ Hhi := {h′ ∈ Hh\ZHh | i ∈ ph(h′)}.
In the following, let SPNEn denote the SPNE concept for the class of n-person exten-
sive form games, i.e. SPNEn(Γ) := {s ∈ SΓ | s constitutes a SPNE of game Γ}.
2.1.6 Mechanisms
Let N := {1, . . . , n} be a set of agents, and let X be a nonempty set of outcomes.
Definition A strategic n-person mechanism for (N,X) is a tuple (N, {Si}i∈N , g), where
(N, {Si}i∈N) is a strategic n-person game form and g : S1×. . .×Sn → X is the outcome
function.
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Definition An extensive n-person mechanism (with posssible simultaneous moves) for
(N,X) is a tuple (N,H, p, g), where (N,H, p) is an extensive n-person game form and
g : ZH → X is the outcome function.
2.1.7 Classical Environments
Throughout this paper, we concentrate our analysis to environments with complete
information: in contrast to the designer, who is not informed about the actual state of
the environment, each agent knows the other agents’ preferences.15 The structure of
the environment is commonly known, i.e., known to both the designer and the agents.
For expositional purposes, we define all environments (with complete information) in
this paper via an explicit type structure. Our analysis, however, is solely based on the
respective state space.
Definition An n-person classical environment (with complete information) is a tuple
(N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {u′i}i∈N ,G), where
N := {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents,
X 6= ∅ is the set of feasible outcomes,
Θi is the set of possible types for agent i,
Θ ⊆ Θ1 × . . .×Θn is the set of possible type profiles / states, Θ 6= ∅,
u′i : X × Θ → R, u′i(·, θ) : X → R being agent i’s utility function over outcome
space X when the actual state of the environment is θ ∈ Θ, representing her
rational preference relation over X, and
G ≡ Gstrat ∪ Gext is a set of strategic and/or extensive mechanisms for (N,X).
Let E ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {u′i}i∈N ,G) denote a classical n-person environment.
Definition
The game induced by mechanism G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) ∈ Gstrat and state θ ∈ Θ in envi-
ronment E is the n-person normal form game ΓE,G,θ := (N, {Si}i∈N , {u′i(g(·), θ)}i∈N).
The game induced by mechanism G ≡ (N,H, p, g) ∈ Gext and state θ ∈ Θ in environ-
ment E is the n-person extensive form game ΓE,G,θ := (N,H, p, {u′i(g(·), θ)}i∈N).
2.1.8 Social Choice Correspondences
A (social) choice correspondence specifies, for each possible state of the environment,
the (socially) desirable outcomes for this state.
15For a survey on the implementation in environments with complete information, see, for example,
Moore [32] or Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m [28].
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Let E ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {u′i}i∈N ,G) be a classical n-person environment.
Definition A (social) choice correspondence (SCC) for environment E is a correspon-
dence α : Θ⇒ X satisfying α(θ) 6= ∅ ∀ θ ∈ Θ.16
2.1.9 Implementation
Let E ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {u′i}i∈N ,G) be a classical n-person environment, let α be a
(social) choice correspondence for E, and let EC ∈ {DSEnnfg, NEnnfg}.
Definition17
Mechanism G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) ∈ Gstrat EC-implements α in environment E
(i) strongly if, ∀ θ ∈ Θ, EC(ΓE,G,θ) 6= ∅ and g(EC(ΓE,G,θ)) ⊆ α(θ),
i.e., if in every possible state of the environment mechanism G induces the agents
to establish one of the desirable outcomes for this state assuming that the agents
play the game induced by G and θ in E according to equilibrium concept EC.
(ii) fully if, ∀ θ ∈ Θ, g(EC(ΓE,G,θ)) = α(θ),18
i.e., if mechanism G strongly EC-implements α in environment E and (if in
every state) each of the desirable outcomes is possible.
Mechanism G ≡ (N,H, p, g) ∈ Gext SPNEn-implements α in environment E
(i) strongly if, ∀ θ ∈ Θ, SPNEn(ΓE,G,θ) 6= ∅ and g(O(SPNEn(ΓE,G,θ))) ⊆ α(θ),
(ii) fully if, ∀ θ ∈ Θ, g(O(SPNEn(ΓE,G,θ))) = α(θ).
Let EC ∈ {DSEnnfg, NEnnfg, SPNEn}.
Definition (Social) choice correspondence α is strongly/fully EC-implementable in
environment E if there exists a mechanism G ∈ G that strongly/fully EC-implements
α in E.19
Note that if (social) choice correspondence α is fully EC-implementable in environment
E, then α(θ) = α(θ′) for all two states (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ × Θ which correspond to the same
preference profile over X, i.e., for each pair of states such that each agent has the same
preference relation over the set of feasible outcomes in both states.
16Note that, throughout this paper, we will sometimes treat a single-valued correspondence
f : A ⇒ B as a function, and f(a) as an element of B, and sometimes a function f : A → B as
a correspondence, and f(a) as a subset of B.
17The notation used in the literature to refer to different grades of implementation is not unique.
18Note that (i) is equivalent to (ii) if α is single-valued.
19Note that whether or not a mechanism implements a (social) choice function is independent of
any change in the agents’ utility functions which does not change the agents’ (ordinal) preferences.
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2.2 Conditions for the Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
Proposition 2.1 and 2.2 outline the necessary and the sufficient condition for full imple-
mentation of a (social) choice correspondence in Nash Equilibrium presented by Maskin
[26] (who considers preference relations and profiles instead of types, type profiles and
utility functions).20
Let E ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {u′i}i∈N ,G) be a classical n-person environment, and let α
be a SCC for environment E.
Definition SCC α is Maskin-monotonic in environment E if, for all (θ, θ′, x) ∈
Θ × Θ × X that satisfy x ∈ α(θ) and x 6∈ α(θ′), there is some agent i ∈ N and
some outcome x′ ∈ X such that u′i(x, θ) ≥ u′i(x′, θ) and u′i(x, θ′) < u′i(x′, θ′).21
Proposition 2.1 (Maskin [26]) If α is fully NEnnfg-implementable in environment
E, then α is Maskin-monotonic in E.
Sketch of the proof22
Let G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) ∈ G be a mechanism that fully NEnnfg-implements α in envi-
ronment E, and consider arbitrary (θ, θ′, x) ∈ Θ × Θ × X that satisfy x ∈ α(θ) and
x 6∈ α(θ′). Since G fully NEnnfg-implements α in E, there exists a strategy profile
s ∈ S1× . . .×Sn satisfying g(s) = x which is a Nash Equilibrium of the game induced
by mechanism G and type profile θ in environment E and which is not a Nash Equi-
librium of the game induced by G and θ′ in E.
Since s 6∈ NEnnfg(ΓE,G,θ′), there exists an i ∈ N and a strategy s′i ∈ Si such that
u′i(g(s
′
i, s−i), θ
′) > u′i(g(s), θ
′).
Since s ∈ NEnnfg(ΓE,G,θ), we have that u′i(g(s), θ) ≥ u′i(g(s′i, s−i), θ).
It remains to define x′ := g(s′i, s−i).
2
Definition SCC α satisfies no-veto-power in environment E if x ∈ α(θ) for all (x, θ) ∈
X ×Θ that satisfy ]{i ∈ N | u′i(x, θ) ≥ u′i(y, θ) ∀ y ∈ X} ≥ n− 1.
20Conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for the implementation in Nash Equilibrium
have been obtained, for example, by Moore and Repullo [33], Dutta and Sen [11] (only for the case of
two agents), and Sjo¨stro¨m [48].
21This is equivalent to the condition that x ∈ α(θ′) for all (x, θ, θ′) ∈ X×Θ×Θ that satisfy x ∈ α(θ)
and Li(x, θ) ⊆ Li(x, θ′) ∀ i ∈ N , where Li(x, θ) := {y ∈ X | u′i(x, θ) ≥ u′i(y, θ)} denotes agent i’s
lower contour set for outcome x ∈ X when the state of the environment is θ ∈ Θ.
22This sketch follows that of Osborne and Rubinstein [37] (who consider preference relations and
profiles instead of types, type profiles and utility functions).
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Proposition 2.2 (Maskin [26]) If G is the set of all strategic mechanisms for (N,X),
]N ≥ 3, and α is Maskin-monotonic and satisfies no-veto-power in environment E,
then α is fully NEnnfg-implementable in E.
Sketch of the proof23
Define the strategic n-person mechanism G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) as follows:
Define Si := {(ti, xi,mi) | ti ∈ Θ, xi ∈ X,mi ∈ N0} ∀ i ∈ N .
For all ((t1, x1,m1), . . . , (tn, xn,mn)) ∈ (Θ×X × N0)n that satisfy
∃ (j, θ, x,m) ∈ N ×Θ×X × N0 s.t.
x ∈ α(θ) and (ti, xi,mi) = (θ, x,m) ∀ i ∈ N\{j},
define
g((t1, x1,m1), . . . , (tn, xn,mn)) :=
 xj if u′j(x, θ) ≥ u′j(xj, θ)x otw. .
For all other ((t1, x1,m1), . . . , (tn, xn,mn)) ∈ (Θ×X × N0)n, define
g((t1, x1,m1), . . . , (tn, xn,mn)) := xk, where k ∈ N satisfies mk ≥ mi ∀ i ∈ N .
Then, mechanism G fully NEnnfg-implements α in environment E, i.e.
g(NEnnfg(Γ
E,G,θ)) = α(θ) ∀ θ ∈ Θ.
We briefly sketch the details in Appendix B.
2
2.3 The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem is due to Gibbard [14] and Satterthwaite [44].
Several versions and proofs of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem can be found in
the literature.24 The following (version and proof) is a mixture of elements from Mas-
Colell, Whinston, and Green [29] and Osborne and Rubinstein [37]. Our sketch of the
proof is divided into two parts by the use of the following lemma, the proof of which
can be found in Appendix A.
Lemma 2.3 Let n ∈ N, n ≥ 2, and let N denote the set N := {1, . . . , n}. Let X
be a set that contains at least three elements, let RX denote the set of all rational
preference relations over X having the property that no two distinct alternatives are
indifferent, and let P denote the set P := (RX)N . If f : P → X satisfies
23In the words of Maskin [26], “this elegant proof is due essentially to Repullo” [41] (who also
considers preference relations and profiles instead of types, type profiles and utility functions).
24For a discussion of different versions/proofs of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, see, for ex-
ample, Barbera` [5].
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(a) ∀ x ∈ X ∃ %∈ P s.t. f(%) = x and
(b) ∀ j ∈ N , f(%j,%−j) %j f(%′j,%−j) ∀ (%,%′j) ∈ P ×RX ,
then ∃ j ∈ N such that ∀ %∈ P we have that f(%) %j x′ ∀ x′ ∈ X.
Let E ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {u′i}i∈N ,G) be a classical n-person environment such that
X is finite,25 and let α be a single-valued SCC for environment E.
Proposition 2.3 (Gibbard [14] and Satterthwaite [44]) For all (i, θ) ∈ N × Θ,
let %(θ)i denote the rational preference relation over X induced by u′i(·, θ). For each
θ ∈ Θ, let %(θ) denote the preference profile (%(θ)1 , . . . ,%(θ)n ), and let RX denote the
set of all rational preference relations over X having the property that no two distinct
alternatives are indifferent. Suppose that
X contains at least three elements,
P := {%(θ)| θ ∈ Θ} = (RX)N ,
∀ x ∈ X ∃ θ ∈ Θ s.t. α(θ) = {x}, and that
α is fully (⇔ strongly) DSEnnfg-implementable in environment E.
Then, α is dictatorial, i.e., there exists an agent j ∈ N such that, ∀ θ ∈ Θ, u′j(α(θ), θ) ≥
u′j(x
′, θ) ∀ x′ ∈ X.
Sketch of the proof
Let β : P → X be defined by β(%) := α(θ) where θ ∈ Θ satisfies %=%(θ).26
(a) Consider an arbitrary x ∈ X. By assumption, there exists a θ ∈ Θ such that
α(θ) = {x}. Then, %(θ)∈ P satisfies β(%(θ)) = α(θ) = {x}. In other words, for
each x ∈ X, there exists a preference profile %∈ P such that β(%) = x.
(b) By assumption, there exists a mechanism G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) ∈ G which fully
DSEnnfg-implements α in E, i.e., g(DSE
n
nfg(Γ
E,G,θ)) = α(θ) ∀ θ ∈ Θ.
For each (i, θ) ∈ N ×Θ, let
Ai(θ) := {si ∈ Si | u′i(g(si, s′−i), θ) ≥ u′i(g(s′i, s′−i), θ) ∀ s′ ∈ S1 × . . .× Sn}
denote the set of dominant strategies for agent i in game ΓE,G,θ.
Note that Ai(θ) = Ai(θ
′) ∀ (i, θ′) ∈ N × Θ such that %(θ)i =%(θ
′)
i . And, since α
is fully DSEnnfg-implementable in E, we have that Ai(θ) 6= ∅ ∀ (i, θ) ∈ N ×Θ.
Consider an agent j ∈ N and (%,%′j) ∈ (RX)N ×RX . Since P = (RX)N , there
exists a tuple (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ × Θ such that %=%(θ) and (%′j,%−j) =%(θ′). Note
that, in particular, %(θ)i =%
(θ′)
i ∀ i ∈ N\{j}, and, therefore, Ai(θ) = Ai(θ′) ∀ i ∈
25Note that a finite outcome space X allows every rational preference relation over X to be repre-
sentable by a utility function.
26Remember that, since α is fully DSEnnfg-implementable in environment E, we have that α(θ) =
α(θ′) for all (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ×Θ which correspond to the same preference profile over X.
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N\{j}.
Let s∗i ∈ Ai(θ) ∀ i ∈ N and s′j ∈ Aj(θ′). Then, since s∗j ∈ Aj(θ) and s∗ ∈
DSEnnfg(Γ
E,G,θ) and (s′j, s
∗
−j) ∈ DSEnnfg(ΓE,G,θ′), we have that u′j(α(θ), θ) =
u′j(g(s
∗), θ) ≥ u′j(g(s′j, s∗−j), θ) = u′j(α(θ′), θ), which implies that β(%) = α(θ) %j
α(θ′) = β(%′j,%−j).
Therefore, ∀ j ∈ N , we have that β(%) %j β(%′j,%−j) ∀ (%,%′j) ∈ (RX)N×RX .
Lemma 2.3 now implies that there exists an agent j ∈ N such that ∀ %∈ (RX)N we
have that β(%) %j x′ ∀ x′ ∈ X.
Thus, ∀ θ ∈ Θ, we have that α(θ) = β(%(θ)) %(θ)j x′ ∀ x′ ∈ X, i.e. u′j(α(θ), θ) ≥
u′j(x
′, θ) ∀ x′ ∈ X. In other words, α is dictatorial.
2
3 Implementation in Environments with Limited
Enforcement Power
We consider a model for a setting that is characterized by the presence of n ∈ N, n ≥ 2,
agents (denoted by the numbers 1 to n), a designer (denoted by the number 0), and a
set of feasible outcomes X 6= ∅. We let N := {1, . . . , n} denote the set of agents, and
N+ := {0, . . . , n} the set that consists of all agents and the designer. Within a certain
(possibly infinite) time interval T , the agents and the designer can implement exactly
one element of the set of feasible outcomes X by performing in some joint course of
action. If no feasible outcome x ∈ X is implemented within this time interval, a specific
element of X prevails, which, in the following, will be denoted by x¯.
Consider, for example, the exchange economy (as mentioned in the introduction to
this paper) in which any exchange requires (and requires only) the agreement of all
agents participating in this exchange. The set of feasible outcomes might consist of all
those ‘consumption bundles’ that result from some possible reallocation or the initial
allocation, which will be ‘consumed’ if no reallocation can be agreed upon.
We assume that the designer can force the agents to participate in one of a certain set
of mechanisms, i.e., to behave according to its rules. In contrast to the assumptions
of the standard theory, however, we assume that the outcome space (and, therefore,
possibly the outcome function of a designated mechanism) is not fully enforceable by
the designer: the designer might be able to enforce some of the outcomes, but he is not
able to enforce all of the outcomes. Instead, certain groups of agents might be able to
enforce certain outcomes.
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We assume that the enforcement structure of the setting can be described by a cor-
respondence from the set of coalitions N+ := {S | S ⊆ N+, S 6= ∅} to the set of
outcomes X, specifying, for each coalition, the set of outcomes that this coalition is
able to enforce (e.g., by, in the case of more than one member, signing a binding agree-
ment/contract on the outcome or the corresponding joint course of action).
Definition An enforcement structure for (N,X) is a correspondence e : N+ ⇒ X that
satisfies e(N+) = X and the following two consistency requirements:
(1) If a coalition S ∈ N+ can enforce an outcome x ∈ X, then every super-coalition
S ′ ⊇ S can also enforce outcome x:
e(S ′) ⊇ e(S) ∀ S, S ′ ∈ N+, S ′ ⊇ S.
(2) There are no two disjoint coalitions S ∈ N+ and S ′ ∈ N+ such that coalition
S can enforce an outcome x ∈ X and coalition S ′ can enforce some distinct
outcome x′ ∈ X:
@ (S, S ′, x, x′) ∈ N+ ×N+ ×X ×X s.t.
S ∩ S ′ = ∅, x 6= x′, x ∈ e(S), x′ ∈ e(S ′).
For example, a setting in which the implementation of an outcome requires the consent
of a majority of agents could be described by the following enforcement structure:
Example The Majority Voting Enforcement Structure for (N,X) is defined by
e(S) =
 X if ](S ∩N) > n2∅ otw. ∀ S ∈ N+.
An enforcement structure describing the necessary consent of a higher percentage of
agents would be defined correspondingly.
Settings that can be modeled as a bargaining game could be described by the following
enforcement structure:
Example A Bargaining Game Enforcement Structure for (N,X) is a correspondence
e : N+ ⇒ X that satisfies
e(S) =

X if S = N or S = N+
∅ if S = {0}
{xˆ} otw.
∀ S ∈ N+
for some xˆ ∈ X.
And, settings that can be modeled as a cooperative game, or as an exchange or produc-
tion economy, in which every singleton coalition’s ‘possibility set’ consists of at least
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two ‘alternatives’, could be described by the following enforcement structure:
Example The Cooperative Game Enforcement Structure for (N,X) is defined by
e(S) =
 X if S = N or S = N+∅ otw. ∀ S ∈ N+.
The latter two examples will be re-considered in Chapter 5, which is concerned with
the implementation of cooperative solution concepts.
As already mentioned above, we assume that the grand coalition can enforce every
feasible outcome, i.e., e(N+) = X, and that the designer has limited enforcement
power : e({0}) 6= X. If there exists at least one element of the outcome space that
the designer is able to enforce, i.e., if e({0}) 6= ∅, then we say that the designer
has active enforcement power.27 If e({0}) = ∅, then there might exist a coalition
S ∈ N := {S | S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅} such that the group consisting of this coalition and the
designer is able to enforce more outcomes than this coalition can enforce by itself, i.e.,
such that e(S∪{0}) 6= e(S). And, depending on whether such a coalition exists or not,
we say that the designer has passive enforcement power or no enforcement power.28
In the following, we consider time interval T as divided into three parts.
In part one, the game induced by the mechanism and the type profile is played. Part
one results in an outcome x ∈ X suggested by the mechanism.
In part two, the agents consider the implementation of x. We assume that the designer
is committed to support the implementation of every suggested outcome whenever the
underlying enforcement structure allows him to do so. We use the tuples (x, 1) and
(x, 0) to denote the results that, ‘right after the mechanism has been played’, outcome
x is or is not being implemented, respectively.
If part two results in (x, 0), i.e., outcome x is suggested by the mechanism but is not
being implemented, the time remaining (part three) still offers the possibility for an
outcome to be implemented. We use the tuple (y, 2) to denote the result that outcome
y ∈ X\{x¯} is implemented in this part of the time interval. And, the tuple (x¯, 2)
denotes the result that outcome x¯ is implemented in this part of the time interval or
that outcome x¯ prevails since no other outcome is implemented within time interval T .
An illustration of the time schedule in tabular form can be found in Appendix J.
27Note that if there exists an outcome x ∈ X such that x ∈ e({0}), then our definition of an
enforcement structure requires e(S) ⊆ {x} ∀ S ∈ N .
28Note that the designer to have active or passive enforcement power places verifiability restrictions
on the set of outcomes.
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In Section 3.1, we define environments with limited enforcement power, and, based
on Maskin and Moore’s [27] notion of “implementation with renegotiation function h”
and Jackson and Palfrey’s [24a] notion of “G-Nash implementation”, the concept of
implementation in these environments (LE Implementation).
In Section 3.2, we present an important neccessary condition for the implementation
of (social) choice correspondences in environments with limited enforcement power.
Section 3.3 shows how Jackson and Palfrey’s results on sufficient and necessary condi-
tions for “G-Nash implementation” extend to our environments.
Our discussion in Section 3.4 extends the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem to environ-
ments with limited enforcement power. The assumption of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
Theorem that all preference profiles be possible has a somehow abstract counterpart
in our environments.
Section 3.5 contrasts environments with limited enforcement power to their correspond-
ing classical environments. In the case of weak pessimistic beliefs, i.e., all suggested
outcomes are implemented by a coalition that is able to do so, the implementability
of a (social) choice correspondence in an environment with limited enforcement power
implies the implementability of that correspondence in the corresponding classical en-
vironment, and vice versa. Jackson and Palfrey [24a] present examples showing that
there are voluntarily implementable (social) choice correspondences that are not Nash-
implementable, and vice versa. We consider minor and greater modified and adapted
versions of these examples to illustrate that, in the case of no weak pessimistic beliefs,
every combination of Nash-implementability/non-Nash-implementability of a (social)
choice correspondence in an environment with limited enforcement power compared to
its corresponding classical environment is possible.
In Section 3.6, we briefly discuss an extensive procedure for the implementation de-
cision of the agents. This procedure sequentially allows, after a strategic mechanism
has been played, each agent to either decide in favour or against the implementation of
the outcome suggested by the mechanism. In particular, we show that, if every agent
is not indifferent between a suggested outcome being implemented or not, and if the
enforcement structure is one of those discussed at the beginning of this chapter, then
the implementation decision of the agents following a Nash Equilibrium of a strategic
mechanism can be ‘copied’ by a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium analysis of this
mechanism followed by the extensive decision procedure. Note, however, that these
two alternatives require different assumptions, in particular, on the behaviour of the
agents.
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3.1 Definitions
3.1.1 Environments with Limited Enforcement Power
Definition An n-person environment with limited enforcement power is a tuple
(N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {ui}i∈N ,G, R, e), where
N := {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents,
X 6= ∅ is the set of feasible outcomes,
Θi is the set of possible types for agent i,
Θ ⊆ Θ1 × . . .×Θn is the set of possible type profiles / states, Θ 6= ∅,
ui : (X × {1}) ∪ (X × {0})×Θ→ R,
ui(·, θ) : (X × {1}) ∪ (X × {0}) → R being agent i’s utility function over
(X × {1}) ∪ (X × {0}) when the actual state of the environment is θ ∈ Θ,
representing her rational preference relation over (X ×{1})∪ (X ×{0}), and
satisfying Assumption 3.0 below,
G ≡ Gstrat ∪ Gext is a set of mechanisms for (N,X),
e : N+ ⇒ X is an enforcement structure for (N,X), satisfying
e({0}) 6= X, and
R : X ×Θ→ (X × {1}) ∪ (X × {0}) is the realization function, satisfying
R(x, θ) =

(x, 1) if ∃ S ∈ N+ s.t. x ∈ e(S) and
ui((x, 1), θ) ≥ ui((x, 0), θ) ∀ i ∈ S ∩N
(x, 0) otw.
on X ×Θ.
In environments with limited enforcement power, the agents’ utility functions represent
their rational preference relations over the realization space (X×{1})∪(X×{0}) based
on their beliefs about what will happen if an outcome suggested by a mechanism is not
being implemented by a coalition that is able to do so. To be more precise, we assume
that, for each agent i ∈ N and each state θ ∈ Θ, the ‘X × {0} part of ui(·, θ)’ can
be interpreted as reflecting agent i′s beliefs about what will happen if the suggested
outcome is not being implemented, based on (the knowledge of) his own and all other
agents’ preferences over X × {1} (represented by {ui(·, θ)|X×{1}}i∈N). Each agent i’s
type corresponds to her preferences over X × {1}:29
Assumption 3.0 The preference relation over X × {1} induced by ui(·, θ) equals the
preference relation over X × {1} induced by ui(·, θ′) for all (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ×Θ s.t. θi = θ′i.
29In our definition above, an explicit type structure is introduced for expositional purposes only.
This includes, in particular, Assumption 3.0.
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In environments with limited enforcement power, the outcome suggested by a mecha-
nism is ‘transformed’ in a state-contingent way via realization function R. Although
this function determines only whether or not the suggested outcome is realized, and
does not describe a possible change from a suggested to a different final outcome, it is
similar, in spirit, to Jackson and Palfrey’s [24a] “generalized reversion function” and
Maskin and Moore’s [27] “renegotiation function”.
An outcome suggested by a mechanism is implemented, or realized, if and only if there
exists a coalition S which is able to enforce this outcome and all agents in this coalition
weakly prefer its realization to its non-realization, i.e., all agents believe that its non-
realization is no better than its realization. Note that, given utility functions {ui}i∈N ,
realization function R is completely determined by enforcement structure e.
Sometimes, in the remainder of this paper, we will restrict our analysis to environments
in which agents’ utilities on X ×{0} can be justified by assuming that they have non-
probabilistic beliefs in certain outcomes (and that they do not discount the future):
If ui((x, 0), θ) = ui((bi1((x, 0), θ), 1), θ) ∀ (i, θ, x) ∈ N × Θ × X for some family of
functions {bi}i∈N , bi : (X × {0})× Θ → X × {2} ∀ i ∈ N ,30 then we say that agents’
beliefs can be justified by prediction functions {bi}i∈N for (X,Θ).
A prediction function bi for agent i specifies, for each possible non-realization case,
her prediction for the final outcome. Prediction function bi is outcome-independent, if
agent i’s prediction is independent of the outcome suggested by the mechanism, i.e., if
bi((x, 0), θ) = bi((x
′, 0), θ) ∀ (x, x′, θ) ∈ X ×X ×Θ.
We say that agents have pessimistic beliefs in environment E if, ∀ i ∈ N , ui((x, 1), θ) ≥
ui((x, 0), θ) ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X×Θ. Agents have weak pessimistic beliefs in environment E if
R(x, θ) = (x, 1) ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X ×Θ, i.e., if, in each possible state, agents are ‘sufficiently
pessimistic’ in the sense that for each feasible outcome there exists a coalition that is
able and willing to implement this outcome.
3.1.2 Corresponding Classical Environments
For every n-person environment with limited enforcement power
E ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {ui}i∈N ,G, R, e),
there exists exactly one classical n-person environment
EC ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {u′i}i∈N ,G)
30I.e., if, in each state θ, each agent i’s utility level from an outcome x being suggested and not
being implemented equals her utility level from the corresponding predicted outcome as being realized
in the second part of the time interval.
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which shares the same outcome space, state space, and mechanism space, and which
satisfies u′i(x, θ) = ui((x, 1), θ) ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X ×Θ. We refer to this classical environment
as environment E’s corresponding classical environment.31
3.1.3 Abstract Environments with State-contingent Mechanisms
Let N ≡ {1, . . . , n} be a set of agents, let X be a nonempty set of outcomes, and let
Θ be a nonempty set of states (that correspond to profiles of preferences over X).
Definition An abstract strategic n-person state-contingent mechanism for (N,X,Θ)
is a tuple (N, {Si}i∈N , g), where (N, {Si}i∈N) is a strategic n-person game form and
g : S1 × . . .× Sn ×Θ→ X is the state-contingent outcome function.
Definition An abstract extensive n-person state-contingent mechanism (with possible
simultaneous moves) for (N,X,Θ) is a tuple (N,H, p, g), where (N,H, p) is an exten-
sive n-person game form and g : ZH×Θ→ X is the state-contingent outcome function.
Definition An abstract n-person environment with state-contingent mechanisms is a
tuple (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {u′i}i∈N ,G), where N , X, {Θi}i∈N , Θ, and {u′i}i∈N are as in
classical environments, and G ≡ Gstrat∪Gext is a set of strategic and/or extensive state-
contingent mechanisms for (N,X,Θ).
Let E ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {u′i}i∈N ,G) be an abstract n-person environment with
state-contingent mechanisms, let α be a (social) choice correspondence for environ-
ment E (as defined for classical environments), and let EC ∈ {DSEnnfg, NEnnfg}.
Definition
The game induced by mechanism G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) ∈ Gstrat and state θ ∈ Θ in envi-
ronment E is the n-person normal form game ΓE,G,θ := (N, {Si}i∈N , {u′i(g(·, θ), θ)}i∈N).
The game induced by mechanism G ≡ (N,H, p, g) ∈ Gext and state θ ∈ Θ in environ-
ment E is the n-person extensive form game ΓE,G,θ := (N,H, p, {u′i(g(·, θ), θ)}i∈N).
Definition
Mechanism G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) ∈ Gstrat EC-implements α in E
(i) strongly if, ∀ θ ∈ Θ, EC(ΓE,G,θ) 6= ∅ and g(EC(ΓE,G,θ), θ) ⊆ α(θ).
(ii) fully if, ∀ θ ∈ Θ, g(EC(ΓE,G,θ), θ) = α(θ).
Mechanism G ≡ (N,H, p, g) ∈ Gext SPNEn-implements α in E
(i) strongly if, ∀ θ ∈ Θ, SPNEn(ΓE,G,θ) 6= ∅ and g(O(SPNEn(ΓE,G,θ)), θ) ⊆ α(θ).
(ii) fully if, ∀ θ ∈ Θ, g(O(SPNEn(ΓE,G,θ)), θ) = α(θ).
31Remember our graphical illustration of the different environments’ relationship in Appendix K.
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3.1.4 LE Implementation
Let E ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {ui}i∈N ,G, R, e) be an n-person environment with limited
enforcement power.
Definition A (social) choice correspondence (SCC) for environment E is a correspon-
dence α : Θ⇒ X satisfying α(θ) 6= ∅ ∀ θ ∈ Θ.
Let α be a (social) choice correspondence for environment E.
Let ∗ denote the function from the set of mechanims for (N,X) to the set of state-
contingent mechanisms for (N, (X × {1}) ∪ (X × {0}),Θ) defined by
(N, {Si}i∈N , g)∗ := (N, {Si}i∈N , g∗), g∗(s, θ) := R(g(s), θ) ∀ (s, θ) ∈ S ×Θ, and
(N,H, p, g)∗ := (N,H, p, g∗), g∗(h, θ) := R(g(h), θ) ∀ (h, θ) ∈ ZH ×Θ.
Let E∗ denote the abstract n-person environment with state-contingent mechanisms
E∗ := (N, (X × {1}) ∪ (X × {0}), {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {ui}i∈N ,G∗),
and let α∗ : Θ⇒ (X × {1}) ∪ (X × {0}) denote the SCC for E∗ defined by
α∗(θ) := {(x, 1) | x ∈ α(θ)} ∀ θ ∈ Θ.
Let EC ∈ {DSEnnfg, NEnnfg}.
Definition
Mechanism G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) ∈ Gstrat EC-implements α in environment E
(i) strongly, if mechanism G∗ strongly EC-implements α∗ in E∗, i.e., if, ∀ θ ∈ Θ,
EC(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ) 6= ∅ and
R(g(EC(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ)), θ) = g∗(EC(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ), θ) ⊆ α∗(θ) = {(x, 1) | x ∈ α(θ)},
(ii) fully, if mechanism G∗ fully EC-implements α∗ in E∗, i.e., if, ∀ θ ∈ Θ,
R(g(EC(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ)), θ) = g∗(EC(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ), θ) = α∗(θ) = {(x, 1) | x ∈ α(θ)},
where ΓE
∗,G∗,θ ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui(R(g(·), θ), θ)}i∈N) denotes the game induced by
mechanism G∗ and type profile θ in environment E∗.
Definition
Mechanism G ≡ (N,H, p, g) ∈ Gext SPNEn-implements α in environment E
(i) strongly, if mechanismG∗ strongly SPNEn-implements α∗ in E∗, i.e. if, ∀ θ ∈ Θ,
SPNEn(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ) 6= ∅ and
R(g(O(SPNEn(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ))), θ) = g∗(O(SPNEn(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ)), θ) ⊆ α∗(θ),
(ii) fully, if mechanism G∗ fully SPNEn-implements α∗ in E∗, i.e., if, ∀ θ ∈ Θ,
R(g(O(SPNEn(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ))), θ) = g∗(O(SPNEn(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ)), θ) = α∗(θ),
where ΓE
∗,G∗,θ ≡ (N,H, p, {ui(R(g(·), θ), θ)}i∈N) denotes the game induced by mecha-
nism G∗ and type profile θ in environment E∗.
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Note that a strategic mechanism G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) ∈ Gstrat fully EC-implements α
in E’s corresponding classical environment EC , if, ∀ θ ∈ Θ, g(EC(ΓEC ,G,θ)) = α(θ),
where ΓE
C ,G,θ ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui((g(·), 1), θ)}i∈N).
An extensive mechanism G ≡ (N,H, p, g) ∈ Gext fully SPNEn-implements α in E’s
corresponding classical environment EC , if, ∀ θ ∈ Θ, g(O(SPNEn(ΓEC ,G,θ))) = α(θ),
where ΓE
C ,G,θ ≡ (N,H, p, {ui((g(·), 1), θ)}i∈N).
Let EC ∈ {DSEnnfg, NEnnfg, SPNEn}.
Definition SCC α is strongly/fully EC-implementable in environment E if there ex-
ists a mechanism G ∈ G that strongly/fully EC-implements α in E.
Note that, according to our definition of LE implementation, any change in the en-
forcement structure which does not change the realization function will not affect the
implementability of a SCC. In particular, any change in the passive enforcement power
of the designer will not affect the implementability of a SCC.
3.2 A Necessary Condition: Consistency
Let E ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {ui}i∈N ,G, R, e) be an n-person environment with limited
enforcement power, and let α be a SCC for environment E.
Definition SCC α is consistent with (realization function R in) environment E if,
∀ (θ, x) ∈ Θ×X s.t. x ∈ α(θ), we have that R(x, θ) = (x, 1).
The following proposition formalizes a necessary condition which is an immediate con-
sequence of our notion of implementation in environments with limited enforcement
power. Let EC ∈ {DSEnnfg, NEnnfg, SPNEn}.
Proposition 3.1 If α is fully EC-implementable in environment E, then α is consis-
tent with (realization function R in) environment E.
Proof
Let G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) ∈ Gstrat be a mechanism that fully EC-implements α in envi-
ronment E (EC ∈ {DSEnnfg, NEnnfg}). The proof for the case G ∈ Gext is analogous.
Consider an arbitrary tuple (θ, x) ∈ Θ×X such that x ∈ α(θ).
Since, by definition, mechanism G∗ fully EC-implements α∗ in environment E∗, there
exists an EC-Equilibrium s ∈ S1 × . . . × Sn of the game induced by G∗ and θ in E∗
that satisfies g∗(s, θ) = R(g(s), θ) = (x, 1). Since R(g(s), θ) ∈ {(g(s), 1), (g(s), 0)}, the
preceding implies that g(s) = x and R(x, θ) = (x, 1).
2
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Remark 3.1 Suppose that e is the cooperative game enforcement structure for (N,X).
If α is fully EC-implementable in environment E, then, in each state θ ∈ Θ, each agent
i’s beliefs are such that he weakly prefers the realization of any desirable outcome to
its non-realization, i.e., ui((x, 1), θ) ≥ ui((x, 0), θ) ∀ (i, x) ∈ N × α(θ).
3.3 Conditions for the Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
Our concept of LE Implementation extends to the following abstract environments.
Definition An abstract n-person environment with an unrestricted realization function
is a tuple (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {ui}i∈N ,G, R), where N , X, {Θi}i∈N , Θ, {ui}i∈N , and G
are as in environments with limited enforcement power, not necessarily satisfying As-
sumption 3.0, and R is a function from X ×Θ to (X × {1}) ∪ (X × {0}).
Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3 provide a necessary and a sufficient condition for full Nash-
implementation in these abstract environments, respectively. They follow from the
logic of Maskin’s [26] conditions, and are extensions of two theorems established by
Jackson and Palfrey [24a, 24b] (Theorem 1 and 2), which cover the (from an interpre-
tative point of view) special case R(X × Θ) ⊆ X × {1}.32 Both theorems and their
proofs carry over to our abstract environments.
Let E ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {ui}i∈N ,G, R) be an abstract n-person environment with
an unrestricted realization function, and let α be a SCC for environment E.
Lemma 3.2 If α is fully NEnnfg-implementable in environment E, then, ∀ (θ, x) ∈
Θ ×X s.t. x ∈ α(θ), there exists an outcome x′ ∈ X which satisfies R(x′, θ) = (x, 1)
and the following condition:
∀ θ′ ∈ Θ s.t. R(x′, θ′) 6∈ α(θ′)× {1} there exists a tuple (i, y) ∈ N ×X s.t.
ui(R(y, θ
′), θ′) > ui(R(x′, θ′), θ′) and ui(R(y, θ), θ) ≤ ui(R(x′, θ), θ).
Proof
Let G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) ∈ G be a mechanism that fully NEnnfg-implements α in envi-
ronment E, and consider arbitrary (θ, x) ∈ Θ×X that satisfy x ∈ α(θ).
32Remember that Jackson and Palfrey do not consider an ‘extended outcome space’ as we do in
environments with limited enforcement power (and thus in abstract environments with an unrestricted
realization function). From a purely mathematical point of view, Lemma 3.2 could be seen as a special
case / as an implication of Jackson and Palfrey’s Theorem 1, if we consider their set of feasible outcomes
A to be the set (X × {0}) ∪ (X × {1}) and focus on those mechanisms whose image lies in X × {1}.
This perspective leaves open the question for an interpretation of their generalized reversion function,
which in this case is a function G : (X × {0}) ∪ (X × {1})×Θ→ (X × {0}) ∪ (X × {1}).
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Since G fully NEnnfg-implements α in E, we have that R(g(NE
n
nfg(Γ
E∗,G∗,θ)), θ) =
{(y, 1) | y ∈ α(θ)}. Thus, there exists a Nash Equilibrium a ∈ S1 × . . . × Sn of the
game induced by G∗ and θ in E∗ that satisfies R(g(a), θ) = (x, 1).
Defining x′ := g(a) ∈ X, we have that R(x′, θ) = (x, 1).
Also, since strategy profile a is a Nash Equilibrium of the game induced by G∗ and θ
in E∗, we have that, ∀ i ∈ N , ui(R(g(a′i, a−i), θ), θ) ≤ ui(R(g(a), θ), θ) ∀ a′i ∈ Si.
Consider now an arbitrary θ′ ∈ Θ s.t. R(x′, θ′) 6∈ α(θ′)×{1}. Then, strategy profile a is
not a Nash Equilibrium of the game induced by G∗ and θ′ in E∗: a ∈ NEnnfg(ΓE∗,G∗,θ′)
would imply R(g(a), θ′) = R(x′, θ′) ∈ α(θ′) × {1}, a contradiction. Thus, there exists
an i ∈ N and a strategy a′i ∈ Si s.t. ui(R(g(a′i, a−i), θ′), θ′) > ui(R(g(a), θ′), θ′), and it
remains to define y := g(a′i, a−i).
2
Lemma 3.3 If G is the set of all strategic mechanisms for (N,X), ]N ≥ 3, and α
satisfies
(i) ∀ (θ, x) ∈ Θ×X s.t. x ∈ α(θ), there exists an outcome x′ ∈ X which satisfies
R(x′, θ) = (x, 1) and the condition of Lemma 3.2,
(ii) R(x, θ) ∈ α(θ)× {1} ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X ×Θ that satisfy
]{i ∈ N | ui(R(x, θ), θ) ≥ ui(R(y, θ), θ) ∀ y ∈ X} ≥ n− 1,
then α is fully NEnnfg-implementable in environment E.
Proof
Consider the strategic n-person mechanism G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) defined as follows.
Define Si := {(ti, xi,mi) | ti ∈ Θ, xi ∈ X,mi ∈ N0} ∀ i ∈ N .
For all ((t1, x1,m1), . . . , (tn, xn,mn)) ∈ (Θ×X × N0)n that satisfy
∃ (j, θ, x,m) ∈ N ×Θ×X × N0 s.t.
R(x, θ) ∈ α(θ)× {1} and
(ti, xi,mi) = (θ, x,m) ∀ i ∈ N\{j} and
∀ θ′ ∈ Θ s.t. R(x, θ′) 6∈ α(θ′)× {1} ∃ (i, y) ∈ N ×X s.t.
ui(R(x, θ), θ) ≥ ui(R(y, θ), θ) and ui(R(x, θ′), θ′) < ui(R(y, θ′), θ′),
define g((t1, x1,m1), . . . , (tn, xn,mn)) :=
 xj if uj(R(x, θ), θ) ≥ uj(R(xj, θ), θ)x otw. .33
For all other ((t1, x1,m1), . . . , (tn, xn,mn)) ∈ (Θ×X × N0)n, define
g((t1, x1,m1), . . . , (tn, xn,mn)) := xk, where k ∈ N satisfies mk ≥ mi ∀ i ∈ N .
33Jackson and Palfrey require the (stronger) condition (ti, xi,mi) = (θ, x, 0) ∀ i ∈ N\{j}. The
remainder of our proof covers both alternatives.
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Then, mechanism G fully NEnnfg-implements α in environment E, i.e.,
R(g(NEnnfg(Γ
E∗,G∗,θ)), θ) = {(y, 1) | y ∈ α(θ)} ∀ θ ∈ Θ.
The details can be found in Appendix B.
2
Proposition 3.2 and 3.3 summarize the implications of the preceding lemmas for en-
vironments with limited enforcement power, i.e., for environments with realization
functions that, in particular, satisfy R(x, θ) ∈ {(x, 1), (x, 0)} ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X × Θ. We
give a different proof for Proposition 3.3 in Appendix B, showing that it can be proven
directly by using a mechanism that is less complex in a certain way.34
Let E ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {ui}i∈N ,G, R, e) be an n-person environment with limited
enforcement power, and let α be a SCC for environment E.
Proposition 3.2 (Necessary condition for full implementation in Nash Equilibrium)
If α is fully NEnnfg-implementable in environment E, then ∀ (θ, θ′, x) ∈ Θ × Θ × X
satisfying x ∈ α(θ) and R(x, θ′) 6∈ α(θ′)×{1},35 there exists a tuple (i, y) ∈ N ×X s.t.
ui(R(y, θ
′), θ′) > ui(R(x, θ′), θ′) and ui(R(y, θ), θ) ≤ ui(R(x, θ), θ).
Proof
By Lemma 3.2, ∀ (θ, x) ∈ Θ×X s.t. x ∈ α(θ), there exists an outcome x′ ∈ X which
satisfies R(x′, θ) = (x, 1) and the condition of Lemma 3.2.
Since R(y, θ) ∈ {(y, 1), (y, 0)} ∀ (y, θ) ∈ X × Θ, the only outcome x′ ∈ X which can
satisfy R(x′, θ) = (x, 1) is outcome x itself.
Thus, ∀ (θ, x) ∈ Θ×X s.t. x ∈ α(θ), we have that R(x, θ) = (x, 1) and that ∀ θ′ ∈ Θ
s.t. R(x, θ′) 6∈ α(θ′) × {1} there exists a tuple (i, y) ∈ N × X s.t. ui(R(y, θ′), θ′) >
ui(R(x, θ
′), θ′) and ui(R(y, θ), θ) ≤ ui(R(x, θ), θ).
2
Remark 3.2 SCC α satisfies the necessary condition of Proposition 3.2 if and only if
α satisfies the following condition:
SCC α is consistent with realization function R in environment E, and ∀ (θ, θ′, x) ∈
Θ × Θ × X such that θ 6= θ′ and x ∈ α(θ) and R(x, θ′) 6∈ α(θ′) × {1}, there exists a
tuple (i, y) ∈ N ×X s.t.
ui(R(y, θ
′), θ′) > ui(R(x, θ′), θ′) and ui(R(y, θ), θ) ≤ ui(R(x, θ), θ).
34Our proof for Proposition 3.3 is, in fact, similar to Jackson and Palfrey’s [24a] first proof of their
sufficient condition for “G-Nash implementation” (which is corrected in Jackson and Palfrey [24b]).
35And, in particular, ∀ (θ, θ′, x) s.t. x ∈ α(θ) and x 6∈ α(θ′).
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Proposition 3.3 (Sufficient condition for full implementation in Nash Equilibrium)
If G is the set of all strategic mechanisms for (N,X), ]N ≥ 3, and α satisfies
(i) the necessary condition of Proposition 3.2, and
(ii) R(x, θ) ∈ α(θ)× {1} ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X ×Θ that satisfy
]{i ∈ N | ui(R(x, θ), θ) ≥ ui(R(y, θ), θ) ∀ y ∈ X} ≥ n− 1,
then α is fully NEnnfg-implementable in environment E.
Proof
To see that α satisfies (i) of Lemma 3.3, consider arbitrary (θ, x) ∈ Θ×X s.t. x ∈ α(θ).
We show that x′ := x satisfies R(x′, θ) = (x, 1) and the condition of Lemma 3.2.
First, assume that R(x, θ) 6= (x, 1), i.e., R(x, θ) = (x, 0).
Then, in particular, R(x, θ) 6∈ α(θ) × {1}, and, by assumption, ∃ (i, y) ∈ N × X s.t.
ui(R(y, θ), θ) > ui(R(x, θ), θ) and ui(R(y, θ), θ) ≤ ui(R(x, θ), θ), a contradiction.
Also, by assumption, ∀ θ′ ∈ Θ s.t. R(x, θ′) 6∈ α(θ′)× {1}, ∃ (i, y) ∈ N ×X s.t.
ui(R(y, θ
′), θ′) > ui(R(x, θ′), θ′) and ui(R(y, θ), θ) ≤ ui(R(x, θ), θ).
2
Remark 3.3 Proposition 3.3(ii) is equivalent to the following condition
(ii)’ (a) x ∈ α(θ) ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X ×Θ that satisfy R(x, θ) = (x, 1) and
]{i ∈ N | ui((x, 1), θ) ≥ ui(R(y, θ), θ) ∀ y ∈ X} ≥ n− 1,
(b) there does not exist a tuple (x, θ) ∈ X ×Θ such that
R(x, θ) = (x, 0) and ]{i ∈ N | ui((x, 0), θ) ≥ ui(R(y, θ), θ) ∀ y ∈ X} ≥ n−1.
For environments in which agents have weak pessimistic beliefs, the preceding propo-
sitions imply that Maskin-monotonicity is a necessary condition and that Maskin-
monotonicity together with no-veto-power is a sufficient condition for full implementa-
tion in Nash Equilibrium:
Corollary 3.2 Suppose that agents have weak pessimistic beliefs in environment E.
If α is fully NEnnfg-implementable in environment E, then, ∀ (θ, θ′, x) ∈ Θ × Θ × X
s.t. x ∈ α(θ) and x 6∈ α(θ′), there exists a tuple (i, y) ∈ N ×X such that
ui((y, 1), θ
′) > ui((x, 1), θ′) and ui((y, 1), θ) ≤ ui((x, 1), θ).
Corollary 3.3 Suppose that agents have weak pessimistic beliefs in environment E.
If G is the set of all strategic mechanisms for (N,X), ]N ≥ 3, and α satisfies
(i) the necessary condition of Corollary 3.2, and
(ii) x ∈ α(θ) for all (x, θ) ∈ X ×Θ that satisfy
]{i ∈ N | ui((x, 1), θ) ≥ ui((y, 1), θ) ∀ y ∈ X} ≥ n− 1,
then α is fully NEnnfg-implementable in environment E.
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3.4 Gibbard-Satterthwaite in Environments with Limited En-
forcement Power
Proposition 3.4 extends the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem outlined in Section 2.3 to
environments with limited enforcement power.
The assumption of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem that all preference profiles be
possible has a somehow abstract counterpart in our environments. To be more precise,
the preference relations over outcome space X that have to satisfy the respective as-
sumption in environments with limited enforcement power are those induced by utility
functions ui(R(·, θ), θ) : X → R.
Furthermore, in our extension to environments with limited enforcement power, an ad-
ditional assumption has to be made explicit. As already mentioned at the end of Para-
graph 2.1.9, in a classical environment E ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {u′i}i∈N ,G), a (social)
choice correspondence α (for E) which is DSEnnfg-implementable in environment E has
to satisfy the following condition: α(θ) = α(θ′) for all two states (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ×Θ which
correspond to the same preference profile over X, i.e., for each pair of states such that
each agent has the same preference relation over the set of feasible outcomes in both
states. In environments with limited enforcement power, the corresponding implication
is not necessarily satisfied. To see this, consider an environment with limited enforce-
ment power E ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {ui}i∈N ,G, R, e) and two states (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ×Θ such
that, for every agent i ∈ N , the preference relation over X induced by ui(R(·, θ), θ)
equals that induced by ui(R(·, θ′), θ′). If G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) ∈ G denotes a mecha-
nism that fully DSEnnfg-implements a SCC α (for E) in environment E, then we have
that S∗ := DSEnnfg(Γ
E∗,G∗,θ) = DSEnnfg(Γ
E∗,G∗,θ′) and R(g(S∗), θ) = α(θ) × {1} and
R(g(S∗), θ′) = α(θ′)×{1}. However, this does not necessarily imply that R(g(S∗), θ) =
R(g(S∗), θ′), which in turn would imply that α(θ) = α(θ′). In our extension of the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, we explictly assume that α(θ) = α(θ′).
Note, however, that in the special case of weak pessimistic beliefs our assumptions
become an intuitive reflection of those in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem. Our
proof of Proposition 3.4 follows the lines of Section 2.3.
Let E ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {ui}i∈N ,G, R, e) be an n-person environment with limited
enforcement power such that X is finite, and let α be a single-valued (social) choice
correspondence for environment E. For all (i, θ) ∈ N ×Θ, let %(θ)i denote the rational
preference relation over X induced by ui(R(·, θ), θ). For each θ ∈ Θ, let %(θ) denote the
preference profile (%(θ)1 , . . . ,%
(θ)
n ), and let RX denote the set of all rational preference
relations over X having the property that no two distinct alternatives are indifferent.
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Proposition 3.4 Suppose that
X contains at least three elements,
P := {%(θ)| θ ∈ Θ} = (RX)N ,
∀ x ∈ X ∃ θ ∈ Θ s.t. α(θ) = {x},
α is fully DSEnnfg-implementable in environment E, and that
α(θ) = α(θ′) ∀ (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ×Θ such that %(θ)=%(θ′).
Then ∃ j ∈ N such that, ∀ θ ∈ Θ, uj((α(θ), 1), θ) ≥ uj(R(x′, θ), θ) ∀ x′ ∈ X.
Proof
Let β : P → X be defined by β(%) := α(θ) where θ ∈ Θ satisfies %=%(θ).
(a) Consider an arbitrary x ∈ X. By assumption, there exists a θ ∈ Θ such that
α(θ) = {x}. Then, %(θ)∈ P satisfies β(%(θ)) = α(θ) = {x}.
In other words, ∀ x ∈ X, there exists a profile %∈ P such that β(%) = x.
(b) By assumption, there exists a mechanism G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) ∈ G which fully
DSEnnfg-implements α in environment E, i.e.
R(g(DSEnnfg(Γ
E∗,G∗,θ)), θ) = (α(θ), 1) ∀ θ ∈ Θ.
In particular, ∀ θ ∈ Θ and ∀ s ∈ DSEnnfg(ΓE∗,G∗,θ), we have that R(g(s), θ) =
(α(θ), 1), and thus g(s) = α(θ) and R(α(θ), θ) = (α(θ), 1).
Define S := S1 × . . .× Sn, and, for each (i, θ) ∈ N ×Θ, let
Ai(θ) := {si ∈ Si | ui(R(g(si, s′−i), θ), θ) ≥ ui(R(g(s′i, s′−i), θ), θ) ∀ s′ ∈ S}
= {si ∈ Si | g(si, s′−i) %(θ)i g(s′i, s′−i) ∀ s′ ∈ S}
denote the set of dominant strategies for agent i in game ΓE
∗,G∗,θ.
Note that Ai(θ) = Ai(θ
′) ∀ θ′ ∈ Θ such that %(θ)i =%(θ
′)
i . And, since α is fully
DSEnnfg-implementable in E, we have that Ai(θ) 6= ∅ ∀ (i, θ) ∈ N ×Θ.
Consider an agent j ∈ N and (%,%′j) ∈ (RX)N ×RX . Since P = (RX)N , there
exists a tuple (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ×Θ such that %=%(θ) and (%′j,%−j) =%(θ′). Note that,
in particular, %(θ)i =%
(θ′)
i ∀ i ∈ N\{j}, and, thus, Ai(θ) = Ai(θ′) ∀ i ∈ N\{j}.
Let s∗i ∈ Ai(θ) ∀ i ∈ N and s′j ∈ Aj(θ′). Then, since s∗j ∈ Aj(θ) and s∗ ∈
DSEnnfg(Γ
E∗,G∗,θ) and (s′j, s
∗
−j) ∈ DSEnnfg(ΓE∗,G∗,θ′), we have that
β(%) = α(θ) = g(s∗) %j g(s′j, s∗−j) = α(θ′) = β(%′j,%−j).
Hence, ∀ j ∈ N , we have that β(%) %j β(%′j,%−j) ∀ (%,%′j) ∈ (RX)N ×RX .
Lemma 2.3 now implies that there exists an agent j ∈ N such that ∀ %∈ (RX)N we
have that β(%) %j x′ ∀ x′ ∈ X.
Thus, ∀ θ ∈ Θ, we have that α(θ) = β(%(θ)) %(θ)j x′ ∀ x′ ∈ X, i.e., uj((α(θ), 1), θ) =
uj(R(α(θ), θ), θ) ≥ uj(R(x′, θ), θ) ∀ x′ ∈ X.
2
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Corollary 3.4 For all (i, θ) ∈ N × Θ, let P(θ)i denote the rational preference relation
over X ×{1} induced by ui(·, θ). For each θ ∈ Θ, let P(θ) denote the preference profile
(P(θ)1 , . . . ,P(θ)n ), and let RX×{1} denote the set of all rational preference relations over
X ×{1} having the property that no two distinct alternatives are indifferent. Suppose
that X contains at least three elements,
{P(θ) | θ ∈ Θ} = (RX×{1})N ,
∀ x ∈ X ∃ θ ∈ Θ s.t. α(θ) = {x},
α is fully DSEnnfg-implementable in environment E, and that
agents have weak pessimistic beliefs in environment E.
Then ∃ j ∈ N such that, ∀ θ ∈ Θ, uj((α(θ), 1), θ) ≥ uj((x′, 1), θ) ∀ x′ ∈ X.
Proof
For all (i, θ) ∈ N×Θ, let %(θ)i denote the rational preference relation over X induced by
ui(R(·, θ), θ). For each θ ∈ Θ, let %(θ) denote the preference profile (%(θ)1 , . . . ,%(θ)n ), and
let RX denote the set of all rational preference relations over X having the property
that no two distinct alternatives are indifferent.
Since {P(θ) | θ ∈ Θ} = (RX×{1})N and %(θ)i is the rational preference relation over X
induced by ui(R(·, θ), θ) = ui((·, 1), θ), we have that {%(θ)| θ ∈ Θ} = (RX)N .
Consider (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ × Θ such that %(θ)=%(θ′). Since %(θ)i is the rational preference
relation over X induced by ui(R(·, θ), θ) = ui((·, 1), θ), we have that P(θ) = P(θ′).
And, since α is fully DSEnnfg-implementable in environment E and agents have weak
pessimistic beliefs in E, we have that α(θ) = α(θ′).
Proposition 3.4 implies that ∃ j ∈ N such that, ∀ θ ∈ Θ,
uj((α(θ), 1), θ) ≥ uj(R(x′, θ), θ) = uj((x′, 1), θ) ∀ x′ ∈ X.
2
3.5 Implementability in Corresponding Environments
Let E ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {ui}i∈N ,G, R, e) be an n-person environment with limited
enforcement power, let α be a (social) choice correspondence for environment E, and
let EC ∈ {NEnnfg, DSEnnfg, SPNEn}.
Proposition 3.5 If a mechanism G ∈ G strongly/fully EC-implements α in en-
vironment E, and the image Y ⊆ X of its outcome function satisfies R(x, θ) =
(x, 1) ∀ (x, θ) ∈ Y ×Θ, i.e., each outcome in the image is realized, then mechanism G
strongly/fully EC-implements α in environment E’s corresponding classical environ-
ment, and vice versa.
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Proof
Consider the case of a strategic mechanism G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) ∈ G and full imple-
mentation in EC ∈ {NEnnfg, DSEnnfg}. The other cases are similar.
Let EC ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {u′i}i∈N ,G) denote E’s corresponding classical environ-
ment, i.e., u′i(x, θ) = ui((x, 1), θ) ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X ×Θ.
By definition, mechanism G fully EC-implements α in environment EC if and only if
g(EC(ΓE
C ,G,θ)) = α(θ) ∀ θ ∈ Θ.
By definition, mechanism G fully EC-implements α in environment E if and only if
R(g(EC(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ)), θ) = {(x, 1) | x ∈ α(θ)} ∀ θ ∈ Θ.
Since, by assumption, R(g(EC(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ)), θ) = (g(EC(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ)), 1), it is sufficient to
show that EC(ΓE
C ,G,θ) = EC(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ).
To see this, note that ΓE
C ,G,θ ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui((g(·), 1), θ)}i∈N)
= (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui(R(g(·), θ), θ)}i∈N) ≡ ΓE∗,G∗,θ.
2
In the special case of weak pessimistic beliefs, every outcome in the image of a mech-
anism’s outcome function is realized, and we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3.5 If agents have weak pessimistic beliefs in environment E, then full EC-
implementability of α in environment E is equivalent to full EC-implementability of
α in E’s corresponding classical environment.
In the case of no weak pessimistic beliefs, every combination of Nash-implementability/
non-Nash-implementability of a SCC in an environment with limited enforcement power
compared to its corresponding classical environment is possible:
Remark 3.5 If agents do not have weak pessimistic beliefs in environment E, then,
in general, everything is possible:
(a) α is fully NEnnfg-implementable in environment E and in E’s corresponding
classical environment, or
(b) α is not fully NEnnfg-implementable in environment E but is fully NE
n
nfg-
implementable in E’s corresponding classical environment, or
(c) α is fully NEnnfg-implementable in environment E but is not fully NE
n
nfg-
implementable in E’s corresponding classical environment, or
(d) α is neither fully NEnnfg-implementable in environment E nor in E’s correspond-
ing classical environment.
The following ‘Unanimity Voting’ examples illustrate each of the four cases.
Jackson and Palfrey [24a] present an example (Section 3, Example 3) showing that
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there are Nash-implementable (social) choice correspondences that are not voluntarily
implementable. Although, in principle, their example could be adapted into our frame-
work to illustrate case (b), we consider a slightly modified version (with respect to the
agents’ preferences) which allows us to use Jackson and Palfrey’s simple mechanism
in order to illustrate both case (a) and case (b) by only changing the agents’ identical
and outcome-independent predictions.
In their Example 1, Jackson and Palfrey [24a] present a three-agents–two-states–four-
outcomes voting example showing that a (social) choice correspondence which is not
Nash-implementable may nevertheless satisfy their necessary condition for voluntary
implementation. And, a two-agents exchange economy example (Example 2) shows
that there are voluntarily implementable (social) choice correspondences that are not
Nash-implementable. To illustrate case (c), we consider, for simplicity, a voting ex-
ample with only three outcomes and three different preference profiles, which again
has the merit that we can illustrate both case (c) and case (d) by only changing the
agents’ identical and outcome-independent predictions. For expositional purposes, we
finally adapt Jackson and Palfrey’s exchange economy example to our framework in
Appendix C (again illustrating case (c)).
Common to all of the following ‘Unanimity Voting’ examples is that two or three vot-
ers can vote for one out of three candidates, i.e., for candidate 0, 1, or candidate 2, to
change or to confirm the actual status quo, candidate 0. An unanimous vote for one
candidate implies that this candidate is the new (and maybe old) status quo. Only one
vote for candidate 0 is sufficient to confirm the actual status quo.
Example 3.5(a)
Let E ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {ui}i∈N ,G, R, e) be the n-person environment with limited
enforcement power, where
N = {1, 2},
X = {x0, x1, x2},
Θi = {θˆi, θ˜i} ∀ i ∈ N ,
Θ = {θˆ ≡ (θˆ1, θˆ2), θ˜ ≡ (θ˜1, θ˜2)},
u1((x0, 1), θˆ) = u2((x0, 1), θˆ) = 1, u1((x0, 1), θ˜) = 2, u2((x0, 1), θ˜) = 2,
u1((x1, 1), θˆ) = u2((x1, 1), θˆ) = 2, u1((x1, 1), θ˜) = 2, u2((x1, 1), θ˜) = 3,
u1((x2, 1), θˆ) = u2((x2, 1), θˆ) = 3, u1((x2, 1), θ˜) = 1, u2((x2, 1), θ˜) = 1,
ui((xj, 0), θ) = ui((x0, 1), θ) ∀ (i, j, θ) ∈ N × {0, 1, 2} ×Θ,
G is the set of strategic n-person mechanisms for (N,X), and
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e is the bargaining game enforcement structure defined by
e(S) =

X if S = N or S = N+
∅ if S = {0}
{x0} otw.
∀ S ∈ N+.
Thus, realization function R satisfies
R(x, θ) =

(x0, 1) if x = x0, and ui((x, 1), θ) ≥ ui((x, 0), θ) for some i ∈ N
(x, 1) if x 6= x0, and ui((x, 1), θ) ≥ ui((x, 0), θ) ∀ i ∈ N
(x, 0) otw.
=
 (x, 0) if x = x2 and θ = θ˜(x, 1) otw. ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X ×Θ.
In particular, agents do not have weak pessimistic beliefs in environment E.
Let EC = (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {u′i}i∈N ,G) denote E’s corresponding classical environ-
ment, i.e., u′i(x, θ) = ui((x, 1), θ) ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X × Θ, and let α be the (social) choice
correspondence for environment E defined by
α(θ) =
 {x2} if θ = θˆ{x1} if θ = θ˜ ∀ θ ∈ Θ.
In particular, since R(x2, θˆ) = (x2, 1) and R(x1, θ˜) = (x1, 1), α is consistent with
(realization function R in) environment E.
Note that agents’ beliefs can be justified by outcome-independent prediction functions
{bi}i∈N for (X,Θ), where each bi is defined by bi((x, 0), θ) = (x0, 2) ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X ×Θ.36
SCC α is fully NEnnfg-implementable in environment E:
To see this, consider the strategic mechanism G in which player 2 chooses between x1
and x2, which is then the outcome suggested by the mechanism.
The game induced by G∗ and θˆ in E∗ has exactly one Nash Equilibrium. In this
Nash Equilibrium, player 2 chooses x2, since u2(R(x2, θˆ), θˆ) = u2((x2, 1), θˆ) = 3 > 2 =
u2((x1, 1), θˆ) = u2(R(x1, θˆ), θˆ).
The game induced by G∗ and θ˜ in E∗ has also exactly one Nash Equilibrium. In
this Nash Equilibrium, player 2 chooses x1, since u2(R(x1, θ˜), θ˜) = u2((x1, 1), θ˜) = 3
> 2 = u2((x0, 1), θ˜) = u2((x2, 0), θ˜) = u2(R(x2, θ˜), θ˜).
Thus, R(g(NEnnfg(Γ
E∗,G∗,θˆ)), θˆ) = R({x2}, θˆ) = {(x2, 1)} = α(θˆ)× {1} and
R(g(NEnnfg(Γ
E∗,G∗,θ˜)), θ˜) = R({x1}, θ˜) = {(x1, 1)} = α(θ˜)× {1}.
36Since ui((x, 0), θ) = ui((x0, 1), θ) = ui((bi1((x, 0), θ), 1), θ) ∀ (i, θ, x) ∈ N ×Θ×X.
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Also, SCC α is fully NEnnfg-implementable in environment E
C :
To see this, consider again mechanism G. The game induced by G and θˆ in EC has
exactly one Nash Equilibrium. In this Nash Equilibrium, player 2 chooses x2, since
u′2(x2, θˆ) = u2((x2, 1), θˆ) = 3 > 2 = u2((x1, 1), θˆ) = u
′
2(x1, θˆ).
The game induced by G and θ˜ in EC has also exactly one Nash Equilibrium. In this
Nash Equilibrium, player 2 chooses x1, since u
′
2(x1, θ˜) = u2((x1, 1), θ˜) = 3 > 1 =
u2((x2, 1), θ˜) = u
′
2(x2, θ˜).
Thus, g(NEnnfg(Γ
EC ,G,θˆ)) = {x2} = α(θˆ) and g(NEnnfg(ΓEC ,G,θ˜)) = {x1} = α(θ˜).
Note that we could as well have considered mechanism G′ in which player 2 chooses
between x0, x1, and x2, which is then the outcome suggested by the mechanism. To
see this, it is sufficient to add the following four equations:
u2(R(x2, θˆ), θˆ) = u2((x2, 1), θˆ) = 3 > 1 = u2((x0, 1), θˆ) = u2(R(x0, θˆ), θˆ),
u2(R(x1, θ˜), θ˜) = u2((x1, 1), θ˜) = 3 > 2 = u2((x0, 1), θ˜) = u2(R(x0, θ˜), θ˜),
u′2(x2, θˆ) = u2((x2, 1), θˆ) = 3 > 1 = u2((x0, 1), θˆ) = u
′
2(x0, θˆ), and
u′2(x1, θ˜) = u2((x1, 1), θ˜) = 3 > 2 = u2((x0, 1), θ˜) = u
′
2(x0, θ˜).
Example 3.5(b)
Consider the following modification of Example 3.5(a):
ui((xj, 0), θ) = ui((x1, 1), θ) ∀ (i, j, θ) ∈ N × {0, 1, 2} ×Θ.
Now, agents’ beliefs can be justified by outcome-independent prediction functions
{bi}i∈N , where each bi is defined by bi((x, 0), θ) = (x1, 2) ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X × Θ, and
realization function R satisfies
R(x, θ) =

(x0, 0) if x = x0 and θ = θˆ
(x2, 0) if x = x2 and θ = θ˜
(x, 1) otw.
∀ (x, θ) ∈ X ×Θ.
In particular, agents do not have weak pessimistic beliefs in environment E, and α is
still consistent with environment E.
Since each agent’s preferences over X × {1} are the same as before, α is still fully
NEnnfg-implementable in E’s corresponding classical environment E
C .
However, the change in each agent’s beliefs implies that now α does not satisfy the
necessary conditon of Proposition 3.2, and is therefore not fully NEnnfg-implementable
in environment E. To see this, note that x2 ∈ α(θˆ), R(x2, θ˜) = (x2, 0) 6∈ α(θ˜) × {1},
and that there does not exist a tuple (i, x′) ∈ N ×X such that
ui(R(x
′, θ˜), θ˜) > ui(R(x2, θ˜), θ˜) and ui(R(x′, θˆ), θˆ) ≤ ui(R(x2, θˆ), θˆ) :
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(1, x0) u1(R(x0, θ˜), θ˜) = u1((x0, 1), θ˜) = 2 6> 2 = u1((x2, 0), θ˜) = u1(R(x2, θ˜), θ˜),
(1, x1) u1(R(x1, θ˜), θ˜) = u1((x1, 1), θ˜) = 2 6> 2,
(1, x2) u1(R(x2, θ˜), θ˜) = u1((x2, 0), θ˜) = 2 6> 2,
(2, x0) u2(R(x0, θ˜), θ˜) = u2((x0, 1), θ˜) = 2 6> 3 = u2((x2, 0), θ˜) = u2(R(x2, θ˜), θ˜),
(2, x1) u2(R(x1, θ˜), θ˜) = u2((x1, 1), θ˜) = 3 6> 3, and
(2, x2) u2(R(x2, θ˜), θ˜) = u2((x2, 0), θ˜) = 3 6> 3.
Finally, note that the alternative modification
ui((xj, 0), θ) = ui((x2, 1), θ) ∀ (i, j, θ) ∈ N × {0, 1, 2} ×Θ
leads to the same result. In this case, realization function R satisfies
R(x, θ) =

(x0, 0) if x = x0 and θ = θˆ
(x1, 0) if x = x1 and θ = θˆ
(x, 1) otw.
∀ (x, θ) ∈ X×Θ,
x1 ∈ α(θ˜), R(x1, θˆ) = (x1, 0) 6∈ α(θˆ)× {1},
and there does not exist a tuple (i, x′) ∈ N ×X such that
ui(R(x
′, θˆ), θˆ) > ui(R(x1, θˆ), θˆ) and ui(R(x′, θ˜), θ˜) ≤ ui(R(x1, θ˜), θ˜):
(1, x0) u1(R(x0, θˆ), θˆ) = u1((x0, 0), θˆ) = 3 6> 3 = u1((x1, 0), θˆ) = u1(R(x1, θˆ), θˆ),
(1, x1) u1(R(x1, θˆ), θˆ) = u1((x1, 0), θˆ) = 3 6> 3,
(1, x2) u1(R(x2, θˆ), θˆ) = u1((x2, 1), θˆ) = 3 6> 3,
(2, x0) u2(R(x0, θˆ), θˆ) = u2((x0, 0), θˆ) = 3 6> 3 = u2((x1, 0), θˆ) = u2(R(x1, θˆ), θˆ),
(2, x1) u2(R(x1, θˆ), θˆ) = u2((x1, 0), θˆ) = 3 6> 3, and
(2, x2) u2(R(x2, θˆ), θˆ) = u2((x2, 1), θˆ) = 3 6> 3.
Example 3.5(c)
Let E ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {ui}i∈N ,G, R, e) be the n-person environment with limited
enforcement power, where
N = {1, 2, 3},
X = {x0, x1, x2},
Θi = {θˆi, θ˜i} ∀ i ∈ N ,
Θ = {θˆ ≡ (θˆ1, θˆ2, θˆ3), θ˜ ≡ (θ˜1, θ˜2, θ˜3)},
u2((x0, 1), θ) = u3((x0, 1), θ) = 2 ∀ θ ∈ Θ, u1((x0, 1), θˆ) = 1, u1((x0, 1), θ˜) = 3,
u2((x1, 1), θ) = u3((x1, 1), θ) = 3 ∀ θ ∈ Θ, u1((x1, 1), θˆ) = 1, u1((x1, 1), θ˜) = 2,
u2((x2, 1), θ) = u3((x2, 1), θ) = 1 ∀ θ ∈ Θ, u1((x2, 1), θˆ) = 2, u1((x2, 1), θ˜) = 1,
ui((xj, 0), θ) = ui((x2, 1), θ) ∀ (i, j, θ) ∈ N × {0, 1, 2} ×Θ,
G is the set of strategic n-person mechanisms for (N,X), and
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e is the bargaining game enforcement structure defined by
e(S) =

X if S = N or S = N+
∅ if S = {0}
{x0} otw.
∀ S ∈ N+.
Thus, realization function R satisfies
R(x, θ) =
 (x1, 0) if x = x1 and θ = θˆ(x, 1) otw. ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X ×Θ.
In particular, agents do not have weak pessimistic beliefs in environment E.
Let EC = (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {u′i}i∈N ,G) denote E’s corresponding classical environ-
ment, i.e., u′i(x, θ) = ui((x, 1), θ) ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X × Θ, and let α be the (social) choice
correspondence for environment E defined by
α(θ) =
 {x0} if θ = θˆ{x1} if θ = θ˜ ∀ θ ∈ Θ.
In particular, since R(x0, θˆ) = (x0, 1) and R(x1, θ˜) = (x1, 1), α is consistent with (real-
ization function R in) environment E.
Note that agents’ beliefs can be justified by outcome-independent prediction functions
{bi}i∈N , where each bi is defined by bi((x, 0), θ) = (x2, 2) ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X ×Θ.
SCC α is fully NEnnfg-implementable in environment E, since both conditions of Propo-
sition 3.3 are satisfied:
(i) For all (θ, θ′, x) ∈ Θ × Θ × X satisfying x ∈ α(θ) and R(x, θ′) 6∈ α(θ′) × {1},
there exists a tuple (i, y) ∈ N ×X s.t.
ui(R(y, θ
′), θ′) > ui(R(x, θ′), θ′) and ui(R(y, θ), θ) ≤ ui(R(x, θ), θ):
(i.1) For (θ, θ′, x) = (θˆ, θˆ, x0), we have that R(x0, θˆ) = (x0, 1) ∈ α(θˆ)× {1}.
(i.2) For (θ, θ′, x) = (θˆ, θ˜, x0), we have that R(x0, θ˜) 6∈ α(θ˜) × {1}, and the tuple
(i, y) := (2, x1) satisfies the required inequalities, since
u2(R(x1, θ˜), θ˜) = u2((x1, 1), θ˜) = 3 > 2 = u2((x0, 1), θ˜) = u2(R(x0, θ˜), θ˜) and
u2(R(x1, θˆ), θˆ) = u2((x1, 0), θˆ) = u2((x2, 1), θˆ) = 1
≤ 2 = u2((x0, 1), θˆ) = u2(R(x0, θˆ), θˆ).
(i.3) For (θ, θ′, x) = (θ˜, θˆ, x1), we have that R(x1, θˆ) = (x1, 0) 6∈ α(θˆ) × {1}, and the
tuple (i, y) := (2, x0) satisfies the required inequalities, since
u2(R(x0, θˆ), θˆ) = u2((x0, 1), θˆ) = 2
> 1 = u2((x2, 1), θˆ) = u2((x1, 0), θˆ) = u2(R(x1, θˆ), θˆ) and
u2(R(x0, θ˜), θ˜) = u2((x0, 1), θ˜) = 2 ≤ 3 = u2((x1, 1), θ˜) = u2(R(x1, θ˜), θ˜).
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(i.4) For (θ, θ′, x) = (θ˜, θ˜, x1), we have that R(x1, θ˜) = (x1, 1) ∈ α(θ˜)× {1}.
(ii) R(x, θ) ∈ α(θ)× {1} ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X ×Θ that satisfy
A(x, θ) := ]{i ∈ N | ui(R(x, θ), θ) ≥ ui(R(y, θ), θ) ∀ y ∈ X} ≥ n− 1:
(ii.1) For (x, θ) = (x0, θˆ) and
(ii.2) for (x, θ) = (x1, θ˜), we have that R(x, θ) ∈ α(θ)× {1}.
(ii.3) For (x, θ) = (x0, θ˜), we have that A(x, θ) < n− 1, since
u2(R(x0, θ˜), θ˜) = 2 6≥ 3 = u2(R(x1, θ˜), θ˜) and
u3(R(x0, θ˜), θ˜) = 2 6≥ 3 = u3(R(x1, θ˜), θ˜).
(ii.4) For (x, θ) = (x1, θˆ), we have that A(x, θ) < n− 1, since
u2(R(x1, θˆ), θˆ) = u2((x1, 0), θˆ) = 1 6≥ 2 = u2(R(x0, θˆ), θˆ) and
u3(R(x1, θˆ), θˆ) = u3((x1, 0), θˆ) = 1 6≥ 2 = u3(R(x0, θˆ), θˆ).
(ii.5) For (x, θ) = (x2, θˆ), we have that A(x, θ) < n− 1, since
u2(R(x2, θˆ), θˆ) = 1 6≥ 2 = u2(R(x0, θˆ), θˆ) and
u3(R(x2, θˆ), θˆ) = 1 6≥ 2 = u3(R(x0, θˆ), θˆ).
(ii.6) For (x, θ) = (x2, θ˜), we have that A(x, θ) < n− 1, since
u2(R(x2, θ˜), θ˜) = 1 6≥ 3 = u2(R(x1, θ˜), θ˜) and
u3(R(x2, θ˜), θ˜) = 1 6≥ 3 = u3(R(x1, θ˜), θ˜).
However, SCC α is not fully NEnnfg-implementable in environment E’s corresponding
classical environment, since α is not Maskin-monotonic in EC . To see this, note that
x0 ∈ α(θˆ), x0 6∈ α(θ˜), and that there does not exist a tuple (i, x′) ∈ N ×X such that
u′i(x0, θˆ) ≥ u′i(x′, θˆ) and u′i(x0, θ˜) < u′i(x′, θ˜) :
(1, x0) u
′
1(x0, θ˜) 6< u′1(x0, θ˜),
(1, x1) u
′
1(x0, θ˜) = 3 6< 2 = u′1(x1, θ˜),
(1, x2) u
′
1(x0, θ˜) = 3 6< 1 = u′1(x2, θ˜),
(2, x0) u
′
2(x0, θ˜) 6< u′2(x0, θ˜),
(2, x1) u
′
2(x0, θˆ) = 2 6≥ 3 = u′2(x1, θˆ),
(2, x2) u
′
2(x0, θ˜) = 2 6< 1 = u′2(x2, θ˜),
(3, x0) u
′
3(x0, θ˜) 6< u′3(x0, θ˜),
(3, x1) u
′
3(x0, θˆ) = 2 6≥ 3 = u′3(x1, θˆ), and
(3, x2) u
′
3(x0, θ˜) = 2 6< 1 = u′3(x2, θ˜).
Example 3.5(d)
Consider the following modification of Example 3.5(c):
ui((xj, 0), θ) = ui((x0, 1), θ) ∀ (i, j, θ) ∈ N × {0, 1, 2} ×Θ.
Now, agents’ beliefs can be justified by outcome-independent prediction functions
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{bi}i∈N , where each bi is defined by bi((x, 0), θ) = (x0, 2) ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X × Θ, and
realization function R satisfies
R(x, θ) =

(x2, 0) if x = x2
(x1, 0) if x = x1 and θ = θ˜
(x, 1) otw.
∀ (x, θ) ∈ X ×Θ.
In particular, agents do not have weak pessimistic beliefs in environment E.
Since each agent’s preferences over X × {1} are the same as before, α is still not fully
NEnnfg-implementable in E’s corresponding classical environment E
C .
However, the change in each agent’s beliefs implies that now α is not consistent with
(realization function R in) environment E (since R(x1, θ˜) = (x1, 0) and α(θ˜) = {x1}),
and is therefore not fully NEnnfg-implementable in environment E.
Finally, note that the alternative modification
ui((xj, 0), θ) = ui((x1, 1), θ) ∀ (i, j, θ) ∈ N × {0, 1, 2} ×Θ
leads to the same result. In this case, realization function R satisfies
R(x, θ) =
 (x2, 0) if x = x2(x, 1) otw. ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X ×Θ,
x0 ∈ α(θˆ), R(x0, θ˜) = (x0, 1) 6∈ α(θ˜)× {1},
and there does not exist a tuple (i, x′) ∈ N ×X such that
ui(R(x
′, θ˜), θ˜) > ui(R(x0, θ˜), θ˜) and ui(R(x′, θˆ), θˆ) ≤ ui(R(x0, θˆ), θˆ) :
(1, x0) u1(R(x0, θ˜), θ˜) = u1((x0, 1), θ˜) = 3 6> 3 = u1((x0, 1), θ˜) = u1(R(x0, θ˜), θ˜),
(1, x1) u1(R(x1, θ˜), θ˜) = u1((x1, 1), θ˜) = 2 6> 3 = u1((x0, 1), θ˜) = u1(R(x0, θ˜), θ˜),
(1, x2) u1(R(x2, θ˜), θ˜) = u1((x1, 1), θ˜) = 2 6> 3 = u1((x0, 1), θ˜) = u1(R(x0, θ˜), θ˜),
(2, x0) u2(R(x0, θ˜), θ˜) = u2((x0, 1), θ˜) = 2 6> 2 = u2((x0, 1), θ˜) = u2(R(x0, θ˜), θ˜),
(2, x1) u2(R(x1, θˆ), θˆ) = u2((x1, 1), θˆ) = 3 6≤ 2 = u2((x0, 1), θˆ) = u2(R(x0, θˆ), θˆ),
(2, x2) u2(R(x2, θˆ), θˆ) = u2((x1, 1), θˆ) = 3 6≤ 2 = u2((x0, 1), θˆ) = u2(R(x0, θˆ), θˆ),
(3, x0) u3(R(x0, θ˜), θ˜) = u3((x0, 1), θ˜) = 2 6> 2 = u3((x0, 1), θ˜) = u3(R(x0, θ˜), θ˜),
(3, x1) u3(R(x1, θˆ), θˆ) = u3((x1, 1), θˆ) = 3 6≤ 2 = u3((x0, 1), θˆ) = u3(R(x0, θˆ), θˆ),
(3, x2) u3(R(x2, θˆ), θˆ) = u3((x1, 1), θˆ) = 3 6≤ 2 = u3((x0, 1), θˆ) = u3(R(x0, θˆ), θˆ).
3.6 An Extensive Procedure for the Implementation Decision
We now define an extensive procedure which, under certain conditions, is able to ‘copy’
the implementation decision of the agents. An assumption implicit in our definition of
realization function R (in Paragraph 3.1.1) is that an agent who is indifferent between
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a suggested outcome being implemented or not, supports the implementation of this
outcome whenever he is able to do so. Since this assumption is ‘incompatible’ with
the SPNE concept, we assume in the following that no agent is indifferent between an
outcome being implemented or not.
Let E ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {ui}i∈N ,G, R, e) be an n-person environment with limited
enforcement power such that
(i) each utility function ui satisfies ui((x, 1), θ) 6= ui((x, 0), θ) ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X ×Θ,
(ii) G is the set of all strategic and extensive mechanisms for (N,X), and
(iii) enforcement structure e is one of the enforcement structures discussed at the
beginning of this chapter, i.e. e is the Majority Voting, Cooperative Game, or
a Bargaining Game Enforcement Structure for (N,X).
Let E+ ≡ (N, (X × {1}) ∪ (X × {0}), {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {ui}i∈N ,G+) denote the classical
n-person environment where G+ is the set of all strategic and extensive n-person mech-
anisms for (N, (X × {1} ∪ (X × {0})).
For each strategic mechanism G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) ∈ Gstrat, let G+ ≡ (N,H, p, g+) ∈
G+ext denote the extensive mechanism for (N, (X × {1}) ∪ {X × {0})) defined by
H := {∅} ∪ S1 × . . .× Sn
∪{(s, a1, . . . , ak) | k ∈ N, s ∈ S1× . . .×Sn, ai ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i ∈ N, i ≤ k},
ZH := S1 × . . . Sn × {0, 1}n,
p(∅) := N ,
p(s) := {1} ∀ s ∈ S1 × . . .× Sn,
p(s, a1, . . . , ak) := {k + 1} ∀ k ∈ N\{n},∀ (s, a1, . . . , ak) ∈ H\ZH , and
g+(s, a1 . . . , an) :=

(g(s), 1) if ∃ S ∈ N+ s.t. g(s) ∈ e(S) and
ai = 1 ∀ i ∈ S ∩N
(g(s), 0) otw.
on Zh.
Lemma 3.6 For each strategic mechanism G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) ∈ Gstrat and every
state θ ∈ Θ, the set of ‘reduced mechanisms’ that result from the backward induction
procedure after n steps applied to the game induced by mechanism G+ and state θ in
environment E+ contains exactly one element: (N, {Si}i∈N , gred) ∈ G+strat, gred(s) :=
R(g(s), θ) ∀ s ∈ S1 × . . .× Sn.
Proof
Consider an arbitrary strategy profile s ∈ S1 × . . . × Sn. We analyse the game tree
following strategy profile s in the game induced by mechanism G+ and state θ in
environment E+ according to the two cases in the defintion of realization function R
(applied to (g(s), θ)).
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(1) First, suppose that there exists a coalition S ∈ N+ such that outcome g(s) ∈
e(S) and ui((g(s), 1), θ) ≥ ui((g(s), 0), θ) ∀ i ∈ N ∩ S.
If S = {0}, then, by definition ofG+, g+(s, a1, . . . , an) = (g(s), 1) ∀ (a1, . . . , an) ∈
{0, 1}n. And, therefore, every ‘reduced mechanism’ satisfies gred(s) = (g(s), 1) =
R(g(s), θ).
If S 6= {0}, then consider player i1 := max{ j | j ∈ S ∩ N} at all those of his
decision nodes in the game tree (corresponding to strategy profile s) at which,
within the backward induction procedure, at least one of his alternatives is out-
come (g(s), 1). Since, by assumption, ui1((g(s), 1), θ) > ui1((g(s), 0), θ), player
i1 will choose this alternative.
If S\{i1} ∩ N 6= ∅, then consider player i2 := max{ j | j ∈ S\{i1} ∩ N} at
all those of his decision nodes in the game tree at which, within the backward
induction procedure, at least one of his alternatives is outcome (g(s), 1). Since,
by assumption, ui2((g(s), 1), θ) > ui2((g(s), 0), θ), player i2 will choose this al-
ternative.
We can proceed along these lines up to player i](S∩N) := min{ j | j ∈ S ∩ N},
who also will choose (g(s), 1) at all those of his decision nodes in the game tree at
which, within the backward induction procedure, at least one of his alternatives
is outcome (g(s), 1). And, in addition, at every node at which he is (possibly)
asked for a decision, (g(s), 1) is one of player i](S∩N)’s alternatives.
To verify the latter assertion, assume that there exists a node d at which this
player is asked for a decision but at which (g(s), 1) is not one of his alternatives,
and consider player i](S∩N)−1’s decision nodes that are possibly reached in the
game tree if player i](S∩N) chooses action ‘1’ at node d. If at each of these decision
nodes at least one of player i](S∩N)−1’s alternatives (within the backward induc-
tion procedure) is (g(s), 1), then (as shown above) player i](S∩N)−1 will choose
this alternative (at each of these decision nodes) and we obtain a contradiction.
If, on the other hand, there exists a decision node at which (g(s), 1) is not one
of player i](S∩N)−1’s alternatives, then consider player i](S∩N)−2’s decision nodes
that are possibly reached in the game tree if player i](S∩N)−1 chooses action ‘1’
at this node in the game tree. If at each of these decision nodes at least one
of player i](S∩N)−2’s alternatives is (g(s), 1), we again obtain a contradiction. If
not, we can proceed along these lines, if necessary, up to player i1. If at each
of player i1’s decision nodes at least one of his alternatives is (g(s), 1), then (as
shown above) player i1 will choose this alternative and we obtain a contradic-
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tion. And, since g(s) ∈ e(S), and by definition of mechanism G+, (g(s), 1) has
to be one of player i1’s alternatives: By choosing action ‘1’ at this point in the
game tree, player i1 can always enforce g(s).
Since, at every node at which he is (possibly) asked for a decision, (g(s), 1)
is one of player i](S∩N)’s alternatives, and since player i](S∩N) will choose this
alternative whenever asked for a decision, every ‘reduced mechanism’ satisfies
gred(s) = (g(s), 1) = R(g(s), θ).
(2) Now, suppose that there does not exist a coalition S ∈ N+ such that outcome
g(s) ∈ e(S) and ui((g(s), 1), θ) ≥ ui((g(s), 0), θ) ∀ i ∈ N ∩ S.
If e is the cooperative game enforcement structure, then, by defintion of G+,
g+(s, a1 . . . , an) =
 (g(s), 1) if (a1, . . . , an) = (1, . . . , 1)(g(s), 0) otw. on Zh,
and, since g(s) ∈ X = e(N), there exists an agent i ∈ N such that ui((g(s), 1), θ)
< ui((g(s), 0), θ). Consider this player at every node at which he is asked for a
decision. Outcome function g+ implies that, within the backward induction
procedure, at least one of his alternatives is outcome (g(s), 0). And, since
ui((g(s), 1), θ) < ui((g(s), 0), θ), player i will choose this alternative. Thus,
every ‘reduced mechanism’ satisfies gred(s) = (g(s), 0) = R(g(s), θ).
If e is a bargaining enforcement structure, then, either
g+(s, a1 . . . , an) =
 (g(s), 1) if (a1, . . . , an) = (1, . . . , 1)(g(s), 0) otw. on Zh
and there exists an agent i ∈ N such that ui((g(s), 1), θ) < ui((g(s), 0), θ), or
g+(s, a1 . . . , an) =
 (g(s), 1) if (a1, . . . , an) 6= (0, . . . , 0)(g(s), 0) otw. on Zh
and ui((g(s), 1), θ) < ui((g(s), 0), θ) ∀ i ∈ N .
In the first case, consider player i (satisfying ui((g(s), 1), θ) < ui((g(s), 0), θ))
at every node at which he is asked for a decision. Outcome function g+ implies
that, within the backward induction procedure, at least one of his alternatives
is outcome (g(s), 0). And, since ui((g(s), 1), θ) < ui((g(s), 0), θ), player i will
choose this alternative. Thus, every ‘reduced mechanism’ satisfies gred(s) =
(g(s), 0) = R(g(s), θ).
In the second case, outcome function g+ implies that outcome (g(s), 0) is one of
player n’s alternatives at that node in the mechanism tree which is reached if all
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previous players have chosen action ‘0’. Since un((g(s), 1), θ) < un((g(s), 0), θ),
player n will choose this alternative (by choosing action ‘0’). Thus, within
the backward induction procedure, outcome (g(s), 0) is one of player n − 1’s
alternatives at that node in the mechanism tree which is reached if all previous
players have chosen action ‘0’. In addition, outcome function g+ implies that a
choice of action ‘1’ by player n − 1 can only result in outcome (g(s), 1). Thus,
since un−1((g(s), 1), θ) < un−1((g(s), 0), θ), player n− 1 will choose action ‘0’. If
we proceed along these lines up to player 1, then, within the backward induction
procedure, outcome (g(s), 0) is one of player 1’s alternatives and can only be
chosen by deciding for action ‘0’. Since u1((g(s), 1), θ) < u1((g(s), 0), θ), player 1
will choose action ‘0’. Thus, again, every ‘reduced mechanism’ satisfies gred(s) =
(g(s), 0) = R(g(s), θ).
Finally, if e is the majority voting enforcement structure, then
g+(s, a1 . . . , an) =
 (g(s), 1) if
∑
i∈N ai >
n
2
(g(s), 0) otw.
on Zh,
and there exists a coalition S ∈ N of at least n
2
agents such that ui((g(s), 1), θ) <
ui((g(s), 0), θ) ∀ i ∈ S.
To verify the latter assertion, assume, to the contrary, that for every coalition
S ∈ N of at least n
2
agents there exists an agent i ∈ S satisfying ui((g(s), 1), θ) ≥
ui((g(s), 0), θ).
If n is even, then consider a coalition S∗ ∈ N consisting of n
2
− 1 agents
satisfying ui((g(s), 1), θ) < ui((g(s), 0), θ) ∀ i ∈ S∗ (If such a coalition does
not exist, then there exists a coalition S ∈ N of at least n
2
+ 2 agents sat-
isfying ui((g(s), 1), θ) ≥ ui((g(s), 0), θ) ∀ i ∈ S, contradicting that we are in
case 2). By assumption and construction, every coalition S ∈ N consist-
ing of the members of coalition S∗ and one further agent i ∈ N\S∗ satisfies
ui((g(s), 1), θ) ≥ ui((g(s), 0), θ). Thus, the coalition S ∈ N consisting of all n2+1
potential ‘additional agents’ satisfies ui((g(s), 1), θ) ≥ ui((g(s), 0), θ) ∀ i ∈ S,
contradicting that we are in case 2.
If n is odd, then consider a coalition S∗ ∈ N consisting of n−1
2
agents satis-
fying ui((g(s), 1), θ) < ui((g(s), 0), θ) ∀ i ∈ S∗ (If such a coalition does not
exist, then there exists a coalition S ∈ N of at least n−1
2
+ 2 agents satisfying
ui((g(s), 1), θ) ≥ ui((g(s), 0), θ) ∀ i ∈ S, contradicting that we are in case 2).
By assumption and construction, every coalition S ∈ N consisting of the mem-
bers of coalition S∗ and one further agent i ∈ N\S∗ satisfies ui((g(s), 1), θ) ≥
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ui((g(s), 0), θ). Thus, the coalition S ∈ N consisting of all n−12 +1 potential ‘ad-
ditional agents’ satisfies ui((g(s), 1), θ) ≥ ui((g(s), 0), θ) ∀ i ∈ S, contradicting
that we are in case 2, and verifying our assertion.
Now, consider player i1 := max{ j | j ∈ S} at all those of his decision nodes in
the game tree (corresponding to strategy profile s) at which, within the back-
ward induction procedure, at least one of his alternatives is outcome (g(s), 0).
Since, by assumption, ui1((g(s), 1), θ) < ui1((g(s), 0), θ), player i1 will choose
this alternative.
If S\{i1} 6= ∅, then consider player i2 := max{ j | j ∈ S\{i1}} at all those
of his decision nodes in the game tree at which, within the backward induc-
tion procedure, at least one of his alternatives is outcome (g(s), 0). Since
ui2((g(s), 1), θ) < ui2((g(s), 0), θ), player i2 will choose this alternative.
We can proceed along these lines up to player i]S := min{ j | j ∈ S}, who also
will choose (g(s), 0) at all those of his decision nodes in the game tree at which,
within the backward induction procedure, at least one of his alternatives is out-
come (g(s), 0). And, in addition, at every node at which player i]S is (possibly)
asked for a decision, (g(s), 0) is one of his alternatives.
To verify the latter assertion, assume that there exists a node d at which this
player is asked for a decision but (g(s), 0) is not one of his alternatives, and con-
sider player i]S−1’s decision nodes that are possibly reached in the game tree if
player i]S chooses action ‘0’ at node d. If at each of these decision nodes at least
one of player i]S−1’s alternatives (within the backward induction procedure) is
(g(s), 0), then (as shown above) player i]S−1 will choose this alternative (at each
of these decision nodes) and we obtain a contradiction. If, on the other hand,
there exists a decision node at which (g(s), 0) is not one of player i]S−1’s alterna-
tives, then consider player i]S−2’s decision nodes that are possibly reached in the
game tree if player i]S−1 chooses action ‘0’ at this node in the game tree. If at
each of these decision nodes at least one of player i]S−2’s alternatives is (g(s), 0),
we again obtain a contradiction. If not, we can proceed along these lines, if
necessary, up to player i1. If at each of player i1’s decision nodes at least one
of his alternatives is (g(s), 0), then (as shown above) player i1 will choose this
alternative and we obtain a contradiction. And, by definition of mechanism G+,
(g(s), 0) has to be one of player i1’s alternatives: every terminal node possibly
reached after a choice of action ‘0’ by player i1 at this point in the game tree has
to result in outcome (g(s), 0), since only a maximum number n
2
players could
have chosen action ‘1’.
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Since, at every node at which he is (possibly) asked for a decision, (g(s), 0) is
one of player i]S’s alternatives, and since player i]S will choose this alternative
whenever asked for a decision, every ‘reduced mechanism’ satisfies gred(s) =
(g(s), 0) = R(g(s), θ).
2
Proposition 3.6 For each strategic mechanism G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) ∈ Gstrat and every
state θ ∈ Θ, we have that R(g(NEnnfg(ΓE∗,G∗,θ)), θ) = g+(O(SPNEn(ΓE+,G+,θ))).
Proof
The set of all SPNE of the game induced by mechanism G+ and state θ in environment
E+, ΓE
+,G+,θ, can be derived by means of the backward induction procedure.
If {(N, {Si}i∈N , gredj ) | j ∈ J} denotes the set of ‘reduced mechanisms’ that result
from the backward induction procedure after n steps applied to game ΓE
+,G+,θ, then
g+(O(SPNEn(ΓE
+,G+,θ))) =
⋃
j∈J g
red
j (NE
n
nfg(N, {Si}i∈N , {ui(gredj (·), θ)}i∈N)).
Lemma 3.6 implies that there exists only one ‘reduced mechanism’ (N, {Si}i∈N , gred),
and that gred : S1× . . .×Sn → (X×{1})∪(X×{0}) satisfies gred(s) = R(g(s), θ) ∀ s ∈
S1 × . . .× Sn.
Thus, g+(O(SPNEn(ΓE
+,G+,θ))) = gred(NEnnfg(N, {Si}i∈N , {ui(gred(·), θ)}i∈N))
= R(g(NEnnfg(N, {Si}i∈N , {ui(R(g(·), θ), θ)}i∈N)), θ)
= R(g(NEnnfg(Γ
E∗,G∗,θ)), θ).
2
Let α be a SCC for environment E, and let α+ : Θ ⇒ (X × {1}) ∪ (X × {0}) denote
the SCC for classical environment E+ defined by α+(θ) := {(x, 1) | x ∈ α(θ)} ∀ θ ∈ Θ.
Corollary 3.6 If there exists a strategic mechanism G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) ∈ Gstrat
that strongly/fully NEnnfg-implements α in environment E, then mechanism G
+ ≡
(N,H, p, g+) strongly/fully SPNEn-implements α+ in classical environment E+.
Proof
Suppose that mechanism G fully NEnnfg-implements SCC α in environment E. The
other case is analogous.
Since G fully NEnnfg-implements α in E, we have that
R(g(NEnnfg(Γ
E∗,G∗,θ)), θ) = {(x, 1) | x ∈ α(θ)} ∀ θ ∈ Θ.
By Proposition 3.6, this implies that
g+(O(SPNEn(ΓE
+,G+,θ))) = {(x, 1) | x ∈ α(θ)} ∀ θ ∈ Θ.
Thus, mechanism G+ strongly SPNEn-implements α+ in environment E+.
2
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4 Implementation in Environments with Delegative
Enforcement Power
As before, we consider a model for a setting that is characterized by the presence of
n ∈ N, n ≥ 2, agents (denoted by the numbers 1 to n), a designer (denoted by the
number 0), and a set of feasible outcomes X 6= ∅. Within a certain time interval T ,
exactly one element of the set of feasible outcomes X is to be implemented.
And, as before, we assume that the designer can force the agents to participate in one
of a certain set of mechanisms. However, in line with classical implementation theory
and in contrast to our framework with limited enforcement power, we now assume that
the designer can enforce each of the feasible outcomes. In addition, and this aspect is
new, we assume that the designer is able to impose one of a certain set of enforcement
and default structure assignments on the agents. Such an assignment specifies
(1) for each coalition of agents S ∈ N , the outcomes that, if suggested by the
mechanism, this coalition is able to enforce ‘right after the mechanism has been
played’,
(2) the outcomes that, if suggested by the mechanism, the designer commits to
implement, and
(3) for each feasible outcome x ∈ X which is enforceable by a coalition S ∈ N , the
default outcome that will be enforced by the designer in case that outcome x is
suggested by the mechanism but is not being implemented by a coalition that
is able to do so.
In Section 4.1, we define environments with delegative enforcement power and the
concept of implementation in these environments (DE Implementation). Our concept
of implementation is again based on Maskin and Moore’s [27] notion of “implementation
with renegotiation function h” and Jackson and Palfrey’s [24a] notion of “G-Nash
implementation” (although, of course, each of these two articles considers a different
interpretational context). Subsequently to briefly stating the simple counterparts of
our sufficient and necessary conditions for LE implementation in Nash Equilibrium to
environments with delegative enforcement power in Section 4.2, specific attention is
paid to (what we will refer to as) replica environments in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4,
two examples show that delegative enforcement power can positively affect the Nash-
implementability of a (social) choice correspondence, and that even the availability of
all EDS assignments might not be sufficient for the Nash-implementability of a (social)
choice correspondence in environments in which all mechanisms arising from strategic
game forms are available to the designer.
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4.1 Definitions
In the following, we consider time interval T as divided into three parts.
In part one, the game induced by the mechanism and the type profile is played. Part
one results in an outcome x ∈ X suggested by the mechanism.
In part two, the agents and the designer consider the implementation of x. We use the
tuples (x, 1) and (x, 0) to denote the results that, ‘right after the mechanism has been
played’, outcome x is or is not being implemented, respectively.
If part two results in (x, 0), the designer implements the default outcome as determined
by the default structure. We use the tuple (y, 2) to denote the result that outcome y ∈ X
is implemented in this part of the time interval.
Definition An enforcement and default structure assignment (EDS assignment) for
(N,X) is a tuple A ≡ (e, d), where
e : N+ ⇒ X satisfies e(S ′) ⊇ e(S) ∀ S, S ′ ∈ N+, S ′ ⊇ S,
e(N) ∩ e({0}) = ∅,
e(N) ∪ e({0}) = X, and
e(S ∪ {0}) = e(S) ∪ e({0}) ∀ S ∈ N , and
d : X × {0} → X × {2} satisfies d(x, 0) = (x, 2) ∀ x ∈ e({0}).37
In their discussion of “voluntary implementation”, Jackson and Palfrey [23] briefly
mention a generalization of voluntary implementation to (state-contingent) “blocking
coalitions”. Note that in our context of delegative enforcement power (and in con-
trast to that of Chapter 3) we could ‘equivalently’ define a coalitional veto and default
structure assignment (CVDS assignment) for (N,X), i.e., a tuple (v, d), where
v : N ⇒ X specifies, for each coalition S ∈ N , the outcomes that, if suggested
by the mechanism, coalition S can veto,
satisfying v(S ′) ⊇ v(S) ∀ S, S ′ ∈ N , S ′ ⊇ S, and
d : X ×{0} → X ×{2} specifies, for each feasible outcome x ∈ X which can be
vetoed by a coalition S ∈ N , the default outcome that will be enforced
by the designer in case that outcome x is suggested by the mechanism but
is being vetoed by a coalition that is able to do so,
satisfying d(x, 0) = (x, 2) ∀ x ∈ X\v(N).
37Note that the domain of each of the two mappings e and d is chosen for mathematical reasons.
The economic interpretation and effect of an EDS assignment (e, d) depends solely on correspondence
e restricted to coalitions in N ∪ {{0}} and on mapping d restricted to outcomes in e(N)× {0}. The
degree of freedom arising from the domain as chosen for correspondence e is resolved by the latter
two requirements in our definition of an EDS assignment.
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Then, for each EDS assignment A ≡ (e, d) (for (N,X)) there exists a CVDS assignment
(vA, d) (for (N,X)) which ‘reflects’ assignment A in the sense that
∀ (x, S) ∈ e({0})×N : x 6∈ vA(S), and
∀ (x, S) ∈ X\e({0})×N : x ∈ vA(S)⇔ S ∩ S ′ 6= ∅ ∀ S ′ ∈ N s.t. x ∈ e(S ′),
i.e., coalition S can veto x if and only if every coalition S ′ that
can enforce x has at least one member in coaliton S.
And, for each CVDS assignment A ≡ (v, d) (for (N,X)) there exists an EDS assignment
(eA, d) (for (N,X)) which ‘reflects’ A in the sense that
x ∈ eA({0}) ∀ x ∈ X\v(N) and x 6∈ eA({0}) ∀ x ∈ v(N),
x 6∈ eA(S) ∀ (x, S) ∈ X\v(N)×N , and
∀ (x, S) ∈ v(N)×N : x 6∈ eA(S)⇔ ∃ S ′ ∈ N s.t. S ∩ S ′ = ∅ and x ∈ v(S ′),
i.e., coalition S can enforce x if and only if there does
not exist a disjoint coalition S ′ that can veto x.
We briefly sketch this ‘equivalence’ between the two assignments as well as all possible
assignments for the case of N = 3 agents and ]X = 1 outcome in Appendix D.
4.1.1 Environments with Delegative Enforcement Power
Definition An n-person environment with delegative enforcement power is a tuple
(N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {ui}i∈N ,G,R,A), where
N := {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents,
X 6= ∅ is the set of feasible outcomes,
Θi is the set of possible types for agent i,
Θ ⊆ Θ1 × . . .×Θn is the set of possible type profiles / states, Θ 6= ∅,
ui : (X × {1}) ∪ (X × {2})×Θ→ R,
ui(·, θ) : (X × {1}) ∪ (X × {2}) → R being agent i’s utility function over
(X × {1}) ∪ (X × {2}) when the actual state of the environment is θ ∈ Θ,
representing her rational preference relation over (X × {1}) ∪ (X × {2}),
G ≡ Gstrat ∪ Gext is a set of mechanisms for (N,X),
A 6= ∅ is a set of EDS assignments for (N,X), satisfying Assumption 4.0 below,
and
R ≡ {RA : X × Θ → (X × {1}) ∪ (X × {2}) | A ∈ A} is the set of realization
functions corresponding to A, each satisfying
R(e,d)(x, θ) =

(x, 1) if ∃ S ∈ N+ s.t. x ∈ e(S) and
ui((x, 1), θ) ≥ ui(d(x, 0), θ) ∀ i ∈ S ∩N
d(x, 0) otw.
on X ×Θ.
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In environments with delegative enforcement power, the outcome suggested by a mech-
anism is ‘transformed’ in a state-contingent way via realization function R. This func-
tion determines whether the suggested outcome or a different outcome is realized, and
at which point in time it is realized. In this respect, it is the counterpart of Jack-
son and Palfrey’s [24a] “generalized reversion function” and Maskin and Moore’s [27]
“renegotiation function”.
Given an EDS assignment, an outcome suggested by a mechanism is implemented ‘right
after the mechanism has been played’ if and only if there exists a coalition S which is
able to enforce this outcome (according to the EDS assignment) and all agents in this
coalition weakly prefer its realization to its non-realization, i.e., prefer its realization
to the implementation of the corresponding default outcome.
There exists exactly one EDS assignment (e, d) for (N,X) which satisfies e({0}) = X,
i.e., which allocates no enforcement power on the agents and therefore reflects standard
implementation theory. We assume that this is one of the designer’s options:
Assumption 4.0 The uniquely determined EDS assignment (e, d) for (N,X) which
satisfies e({0}) = X is an element of A.
4.1.2 Corresponding Classical Environments
For every n-person environment with delegative enforcement power
E ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {ui}i∈N ,G,R,A),
there exists exactly one classical n-person environment
EC ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {u′i}i∈N ,G)
which shares the same outcome space, state space, and mechanism space, and which
satisfies u′i(x, θ) = ui((x, 1), θ) ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X × Θ. This classical environment is (as
before) referred to as environment E’s corresponding classical environment.
4.1.3 DE Implementation
Let E ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {ui}i∈N ,G,R,A) be an environment with delegative en-
forcement power.
Definition A (social) choice correspondence (SCC) for environment E is a correspon-
dence α : Θ⇒ X satisfying α(θ) 6= ∅ ∀ θ ∈ Θ.
Let α be a SCC for environment E, and let (e, d) ∈ A be an EDS assignment.
Let ∗(e,d) denote the function from the set of mechanims for (N,X) to the set of state-
contingent mechanisms for (N, (X × {1}) ∪ (X × {2}),Θ) defined by
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(N, {Si}i∈N , g)∗(e,d) := (N, {Si}i∈N , g∗(e,d)),
g∗(e,d)(s, θ) := R(e,d)(g(s), θ) ∀ (s, θ) ∈ S ×Θ, and
(N,H, p, g)∗(e,d) := (N,H, p, g∗(e,d)),
g∗(e,d)(h, θ) := R(e,d)(g(h), θ) ∀ (h, θ) ∈ ZH ×Θ.
Let E∗(e,d) denote the abstract n-person environment with state-contingent mechanisms
E∗(e,d) := (N, (X × {1}) ∪ (X × {2}), {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {ui}i∈N ,G∗(e,d)),
and let α∗(e,d) : Θ⇒ (X × {1}) ∪ (X × {2}) denote the SCC for E∗(e,d) defined by
α∗(e,d)(θ) := {(x, 1) | x ∈ α(θ)} ∀ θ ∈ Θ.
Let EC ∈ {DSEnnfg, NEnnfg}.
Definition Mechanism G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) ∈ Gstrat EC-implements α in environment
E under EDS assignment (e, d)
(i) strongly, if mechanism G∗(e,d) strongly EC-implements α∗(e,d) in E∗(e,d), i.e.
if, ∀ θ ∈ Θ, EC(ΓE∗(e,d),G∗(e,d),θ) 6= ∅ and
R(e,d)(g(EC(ΓE
∗(e,d),G∗(e,d),θ)), θ) = g∗(e,d)(EC(ΓE
∗(e,d),G∗(e,d),θ), θ)
⊆ α∗(e,d)(θ) = {(x, 1) | x ∈ α(θ)},
(ii) fully, if mechanism G∗(e,d) fully EC-implements α∗(e,d) in E∗(e,d), i.e.
if, ∀ θ ∈ Θ, R(e,d)(g(EC(ΓE∗(e,d),G∗(e,d),θ)), θ) = g∗(e,d)(EC(ΓE∗(e,d),G∗(e,d),θ), θ)
= α∗(e,d)(θ) = {(x, 1) | x ∈ α(θ)},
where ΓE
∗(e,d),G∗(e,d),θ ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui(R(e,d)(g(·), θ), θ)}i∈N) denotes the game in-
duced by mechanism G∗(e,d) and type profile θ in environment E∗(e,d).
Definition Mechanism G ≡ (N,H, p, g) ∈ Gext SPNEn-implements α in environment
E under EDS assignment (e, d)
(i) strongly, if mechanism G∗(e,d) strongly SPNEn-implements α∗(e,d) in E∗(e,d), i.e.
if, ∀ θ ∈ Θ, SPNEn(ΓE∗(e,d),G∗(e,d),θ) 6= ∅ and
R(e,d)(g(O(SPNEn(ΓE
∗(e,d),G∗(e,d),θ))), θ) ⊆ {(x, 1) | x ∈ α(θ)},
(ii) fully, if mechanism G∗(e,d) fully SPNEn-implements α∗(e,d) in E∗(e,d), i.e.
if ∀ θ ∈ Θ, R(e,d)(g(O(SPNEn(ΓE∗(e,d),G∗(e,d),θ))), θ) = {(x, 1) | x ∈ α(θ)},
where ΓE
∗(e,d),G∗(e,d),θ ≡ (N,H, p, {ui(R(e,d)(g(·), θ), θ)}i∈N) denotes the game induced
by mechanism G∗(e,d) and type profile θ in environment E∗(e,d).
Note that a strategic mechanism G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) ∈ Gstrat fully EC-implements α
in E’s corresponding classical environment EC if, ∀ θ ∈ Θ, g(EC(ΓEC ,G,θ)) = α(θ),
where ΓE
C ,G,θ ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui((g(·), 1), θ)}i∈N).
An extensive mechanism G ≡ (N,H, p, g) ∈ Gext fully SPNEn-implements α in E’s
corresponding classical environment EC if, ∀ θ ∈ Θ, g(O(SPNEn(ΓEC ,G,θ))) = α(θ),
where ΓE
C ,G,θ ≡ (N,H, p, {ui((g(·), 1), θ)}i∈N).
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Let EC ∈ {DSEnnfg, NEnnfg, SPNEn}.
Definition SCC α is strongly/fully EC-implementable in environment E if there exists
a mechanism G ∈ G and an EDS assignment (e, d) ∈ A such that G strongly/fully EC-
implements α in E under assignment (e, d).
4.2 Conditions for the Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
Let E ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {ui}i∈N ,G,R,A) be an environment with delegative en-
forcement power, and let α be a SCC for environment E.
Definition SCC α is consistent with environment E if there exists an EDS assign-
ment (e, d) ∈ A such that, ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X × Θ satisfying x ∈ α(θ), we have that
R(e,d)(x, θ) = (x, 1).
Corollary 4.1, 4.2 and Proposition 4.3 are the counterparts of Proposition 3.1, 3.2 and
3.3, respectively. Our proofs for Proposition 4.2 and 4.3 are again based on Lemma 3.2
and 3.3. Proposition 4.1 and Corollary 4.1 hold true for all three equilibrium concepts
considered throughout this paper, i.e., for each EC ∈ {DSEnnfg, NEnnfg, SPNEn}.
Proposition 4.1 If a mechanism G ∈ G fully EC-implements α in environment E un-
der an assignment (e, d) ∈ A, then R(e,d)(x, θ) = (x, 1) ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X ×Θ s.t. x ∈ α(θ).
Proof
Let G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) ∈ Gstrat be the mechanism that fully EC-implements α in
environment E (EC ∈ {NEnnfg, DSEnnfg}). The proof for G ∈ Gstrat is analogous.
Consider an arbitrary tuple (θ, x) ∈ Θ×X such that x ∈ α(θ).
Since, by definition, mechanism G∗(e,d) fully EC-implements α∗(e,d) in environment
E∗(e,d), there exists an EC-Equilibrium s ∈ S1× . . .×Sn of the game induced by G∗(e,d)
and θ in E∗(e,d) that satisfies g∗(e,d)(s, θ) = R(e,d)(g(s), θ) = (x, 1).
Since R(e,d)(g(s), θ) ∈ {(g(s), 1), (g(s), 2)}, the preceding implies that g(s) = x and
R(e,d)(x, θ) = (x, 1).
2
Corollary 4.1 If α is fully EC-implementable in environment E, then α is consistent
with environment E.
Proposition 4.2 If a mechanism G ∈ Gstrat fully NEnnfg-implements α in environment
E under an assignment (e, d) ∈ A, then, ∀ (θ, θ′, x) ∈ Θ × Θ ×X satisfying x ∈ α(θ)
and R(e,d)(x, θ′) 6∈ α(θ′)× {1}, there exists a tuple (i, y) ∈ N ×X s.t.
ui(R
(e,d)(y, θ′), θ′) > ui(R(e,d)(x, θ′), θ′) and ui(R(e,d)(y, θ), θ) ≤ ui(R(e,d)(x, θ), θ).
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Proof
By defintion of LE and DE Implementation, mechanism G fully NEnnfg-implements α
in the abstract n-person environment with an unrestricted realization function E(e,d) ≡
(N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {ui}i∈N ,G, R(e,d)) (identifying space X × {2} with X × {0}).
By Lemma 3.2, ∀ (θ, x) ∈ Θ×X s.t. x ∈ α(θ), there exists an outcome x′ ∈ X which
satisfies R(e,d)(x′, θ) = (x, 1) and the following condition:
∀ θ′ ∈ Θ s.t. R(e,d)(x′, θ′) 6∈ α(θ′)× {1} there exists a tuple (i, y) ∈ N ×X s.t.
ui(R
(e,d)(y, θ′), θ′) > ui(R(e,d)(x′, θ′), θ′) and ui(R(e,d)(y, θ), θ) ≤ ui(R(e,d)(x′, θ), θ).
Since R(e,d)(y, θ) ∈ {(y, 1), (y, 2)} ∀ (y, θ) ∈ X × Θ, the only outcome x′ ∈ X which
can satisfy R(e,d)(x′, θ) = (x, 1) is outcome x itself.
Thus, ∀ (θ, x) ∈ Θ × X s.t. x ∈ α(θ), we have that R(e,d)(x, θ) = (x, 1) and that
∀ θ′ ∈ Θ s.t. R(e,d)(x, θ′) 6∈ α(θ′) × {1} there exists a tuple (i, y) ∈ N × X s.t.
ui(R
(e,d)(y, θ′), θ′) > ui(R(e,d)(x, θ′), θ′) and ui(R(e,d)(y, θ), θ) ≤ ui(R(e,d)(x, θ), θ).
2
Corollary 4.2 (Necessary condition for full implementation in Nash Equilibrium)
If α is fully NEnnfg-implementable in environment E, then there exists an EDS assign-
ment (e, d) ∈ A such that the condition of Proposition 4.2 is satisfied.
Proposition 4.3 (Sufficient condition for full implementation in Nash Equilibrium)
If G is the set of all strategic mechanisms for (N,X), ]N ≥ 3, and there exists an EDS
assignment (e, d) ∈ A such that α satisfies
(i) the necessary condition of Proposition 4.2, and
(ii) R(e,d)(x, θ) ∈ α(θ)× {1} ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X ×Θ that satisfy
]{i ∈ N | ui(R(e,d)(x, θ), θ) ≥ ui(R(e,d)(y, θ), θ) ∀ y ∈ X} ≥ n− 1,
then α is fully NEnnfg-implementable in environment E.
Proof
We only have to show that, ∀ (θ, x) ∈ Θ × X such that x ∈ α(θ), there exists an
outcome x′ ∈ X which satisfies R(e,d)(x′, θ) = (x, 1) and the following condition:
∀ θ′ ∈ Θ s.t. R(e,d)(x′, θ′) 6∈ α(θ′)× {1} there exists a tuple (i, y) ∈ N ×X s.t.
ui(R
(e,d)(y, θ′), θ′) > ui(R(e,d)(x′, θ′), θ′) and ui(R(e,d)(y, θ), θ) ≤ ui(R(e,d)(x′, θ), θ).
Lemma 3.3 then implies that α is fully NEnnfg-implementable in the abstract n-person
environment with an unrestricted realization function E(e,d) ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ,
{ui}i∈N ,G, R(e,d)) (identifying space X × {2} with X × {0}), and it remains to note
that, by definition of LE and DE Implementation, the mechanism G ∈ Gstrat which
fully NEnnfg-implements α in E
(e,d) also fully NEnnfg-implements α in E under (e, d).
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Consider arbitrary (θ, x) ∈ Θ×X satisfying x ∈ α(θ).
If we can proof that R(e,d)(x, θ) = (x, 1), then assumption (i) directly implies that
x′ := x is an outcome as required.
Assume, to the contrary, that R(e,d)(x, θ) = (x, 2). Then, in particular, R(e,d)(x, θ) 6∈
α(θ)× {1}, and, by assumption (i), there exists a tuple (i, y) such that
ui(R
(e,d)(y, θ), θ) > ui(R
(e,d)(x, θ), θ) and ui(R
(e,d)(y, θ), θ) ≤ ui(R(e,d)(x, θ), θ),
a contradiction.
2
4.3 Nash-Implementability in Replica Environments
Let Eˆ ≡ (Nˆ ,X, {Θi}i∈Nˆ , Θˆ, {uˆi}i∈N , Gˆ, Rˆ, Aˆ) be an nˆ-person environment with de-
legative enforcement power, and let αˆ be a SCC for environment Eˆ. Furthermore,
suppose that E˜ is a (possibly asymmetric) ‘replica of environment Eˆ’ and that α˜ is
‘the corresponding extension of αˆ’ :
Let E˜ ≡ (N˜ ,X, {Θi}i∈N˜ , Θ˜, {u˜i}i∈N , G˜, R˜, A˜) be an n˜-person environment with dele-
gative enforcement power, let α˜ be a SCC for environment E˜, and let ι : N˜ → Nˆ be a
mapping, such that
ι(i) = i ∀ i ∈ Nˆ ,
n˜ > nˆ,
Θi = Θι(i) ∀ i ∈ N˜ ,
Θ˜ = T (Θˆ),
u˜i(·, T (θˆ)) ≡ uˆι(i)(·, θˆ) ∀ (i, θ) ∈ N˜ × Θˆ, and
α˜(T (θˆ)) = αˆ(θˆ) ∀ θˆ ∈ Θˆ,
where T : Θˆ→ Θ˜ is defined by T (θˆ) := (θˆ1, . . . , θˆnˆ, θˆι(nˆ+1), . . . , θˆι(n˜)) ∀ θˆ ∈ Θˆ.
According to Corollary 4.2, if α˜ is fully NEnnfg-implementable in environment E˜, then
there exists an EDS assignment (e, d) ∈ A˜ such that the condition of Proposition 4.2 is
satisfied. Now, suppose that all possible EDS assignments are available to the designer
both in environment Eˆ and E˜:
Aˆ is the set of all EDS assignments for (Nˆ ,X), and
A˜ is the set of all EDS assignments for (N˜ ,X).
If all possible EDS assignments are available to the designer, the number of available
assignments increases in the number of agents at an increasing rate. Analysing the
Nash-implementability of a (social) choice correspondence by the use of Corollary 4.2,
the number of available assignments, in turn, increases the maximum number of EDS
assignments that have to be checked with respect to the condition of Proposition 4.2.
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If Eˆ is a classical n-person environment and αˆ is a SCC for environment E, and if envi-
ronment E˜ is a replica of E (in the sense described above) and α˜ is the corresponding
extension of α, then it is easy to see that either Maskin-monotonicity is satisfied by
both αˆ in Eˆ and α˜ in E˜ or it is not satisfied by both αˆ in Eˆ and α˜ in E˜. In the
following, we will show that this equivalence extends to environments with delegative
enforcement power.
Lemma 4.4
(i) For each realization function Rˆ ∈ Rˆ, there exists a realization function R˜ ∈ R˜
such that Rˆ(x, θˆ) = R˜(x, T (θˆ)) ∀ (x, θˆ) ∈ X × Θˆ.
(ii) For each realization function R˜ ∈ R˜, there exists a realization function Rˆ ∈ Rˆ
such that Rˆ(x, θˆ) = R˜(x, T (θˆ)) ∀ (x, θˆ) ∈ X × Θˆ.
Proof
(i) Let Rˆ ∈ Rˆ. Then, there exists an EDS assignment (eˆ, d) ∈ Aˆ such that
Rˆ(x, θˆ) = Rˆ(eˆ,d)(x, θˆ) ≡

(x, 1) if ∃ S ∈ Nˆ+ s.t. x ∈ eˆ(S) and
uˆi((x, 1), θˆ) ≥ uˆi(d(x, 0), θˆ) ∀ i ∈ S ∩ Nˆ
d(x, 0) otw.
on X × Θˆ, where Nˆ+ := {S | S ⊆ Nˆ+, S 6= ∅}.
For each S ∈ N˜+ := {S | S ⊆ N˜+, S 6= ∅}, there exists a unique decomposition
S = Sˆ ∪˙ S˜ such that Sˆ ∈ Nˆ+ and S˜ ∈ N˜+\Nˆ+. Throughout the proof of (i), we
let, for each S ∈ N˜+, Sˆ and S˜ denote the respective parts of this decomposition.
Let e˜ : N˜+ ⇒ X be defined by e˜(S) := eˆ(Sˆ) ∀ S ∈ N˜+. Then,
(a) e˜(S) ⊇ e˜(S ′) ∀ (S, S ′) ∈ N˜+ × N˜+ satisfying S ⊇ S ′:
Let (S, S ′) ∈ N˜+×N˜+ satisfying S ⊇ S ′. Then, e˜(S) = e˜(Sˆ ∪˙ S˜) = eˆ(Sˆ),
and e˜(S ′) = e˜(Sˆ ′ ∪˙ S˜ ′) = eˆ(Sˆ ′).
Since (eˆ, d) is an EDS assignment for (Nˆ ,X) and (S ⊇ S ′ implies that)
Sˆ ⊇ Sˆ ′, we have that eˆ(Sˆ) ⊇ eˆ(Sˆ ′). It follows that e˜(S) = eˆ(Sˆ) ⊇ eˆ(Sˆ ′) =
e˜(S ′).
(b) e˜(S ∪ {0}) = e˜(S) ∪ e˜({0}) ∀ S ∈ N˜ :
Let S ∈ N˜ . Then, e˜(S) = e˜(Sˆ ∪˙ S˜) = eˆ(Sˆ), e˜(S ∪ {0}) = e˜((Sˆ ∪˙ {0}) ∪
S˜) = eˆ(Sˆ ∪ {0}), and e˜({0}) = eˆ({0}).
Since (eˆ, d) is an EDS assignment for (Nˆ ,X), we have that eˆ(Sˆ ∪ {0}) =
eˆ(Sˆ) ∪ eˆ({0}). It follows that e˜(S ∪ {0}) = eˆ(Sˆ ∪ {0}) = eˆ(Sˆ) ∪ eˆ({0}) =
e˜(S) ∪ e˜({0}).
(c) d(x, 0) = (x, 2) ∀ x ∈ e˜({0}):
Since (eˆ, d) is an EDS assignment for (Nˆ ,X), we have that d(x, 0) =
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(x, 2) ∀ x ∈ eˆ({0}). It follows that d(x, 0) = (x, 2) ∀ x ∈ e˜({0}) = eˆ({0}).
(d) e˜(N˜) ∪ e˜({0}) = X and e˜(N˜) ∩ e˜({0}) = ∅:
By definition of e˜, we have that e˜(N˜) = e˜(Nˆ ∪ (N˜\Nˆ)) = eˆ(Nˆ), and
e˜({0}) = eˆ({0}).
Since (eˆ, d) is an EDS assignment for (Nˆ ,X), we have that eˆ(Nˆ)∪eˆ({0}) =
X and eˆ(Nˆ)∩ eˆ({0}) = ∅. It follows that e˜(N˜)∪ e˜({0}) = eˆ(Nˆ)∪ eˆ({0}) =
X and e˜(N˜) ∩ e˜({0}) = eˆ(Nˆ) ∩ eˆ({0}) = ∅.
Properties (a) to (d) imply that (e˜, d) is an EDS assignment for (N˜ ,X), and
therefore, by assumption, an element of A˜.
Let R˜ : X × T (Θˆ)→ (X × {1}) ∪ (X × {2}) be defined by
R˜(x, T (θˆ)) := R˜(e˜,d)(x, T (θˆ))
≡

(x, 1) if ∃ S ∈ N˜+ s.t. x ∈ e˜(S) and
u˜i((x, 1), T (θˆ)) ≥ u˜i(d(x, 0), T (θˆ)) ∀ i ∈ S ∩ N˜
d(x, 0) otw.
on X × Θˆ, and note that, in particular, R˜ ∈ R˜.
If the condition
∃ S ∈ N˜+ s.t. x ∈ e˜(S) and u˜i((x, 1), T (θˆ)) ≥ u˜i(d(x, 0), T (θˆ)) ∀ i ∈ S ∩ N˜
is equivalent to the condition
∃ S ∈ Nˆ+ s.t. x ∈ eˆ(S) and uˆi((x, 1), θˆ) ≥ uˆi(d(x, 0), θˆ) ∀ i ∈ S ∩ Nˆ
for each (x, θˆ) ∈ X × Θˆ, then we have that R˜(x, T (θˆ)) = Rˆ(x, θˆ) on X × Θˆ,
which proves part (i). To see this equivalence, consider the two directions:
’⇒’ Let S ∈ N˜+ satisfy the first condition. Then, Sˆ satisfies the second
condition: x ∈ e˜(S) = e˜(Sˆ ∪˙ S˜) = eˆ(Sˆ), and, for each i ∈ Sˆ ∩ Nˆ , we have
that uˆi((x, 1), θˆ) = u˜i((x, 1), T (θˆ)) ≥ u˜i(d(x, 0), T (θˆ)) = uˆi(d(x, 0), θˆ).
’⇐’ Let S ∈ Nˆ+ satisfy the second condition. Then, S = Sˆ also satisfies the
first condition: x ∈ eˆ(S) = e˜(Sˆ ∪˙ ∅) = e˜(Sˆ) = e˜(S), and for each i ∈ S ∩
N˜ = S ∩ Nˆ we have that u˜i((x, 1), T (θˆ)) = uˆi((x, 1), θˆ) ≥ uˆi(d(x, 0), θˆ) =
u˜i(d(x, 0), T (θˆ)).
(ii) Let R˜ ∈ R˜. Then, there exists an EDS assignment (e˜, d) ∈ A˜ such that
R˜(x, T (θˆ)) = R˜(e˜,d)(x, T (θˆ))
≡

(x, 1) if ∃ S ∈ N˜+ s.t. x ∈ e˜(S) and
u˜i((x, 1), T (θˆ)) ≥ u˜i(d(x, 0), T (θˆ)) ∀ i ∈ S ∩ N˜
d(x, 0) otw.
on X × Θˆ.
Let eˆ : Nˆ+ ⇒ X be constructed according to the following instructions:
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(1) eˆ({0}) := e˜({0}).
(2) ∀ (x, θˆ) ∈ X\eˆ({0})× Θˆ satisfying R˜(e˜,d)(x, T (θˆ)) = (x, 1), let outcome x
be an element of eˆ({i ∈ Nˆ | u˜i((x, 1), T (θˆ)) ≥ u˜i(d(x, 0), T (θˆ))}).
(3) ∀ x ∈ X\eˆ({0}), let outcome x be an element of eˆ(Nˆ).
(4) ∀ S ∈ Nˆ , let all outcomes in ⋃S′∈Nˆ ,S′⊆S,S′ 6=S eˆ(S ′) be an element of eˆ(S).
(5) eˆ(S ∪ {0}) := eˆ(S) ∪˙ eˆ({0}) ∀ S ∈ Nˆ .
Then,
(a) eˆ(S) ⊇ eˆ(S ′) ∀ (S, S ′) ∈ Nˆ+ × N˜+ satisfying S ⊇ S ′,
(b) eˆ(S ∪ {0}) = eˆ(S) ∪ eˆ({0}) ∀ S ∈ N˜ ,
(c) d(x, 0) = (x, 2) ∀ x ∈ eˆ({0}),
(d) eˆ(Nˆ) ∪ eˆ({0}) = X and eˆ(Nˆ) ∩ eˆ({0}) = ∅.
Conditions (a) to (d) are a direct consequence of eˆ’s construction,38 and imply
that (eˆ, d) is an EDS assignment for (Nˆ ,X). Therefore, by assumption, (eˆ, d) is
an element of Aˆ.
Now, let Rˆ : X × Θˆ→ (X × {1}) ∪ (X × {2}) be defined by
Rˆ(x, θˆ) := Rˆ(eˆ,d)(x, θˆ)
≡

(x, 1) if ∃ S ∈ Nˆ+ s.t. x ∈ eˆ(S) and
uˆi((x, 1), θˆ) ≥ uˆi(d(x, 0), θˆ) ∀ i ∈ S ∩ Nˆ
d(x, 0) otw.
on X × Θˆ, and note that, in particular, Rˆ ∈ Rˆ.
If the condition
∃ S ∈ N˜+ s.t. x ∈ e˜(S) and u˜i((x, 1), T (θˆ)) ≥ u˜i(d(x, 0), T (θˆ)) ∀ i ∈ S ∩ N˜
is equivalent to the condition
∃ S ∈ Nˆ+ s.t. x ∈ eˆ(S) and uˆi((x, 1), θˆ) ≥ uˆi(d(x, 0), θˆ) ∀ i ∈ S ∩ Nˆ
for each (x, θˆ) ∈ X×Θˆ, then we have that Rˆ(x, θˆ) = R˜(x, T (θˆ)) on X×Θˆ, which
proves part (ii). To see this equivalence, consider the two directions:
’⇒’ First, note that, if there exits a coalition S ∈ N˜+ that satisfies the first
condition, then either there exists a coalition S ∈ N˜ that satisfies the
first condition or the coalition S = {0} satisfies the first condition.39
If a coalition S ∈ N˜ satisfies the first condition, then
Sˆ := {i ∈ Nˆ | u˜i((x, 1), T (θˆ)) ≥ u˜i(d(x, 0), T (θˆ))}
is nonempty and thus an element of Nˆ+. And, since
38In particular, since d(x, 0) = (x, 2) ∀ x ∈ e˜({0}), condition (c) follows from step (1) of eˆ’s
construction.
39Remember that e˜(N˜) ∪ e˜({0}) = X and e˜(N˜) ∩ e˜({0}) = ∅.
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• x ∈ eˆ(Sˆ) by construction of eˆ, and
• uˆi((x, 1), θˆ) = u˜i((x, 1), T (θˆ)) ≥ u˜i(d(x, 0), T (θˆ)) = uˆi(d(x, 0), θˆ)
∀ i ∈ Sˆ ∩ Nˆ = Sˆ,
Sˆ satisfies the second condition.
If S = {0} satisfies the first condition, then Sˆ := {0} ∈ Nˆ+ satisfies the
second condition.
’⇐’ First, note that, if there exits a coalition S ∈ Nˆ+ that satisfies the second
condition, then either there exists a coalition S ∈ Nˆ that satisfies the
second condition or the coalition S = {0} satisfies the second condition.
If S = {0} satisfies the second condition, then S˜ := {0} ∈ N˜+ satisfies
the first condition.
If S = Nˆ satisfies the second condition, then S˜ := N˜ ∈ N˜+ satisfies the
first condition, since
• (x ∈ eˆ(Nˆ) implies that x 6∈ eˆ({0}) = e˜({0}) and thus) x ∈ e˜(N˜),
and
• uˆi((x, 1), θˆ) ≥ uˆi(d(x, 0), θˆ) ∀ i ∈ Nˆ implies that u˜i((x, 1), T (θˆ)) =
uˆι(i)((x, 1), θˆ) ≥ uˆι(i)(d(x, 0), θˆ) = u˜i(d(x, 0), T (θˆ)) ∀ i ∈ N˜ .
If a coalition S ∈ Nˆ , S 6= Nˆ , satisfies the second condition, then, by
construction of eˆ, there exists a subset Sˆ ⊆ S, Sˆ ∈ Nˆ , satisfying
∃ (θˆ′, S˜) ∈ Θˆ× N˜+, S˜ 6= {0}, such that
x ∈ e˜(S˜),
x ∈ eˆ(Sˆ),
u˜i((x, 1), T (θˆ
′)) ≥ u˜i(d(x, 0), T (θˆ′)) ∀ i ∈ S˜ ∩ N˜ , and
Sˆ = {i ∈ Nˆ | u˜i((x, 1), T (θˆ′)) ≥ u˜i(d(x, 0), T (θˆ′))}.
Coalition S˜ ∩ N˜ consists of members of Nˆ and replicas of members of Nˆ
(only). Let Mˆ denote the set of all such members, i.e. Mˆ := ι(S˜ ∩ N˜).
Since u˜i((x, 1), T (θˆ
′)) ≥ u˜i(d(x, 0), T (θˆ′)) ∀ i ∈ S˜ ∩ N˜ , all i ∈ Mˆ must
satisfy uˆi((x, 1), θˆ
′) ≥ uˆi(d(x, 0), θˆ′), i.e., must be an element of Sˆ = {i ∈
Nˆ | uˆi((x, 1), θˆ′) ≥ uˆi(d(x, 0), θˆ′)}. In other words, Mˆ ⊆ Sˆ.
By assumption, all i ∈ S satisfy uˆi((x, 1), θˆ) ≥ uˆi(d(x, 0), θˆ). Since Mˆ ⊆
Sˆ ⊆ S, all i ∈ Mˆ must satisfy this inequality as well. This implies that all
i ∈ S˜∩N˜ must satisfy u˜i((x, 1), T (θˆ)) = uˆι(i)((x, 1), θˆ) ≥ uˆι(i)(d(x, 0), θˆ) =
u˜i(d(x, 0), T (θˆ)). Therefore, coalition S˜ ∈ N˜+ satisfies the first condition.
2
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Proposition 4.4 The respective necessary condition for full implementation in Nash
Equilibrium as outlined in Corollary 4.2 is either satisfied in both environment Eˆ and
E˜ or it is not satisfied in both Eˆ and E˜:
Condition
(i) There exists an EDS assignment (eˆ, dˆ) ∈ Aˆ such that,
∀ (θˆ, θˆ′, x) ∈ Θˆ× Θˆ×X satisfying x ∈ αˆ(θˆ) and Rˆ(eˆ,dˆ)(x, θˆ′) 6∈ αˆ(θˆ′)× {1},
there exists a tuple (i, y) ∈ Nˆ ×X s.t.
uˆi(Rˆ
(eˆ,dˆ)(y, θˆ′), θˆ′) > uˆi(Rˆ(eˆ,dˆ)(x, θˆ′), θˆ′) and uˆi(Rˆ(eˆ,dˆ)(y, θˆ), θˆ) ≤ uˆi(Rˆ(eˆ,dˆ)(x, θˆ), θˆ).
is equivalent to condition
(ii) There exists an EDS assignment (e˜, d˜) ∈ A˜ such that,
∀ (θ˜, θ˜′, x) ∈ Θ˜× Θ˜×X satisfying x ∈ α˜(θ˜) and R˜(e˜,d˜)(x, θ˜′) 6∈ α˜(θ˜′)× {1},
there exists a tuple (i, y) ∈ N˜ ×X s.t.
u˜i(R˜
(e˜,d˜)(y, θ˜′), θ˜′) > u˜i(R˜(e˜,d˜)(x, θ˜′), θ˜′) and u˜i(R˜(e˜,d˜)(y, θ˜), θ˜) ≤ u˜i(R˜(e˜,d˜)(x, θ˜), θ˜).
Proof
’⇒’ According to Lemma 4.4(i), there exists an EDS assignment (e˜, d˜) ∈ A˜ such that
Rˆ(eˆ,dˆ)(x, θˆ) = R˜(e˜,d˜)(x, T (θˆ)) ∀ (x, θˆ) ∈ X × Θˆ.
Let (θˆ, θˆ′, x) ∈ Θˆ× Θˆ×X satisfy
x ∈ α˜(T (θˆ)) and R˜(e˜,d˜)(x, T (θˆ′)) 6∈ α˜(T (θˆ′))× {1}.
Then, x ∈ α˜(T (θˆ)) = αˆ(θˆ) and Rˆ(eˆ,dˆ)(x, θˆ′) = R˜(e˜,d˜)(x, T (θˆ′)) 6∈ α˜(T (θˆ′))×{1} =
αˆ(θˆ′)× {1}, and (i) implies that there exists a tuple (i, y) ∈ Nˆ ×X s.t.
uˆi(Rˆ
(eˆ,dˆ)(y, θˆ′), θˆ′) > uˆi(Rˆ(eˆ,dˆ)(x, θˆ′), θˆ′) and uˆi(Rˆ(eˆ,dˆ)(y, θˆ), θˆ) ≤ uˆi(Rˆ(eˆ,dˆ)(x, θˆ), θˆ).
Thus, (i, y) ∈ Nˆ ×X ⊆ N˜ ×X satisfies
u˜i(R˜
(e˜,d˜)(y, T (θˆ′)), T (θˆ′)) = uˆi(R˜(e˜,d˜)(y, T (θˆ′)), θˆ′) = uˆi(Rˆ(eˆ,dˆ)(y, θˆ′), θˆ′)
> uˆi(Rˆ
(eˆ,dˆ)(x, θˆ′), θˆ′) = uˆi(R˜(e˜,d˜)(x, T (θˆ′)), θˆ′) = u˜i(R˜(e˜,d˜)(x, T (θˆ′)), T (θˆ′))
and
u˜i(R˜
(e˜,d˜)(y, T (θˆ)), T (θˆ)) = uˆi(R˜
(e˜,d˜)(y, T (θˆ)), θˆ) = uˆi(Rˆ
(eˆ,dˆ)(y, θˆ), θˆ)
≤ uˆi(Rˆ(eˆ,dˆ)(x, θˆ), θˆ) = uˆi(R˜(e˜,d˜)(x, T (θˆ)), θˆ) = u˜i(R˜(e˜,d˜)(x, T (θˆ)), T (θˆ)).
’⇐’ According to Lemma 4.4(ii), there exists an EDS assignment (eˆ, dˆ) ∈ Aˆ such
that Rˆ(eˆ,dˆ)(x, θˆ) = R˜(e˜,d˜)(x, T (θˆ)) ∀ (x, θˆ) ∈ X × Θˆ.
Let (θˆ, θˆ′, x) ∈ Θˆ× Θˆ×X satisfy
x ∈ αˆ(θˆ) and Rˆ(eˆ,dˆ)(x, θˆ′) 6∈ αˆ(θˆ′)× {1}.
Then, x ∈ αˆ(θˆ) = α˜(T (θˆ)) and R˜(e˜,d˜)(x, T (θˆ′)) = Rˆ(eˆ,dˆ)(x, θˆ′) 6∈ αˆ(θˆ′) × {1} =
α˜(T (θˆ′))× {1}, and (ii) implies that there exists a tuple (i, y) ∈ N˜ ×X s.t.
u˜i(R˜
(e˜,d˜)(y, T (θˆ′)), T (θˆ′)) > u˜i(R˜(e˜,d˜)(x, T (θˆ′)), T (θˆ′)) and
u˜i(R˜
(e˜,d˜)(y, T (θˆ)), T (θˆ)) ≤ u˜i(R˜(e˜,d˜)(x, T (θˆ)), T (θˆ)).
Thus, (i, y) ∈ N˜ ×X satisfies (ι(i) ∈ Nˆ and)
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uˆι(i)(Rˆ
(eˆ,dˆ)(y, θˆ′), θˆ′) = uˆι(i)(R˜(e˜,d˜)(y, T (θˆ′)), θˆ′) = u˜i(R˜(e˜,d˜)(y, T (θˆ′)), T (θˆ′))
> u˜i(R˜
(e˜,d˜)(x, T (θˆ′)), T (θˆ′)) = uˆι(i)(R˜(e˜,d˜)(x, T (θˆ′)), θˆ′) = uˆι(i)(Rˆ(eˆ,dˆ)(x, θˆ′), θˆ′)
and
uˆι(i)(Rˆ
(eˆ,dˆ)(y, θˆ), θˆ) = uˆι(i)(R˜
(e˜,d˜)(y, T (θˆ)), θˆ) = u˜i(R˜
(e˜,d˜)(y, T (θˆ)), T (θˆ))
≤ u˜i(R˜(e˜,d˜)(x, T (θˆ)), T (θˆ)) = uˆι(i)(R˜(e˜,d˜)(x, T (θˆ)), θˆ) = uˆι(i)(Rˆ(eˆ,dˆ)(x, θˆ), θˆ).
2
Corollary 4.4 SCC α˜ satisfies the necessary condition for full Nash-implementation
in environment E˜ as outlined by Corollary 4.2 if and only if αˆ satisfies the respective
condition for full Nash-implementation in environment Eˆ.
In particular, if E is an environment with delegative enforcement power in which all
possible EDS assignments are available to the designer, and α is a SCC for E which
does not satisfy the necessary condition of Proposition 4.2 (and therefore is not fully
NEnnfg-implementable in E), then the corresponding extension of α is not fully NE
n
nfg-
implementable in any replica of E.
4.4 Implementability in Corresponding Environments
Let E ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {ui}i∈N ,G,R,A) be an environment with delegative en-
forcement power, let EC ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {u′i}i∈N ,G) denote its corresponding
classical environment, and let α be a SCC for environment E.
Let EC ∈ {NEnnfg, DSEnnfg, SPNEn}.
Proposition 4.5 is a consequence of Assumption 4.0.
Proposition 4.5 If α is strongly/fully EC-implementable in environment E’s corre-
sponding classical environment EC , then α is strongly/fully EC-implementable in E.
If A contains only the single EDS assignment (e, d) which satisfies e({0}) = X, then
α is strongly/fully EC-implementable in EC if and only if α is strongly/fully EC-
implementable in E.
Proof
Let (e, d) ∈ A denote the EDS assignment which satisfies e({0}) = X.
Let G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) ∈ Gstrat be a mechanism that fully EC-implements α in EC
(EC ∈ {DSEnnfg, NEnnfg}). The other cases are similar.
Since mechanism G fully EC-implements α in EC , we have that
g(EC(ΓE
C ,G,θ)) = α(θ) ∀ θ ∈ Θ,
where ΓE
C ,G,θ ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui((g(·), 1), θ)}i∈N).
Since R(e,d)(x, θ) = (x, 1) ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X ×Θ, this implies that
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R(e,d)(g(EC(ΓE
∗(e,d),G∗(e,d),θ)), θ) = {(x, 1) | x ∈ α(θ)} ∀ θ ∈ Θ,
where ΓE
∗(e,d),G∗(e,d),θ ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui(R(e,d)(g(·), θ), θ)}i∈N).
Thus, α is fully EC-implementable in E.
If A = {(e, d)}, and α is fully EC-implementable in E, then there exists a mechanism
G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) ∈ Gstrat that fully EC-implements α in E under (e, d). Since
R(e,d)(x, θ) = (x, 1) ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X × Θ, we obtain that α is fully EC-implementable in
environment E’s corresponding classical environment EC .
2
Remark 4.5 If α is not fully NEnnfg-implementable in environment E’s corresponding
classical environment EC , and A contains more EDS assignments than just the single
EDS assignment (e, d) which satisfies e({0}) = X, then, in general, α may be fully
NEnnfg-implementable in environment E. However, in general, α may not be fully
NEnnfg-implementable in environment E even though A is the set of all possible EDS
assignments for (N,X).
Example 4.5 and 4.6 illustrate each of the two cases. In particular, the former one
provides an example of a replica environment.
Example 4.5
Let E ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {ui}i∈N ,G,R,A) be an n-person environment with dele-
gative enforcement power, where
N = {1, 2, 3},
X = {x0, x1, x2},
Θi = {θˆi, θ˜i} ∀ i ∈ N ,
Θ = {θˆ ≡ (θˆ1, θˆ2, θˆ3), θ˜ ≡ (θ˜1, θ˜2, θ˜3)},
u2((x0, 1), θ) = u3((x0, 1), θ) = 2 ∀ θ ∈ Θ, u1((x0, 1), θˆ) = 1, u1((x0, 1), θ˜) = 3,
u2((x1, 1), θ) = u3((x1, 1), θ) = 3 ∀ θ ∈ Θ, u1((x1, 1), θˆ) = 1, u1((x1, 1), θ˜) = 2,
u2((x2, 1), θ) = u3((x2, 1), θ) = 1 ∀ θ ∈ Θ, u1((x2, 1), θˆ) = 2, u1((x2, 1), θ˜) = 1,
ui((xj, 2), θ) = ui((xj, 1), θ) ∀ (i, j, θ) ∈ N × {0, 1, 2} ×Θ,40
G is the set of strategic n-person mechanisms for (N,X), and
A is a set of EDS assignments containing the assignment (e∗, d∗) defined by
e∗(S) :=

X if S = N or S = N+
∅ if S = {0}
{x0} otw.
∀ S ∈ N+ and
40I.e., each agent is indifferent between an outcome being implemented ‘right after the mechanism
has been played’ and the same outcome being implemented as the default outcome.
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d∗(x, 0) := (x2, 2) ∀ x ∈ X.41
Thus, realization function R(e
∗,d∗) satisfies
R(e
∗,d∗)(x, θ)
=

(x, 1) if ∃ S ∈ N+ s.t. x ∈ e∗(S) and
ui((x, 1), θ) ≥ ui((d∗(x, 0), θ) ∀ i ∈ S ∩N
d∗(x, 0) otw.
=

(x0, 1) if x = x0 and ui((x, 1), θ) ≥ ui((d∗(x, 0), θ) for some i ∈ N
(x, 1) if x 6= x0 and ui((x, 1), θ) ≥ ui((d∗(x, 0), θ) ∀ i ∈ N
d∗(x, 0) otw.
=

(x0, 1) if x = x0 and ui((x, 1), θ) ≥ ui((x2, 1), θ) for some i ∈ N
(x, 1) if x 6= x0 and ui((x, 1), θ) ≥ ui((x2, 1), θ) ∀ i ∈ N
(x2, 2) otw.
=

(x0, 1) if x = x0
(x1, 1) if x = x1 and θ = θˆ
(x2, 2) if x = x1 and θ = θ˜
(x2, 1) if x = x2
=
 (x2, 2) if x = x1 and θ = θˆ(x, 1) otw.
on X ×Θ.
Let EC ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {u′i}i∈N ,G) denote E’s corresponding classical environ-
ment, i.e., u′i(x, θ) = ui((x, 1), θ) ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X×Θ, and let α be the SCC for environment
E defined by
α(θ) :=
 {x0} if θ = θˆ{x1} if θ = θ˜ ∀ θ ∈ Θ.
In particular, since R(e
∗,d∗)(x0, θˆ) = (x0, 1) and R
(e∗,d∗)(x1, θ˜) = (x1, 1), α is consistent
with environment E.
SCC α is fully NEnnfg-implementable in environment E, since both conditions of Propo-
sition 4.3 are satisfied with respect to EDS assignment (e∗, d∗). See the corresponding
part in Example 3.5(c), replacing R by R(e
∗,d∗) and every tuple (x1, 0) by (x2, 2).
However, SCC α is not fully NEnnfg-implementable in environment E
C , since α is not
Maskin-monotonic in EC . Again, see the corresponding part in Example 3.5(c).
41Note that e∗ is an enforcement structure for (N,X) (as defined in Chapter 3).
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4.4.1 Two-Agents–Two-Outcomes Environments
Let E ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {ui}i∈N ,G,R,A) be a two-person environment with dele-
gative enforcement power such that X ≡ {x1, x2} contains only two outcomes and A
is the set of all EDS assignments for (N,X). Let α be a SCC for environment E.
Assume, without loss of generality,42 that ui((x, 1), θ) ∈ {1, 2} ∀ (i, x, θ) ∈ N ×X ×Θ,
and that, ∀ (i, θ) ∈ N ×Θ, there exists an outcome x ∈ X such that ui((x, 1), θ) = 1.43
Furthermore, assume that ui((x, 2), θ) = ui((x, 1), θ)− l ∀ (i, x, θ) ∈ N ×X×Θ, where
l ∈ R+ := {r ∈ R | r ≥ 0}. If l = 0, then all agents are indifferent between an outcome
being implemented ‘right after the mechanism has been played’ or the same outcome
being implemented as the default outcome by the designer. If l > 0, then an outcome
being implemented ‘right after the mechanism has been played’ is strictly preferred to
the same outcome being implemented as the default outcome by the designer.
We proof the following lemma in Appendix E.
Lemma 4.6 Suppose that α is not Maskin-monotonic in environment E’s correspond-
ing classical environment EC , i.e. that ∃ (x, θ, θ′) ∈ X ×Θ×Θ such that
(i) x ∈ α(θ) and x 6∈ α(θ′),
(ii) u1((y, 1), θ
′) ≤ u1((x, 1), θ′) or u1((y, 1), θ) > u1((x, 1), θ), and
(iii) u2((y, 1), θ
′) ≤ u2((x, 1), θ′) or u2((y, 1), θ) > u2((x, 1), θ),
where y ∈ X denotes the uniquely determined outcome y 6= x. Then, in particular,
outcome y is an element of α(θ′) (since α(θ′) ⊆ {x, y}, α(θ′) 6= ∅, and x 6∈ α(θ′)).
If l ≥ 1, then each EDS assignment (e, d) ∈ A such that R(e,d)(x, θ) = (x, 1) and
R(e,d)(y, θ′) = (y, 1) satisfies condition (iv) below, i.e., every suggested outcome is
implemented ‘right after the mechanism has been played’.
If either l ∈ (0, 1) and y ∈ α(θ), or if l = 0, then, for each EDS assignment (e, d) ∈ A
satisfying R(e,d)(x, θ) = (x, 1) and R(e,d)(y, θ′) = (y, 1), at least one of the following four
conditions is satisfied:
(iv) R(e,d)(x, θ′) = (x, 1) and R(e,d)(y, θ) = (y, 1).
(v) y ∈ α(θ) and R(e,d)(y, θ) = d(y, 0).
(vi) u1(R
(e,d)(y, θ′), θ′) ≤ u1(R(e,d)(x, θ′), θ′) or u1(R(e,d)(y, θ), θ) > u1(R(e,d)(x, θ), θ),
u2(R
(e,d)(y, θ′), θ′) ≤ u2(R(e,d)(x, θ′), θ′) or u2(R(e,d)(y, θ), θ) > u2(R(e,d)(x, θ), θ).
(vii) R(e,d)(y, θ) 6∈ α(θ)× {1},
u1(R
(e,d)(x, θ), θ) ≤ u1(R(e,d)(y, θ), θ) or u1(R(e,d)(x, θ′), θ′) > u1(R(e,d)(y, θ′), θ′),
u2(R
(e,d)(x, θ), θ) ≤ u2(R(e,d)(y, θ), θ) or u2(R(e,d)(x, θ′), θ′) > u2(R(e,d)(y, θ′), θ′).
42Note that this assumption does not restrict the set of possible preference profiles over X × {1}.
43In other words, (ui((x1, 1), θ), ui((x2, 1), θ)) ∈ {(1, 1), (2, 1), (1, 2)} ∀ (i, θ) ∈ N ×Θ.
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Proposition 4.6 Suppose that α is not Maskin-monotonic in environment E’s corre-
sponding classical environment EC , i.e. that ∃ (x, θ, θ′) ∈ X ×Θ×Θ such that
(i) x ∈ α(θ) and x 6∈ α(θ′),
(ii) u1((y, 1), θ
′) ≤ u1((x, 1), θ′) or u1((y, 1), θ) > u1((x, 1), θ), and
(iii) u2((y, 1), θ
′) ≤ u2((x, 1), θ′) or u2((y, 1), θ) > u2((x, 1), θ),
where y ∈ X denotes the uniquely determined outcome y 6= x. If y ∈ α(θ) or l 6∈ (0, 1),
then α is not fully NEnnfg-implementable in environment E.
Proof
Assume, to the contrary, that α is fully NEnnfg-implementable in environment E, i.e.
that there exists a mechanism G ∈ Gstrat and an EDS assignment (e, d) ∈ A such that
G fully NEnnfg-implements α in E under assignment (e, d). Then, Proposition 4.1 and
4.2 imply that the following four conditions are satisfied:
(viii) R(e,d)(x, θ) = (x, 1) and R(e,d)(y, θ′) = (y, 1) (since x ∈ α(θ) and y ∈ α(θ′)).
(ix) If y ∈ α(θ), then R(e,d)(y, θ) = (y, 1).
(x) There exists an i ∈ N ≡ {1, 2} satisfying
ui(R
(e,d)(y, θ′), θ′) > ui(R(e,d)(x, θ′), θ′) and ui(R(e,d)(y, θ), θ) ≤ ui(R(e,d)(x, θ), θ)
(since, by condition (i), x ∈ α(θ) and R(e,d)(x, θ′) 6∈ α(θ′)× {1}).
(xi) If R(e,d)(y, θ) 6∈ α(θ)× {1}, then ∃ i ∈ N ≡ {1, 2} satisfying
ui(R
(e,d)(x, θ), θ) > ui(R
(e,d)(y, θ), θ) and ui(R
(e,d)(x, θ′), θ′) ≤ ui(R(e,d)(y, θ′), θ′)
(since y ∈ α(θ′)).
Since condition (viii) is satisfied, the preceding lemma implies that at least one of the
following four conditions is satisfied:44
(iv) R(e,d)(x, θ′) = (x, 1) and R(e,d)(y, θ) = (y, 1).
(v) y ∈ α(θ) and R(e,d)(y, θ) = d(y, 0).
(vi) u1(R
(e,d)(y, θ′), θ′) ≤ u1(R(e,d)(x, θ′), θ′) or u1(R(e,d)(y, θ), θ) > u1(R(e,d)(x, θ), θ),
u2(R
(e,d)(y, θ′), θ′) ≤ u2(R(e,d)(x, θ′), θ′) or u2(R(e,d)(y, θ), θ) > u2(R(e,d)(x, θ), θ).
(vii) R(e,d)(y, θ) 6∈ α(θ)× {1},
u1(R
(e,d)(x, θ), θ) ≤ u1(R(e,d)(y, θ), θ) or u1(R(e,d)(x, θ′), θ′) > u1(R(e,d)(y, θ′), θ′),
u2(R
(e,d)(x, θ), θ) ≤ u2(R(e,d)(y, θ), θ) or u2(R(e,d)(x, θ′), θ′) > u2(R(e,d)(y, θ′), θ′).
If condition (iv) is satisfied, then conditions (ii),(iii), and (viii) imply that condition
(vi) is satisfied. Condition (v) contradicts condition (ix). Condition (vi) contradicts
condition (x). And, condition (vii) contradicts condition (xi).
2
44If y ∈ α(θ), then consider the three cases ‘l = 0’, ‘l ≥ 1’, and ‘l ∈ (0, 1)’. If l 6∈ (0, 1), then consider
the two cases ‘l = 0’ and ‘l ≥ 1’.
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Remark 4.6 Suppose that α is not Maskin-monotonic in environment E’s correspond-
ing classical environment EC , i.e. that ∃ (x, θ, θ′) ∈ X ×Θ×Θ such that
(i) x ∈ α(θ) and x 6∈ α(θ′),
(ii) u1((y, 1), θ
′) ≤ u1((x, 1), θ′) or u1((y, 1), θ) > u1((x, 1), θ), and
(iii) u2((y, 1), θ
′) ≤ u2((x, 1), θ′) or u2((y, 1), θ) > u2((x, 1), θ),
where y ∈ X denotes the uniquely determined outcome y 6= x. If y 6∈ α(θ) and
l ∈ (0, 1), then there may exist an EDS assignment (e, d) ∈ A such that the necessary
conditions (for full implementation in Nash Equilibrium) as outlined in Proposition 4.1
and 4.2 are satisfied. See Example 4.6.
Example 4.6
For each l ∈ R+, let E(l) ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {u(l)i }i∈N ,G,R(l),A) be the n-person
environment with delegative enforcement power, where
N = {1, 2},
X = {x1, x2},
Θi = {θˆi, θ˜i} ∀ i ∈ N ,
Θ = {θˆ ≡ (θˆ1, θˆ2), θ˜ ≡ (θ˜1, θ˜2)},
u
(l)
1 ((x1, 1), θˆ) = 1, u
(l)
1 ((x2, 1), θˆ) = 2, u
(l)
2 ((x1, 1), θˆ) = 2, u
(l)
2 ((x2, 1), θˆ) = 1,
u
(l)
1 ((x1, 1), θ˜) = 1, u
(l)
1 ((x2, 1), θ˜) = 1, u
(l)
2 ((x1, 1), θ˜) = 2, u
(l)
2 ((x2, 1), θ˜) = 1,
u
(l)
i ((xj, 2), θ) = u
(l)
i ((xj, 1), θ)− l ∀ (i, j, θ) ∈ N × {1, 2} ×Θ,
G is the set of strategic n-person mechanisms for (N,X), and
A is the set of all EDS assignments for (N,X).
Let EC = (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {u′i}i∈N ,G) denote each environment E(l)’s corresponding
classical environment, i.e., u′i(x, θ) = u
(l)
i ((x, 1), θ) ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X ×Θ (for some l ∈ R+).
Let α be the SCC for each environment E(l) defined by
α(θ) :=
 {x2} if θ = θˆ{x1} if θ = θ˜ ∀ θ ∈ Θ.
SCC α is not fully NEnnfg-implementable in environment E
C , since α is not Maskin-
monotonic in EC : x2 ∈ α(θˆ), x2 6∈ α(θ˜),
u′1(x1, θ˜) = 1 6> 1 = u′1(x2, θ˜), and
u′2(x1, θˆ) = 2 6≤ 1 = u′2(x2, θˆ).
And, by Proposition 4.6, this implies that, for each l 6∈ (0, 1), SCC α is not fully
NEnnfg-implementable in environment E
(l). In particular, E(l), l 6∈ (0, 1), provides an
example of an environment in which a (social) choice correspondence is not fully Nash-
implementable even though all possible EDS assignments are available to the designer.
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However, for each l ∈ (0, 1) and for each EDS assignment (e, d) ∈ A which satisfies
e({1, 2}) = {x1, x2}, e({0}) = e({2}) = ∅, d(x1, 0) = d(x2, 0) = (x2, 2),45
the necessary conditions as outlined in Proposition 4.1 and 4.2 are satisfied:
First,
R
(e,d)
(l) (x, θ) =

(x, 1) if ∃ S ∈ N+ s.t. x ∈ e(S) and
u
(l)
i ((x, 1), θ) ≥ u(l)i (d(x, 0), θ) ∀ i ∈ S ∩N
d(x, 0) otw.
=

(x, 1) if u
(l)
i ((x, 1), θ) ≥ u(l)i ((x2, 1), θ)− l ∀ i ∈ N
(x, 1) if x ∈ e({1}) and u(l)1 ((x, 1), θ) ≥ u(l)1 ((x2, 1), θ)− l
(x2, 2) otw.
=

(x, 1) if x = x1 and θ = θ˜
(x, 1) if x = x2
(x, 1) if x = x1 and
x ∈ e({1}) and u(l)1 ((x, 1), θ) ≥ u(l)1 ((x2, 1), θ)− l
(x2, 2) otw.
=
 (x2, 2) if x = x1 and θ = θˆ(x, 1) otw. (on X ×Θ)
= (x, 1) ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X ×Θ satisfying x ∈ α(θ).
Second, ∀ (θ, θ′, x) ∈ Θ × Θ × X satisfying x ∈ α(θ) and R(e,d)(l) (x, θ′) 6∈ α(θ′) × {1},
there exists a tuple (i, y) ∈ N ×X such that u(l)i (R(e,d)(l) (y, θ′), θ′) > u(l)i (R(e,d)(l) (x, θ′), θ′)
and u
(l)
i (R
(e,d)
(l) (y, θ), θ) ≤ u(l)i (R(e,d)(l) (x, θ), θ):
x1 ∈ α(θ˜), R(e,d)(l) (x1, θˆ) = (x2, 2) 6∈ α(θˆ)× {1},
u
(l)
1 (R
(e,d)
(l) (x2, θˆ), θˆ) = u
(l)
1 ((x2, 1), θˆ) = 2
> 2− l = u(l)1 ((x2, 2), θˆ) = u(l)1 (R(e,d)(l) (x1, θˆ), θˆ),
u
(l)
1 (R
(e,d)
(l) (x2, θ˜), θ˜) = u
(l)
1 ((x2, 1), θ˜) = 1
≤ 1 = u(l)1 ((x1, 1), θ˜) = u(l)1 (R(e,d)(l) (x1, θ˜), θ˜),
and
x2 ∈ α(θˆ), R(e,d)(l) (x2, θ˜) = (x2, 1) 6∈ α(θ˜)× {1},
u
(l)
2 (R
(e,d)
(l) (x1, θ˜), θ˜) = u
(l)
2 ((x1, 1), θ˜) = 2
> 1 = u
(l)
2 ((x2, 1), θ˜) = u
(l)
2 (R
(e,d)
(l) (x2, θ˜), θ˜),
u
(l)
2 (R
(e,d)
(l) (x1, θˆ), θˆ) = u
(l)
2 ((x2, 2), θˆ) = 1− l
≤ 1 = u(l)2 ((x2, 1), θˆ) = u(l)2 (R(e,d)(l) (x2, θˆ), θˆ).
45Note that this allows e to be an enforcement structure (as defined in Chapter 3).
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5 Classical and LE Implementation of Cooperative
Solution Concepts
As an application, we now discuss implications of limited enforcement power on two
different approaches to the implementation of cooperative solution concepts, with par-
ticular emphasis on the Core concept and the Nash Bargaining Solution concept.
One approach, by Trockel [52], is based on a “purely welfaristic” outcome space, and
leads to a rather positive result, an “Embedding Principle”: “. . . I propose a general
procedure of embedding the Nash program into the theory of implementation. That
procedure enables us in our framework to transform any support result from the Nash
program into an implementation result in mechanism theory.” Trockel’s approach has
positive implications on the implementability of the Nash Bargaining Solution concept
and, as we will show by presenting an appropriate support result, the Core concept.46
However, defining a set of single-valued solution concepts as the outcome space, his
approach placed in classical environments is bound to the assumption that the designer
can enforce agents to realize a single-valued solution concept without knowing the ac-
tual cooperative game — an assumption which might not be an adequate description of
many real-world situations. In the words of Trockel, “it may . . . be questioned whether
the outcome space and the mechanism employed for our . . . embedding lemma are
very reasonable from a practical point of view. Such considerations, however, lead us
immediately back to the question to what extent the presently established modeling of
implementation via game forms is an adequate one, a question that led Hurwicz (1994)
to suggest ‘genuine implementation’.”
In Section 5.3, we approach the question to what extent, i.e., for what assumptions
on the structure of beliefs, Trockel’s positive result and its implications concerning
the Nash Bargaining Solution concept and the Core concept extend to environments
with limited enforcement power, in which the designer has no enforcement power on
single-valued solution concepts.
Another approach to the implementation of cooperative solution concepts, by Dagan
and Serrano [9], is based on “coalitional games” specifying “physical outcomes” that
each coalition can achieve and that agents can evaluate according to some rational
46Note that the implementation of the Core as well as non-cooperative characterizations (or “foun-
dations” as termed by Bergin and Duggan [6]) of the Core, with respect to cooperative games (with
transferable as well as with non-transferable utility), specific exchange/production economies, and
with respect to different matching problems, are addressed by several articles. See, for example (and
also for further references), Bergin and Duggan [6] and Okada and Winter [36].
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preference relation (over these “physical outcomes”). Dagan and Serrano come to a
rather negative result in the form of a necessary condition, which, in particular (and
in contrast to the Core concept), affects the implementability of the Nash Bargaining
Solution concept: “. . . major solution concepts in coalitional games (e.g., the Nash
bargaining solution, the NTU-Shapley value) can be derived strategically only by con-
sidering the possibility of random outcomes: either chance moves, mixed strategies, or
pure strategy equilibrium refinements based on trembles must be part of the analysis.”
Our extension of Dagan and Serrano’s result in Section 5.4 indicates that in envi-
ronments with limited enforcement power, and in contrast to their result for classical
environments, not every solution concept which is fully implementable by an ordinally
invariant equilibrium concept must be ordinally invariant.
We begin our discussion with definitions and notation in Section 5.1. Section 5.2 con-
tinues with a more detailed description of Trockel’s [52] approach to the implementation
of cooperative solution concepts.
5.1 Definitions
Throughout this chapter, let n ∈ N, n ≥ 2.
For any partition R of Nn (i.e., for any collection of disjoint nonempty subsets of Nn
whose union is Nn) and each i ∈ Nn, let R(i) denote the element of R that contains i.
The definitions in Paragraph 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 are standard.47 The definitions in Para-
graph 5.1.3 and 5.1.4 are based on Dagan and Serrano [9].48
5.1.1 NTU Games and the Core
Definition An n-person game in characteristic form with nontransferable utility (an
n-person NTU game) is a tuple (N, V ), where N ≡ {1, . . . , n} is the set of players, and
V is a correspondence that assigns to each coalition S ∈ N := {S | S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅} a
(possibly empty) utility possibility set V (S) ⊆ RS.
Note that we often identify an n-person NTU-game (N, V ) with its correspondence V .
For every pair of coalitions (S, S ′) ∈ N ×N , S ′ ⊆ S, and each element u ∈ RS, we let
uS′ denote the projection of u to the coordinates corresponding to coalition S
′.
47See, for example, Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green [29] (Appendix A to Chapter 18 and Section
22.E), Rosenmu¨ller [42] (Chapter 4) and [43] (Chapter 8).
48These kind of games are also considered by several other authors. See, for example, Osborne
and Rubinstein [37], pp. 268-269, 274-275, 299-301, and 312. (Osborne and Rubinstein use the term
“consequences” instead of “physical outcomes”.)
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Let Vn denote the set of all n-person NTU games V satisfying Fup (V ) 6= ∅, where
Fup (V ) := {u ∈ RN | ∃ a partition R of N s.t.uS ∈ V (S) ∀ S ∈ R} denotes the set of
feasible utility profiles in game (N, V ).
Let Cnntu ⊆ Vn be nonempty. The following definition is implicit in several sources, and
explicitly stated, for example, in Trockel [52].49
Definition A solution concept for Cnntu is a correspondence L that assigns to each game
(N, V ) ∈ Cnntu a (possibly empty) subset L(V ) of its feasible utility profiles Fup (V ).
Defintion The Core of (N, V ) ∈ Vn is the set of utility allocations in the utility
possibility set of the grand coalition with the property that no coalition could on its
own make all of its members better off, i.e. Core(V ) := {u ∈ V (N) | @ (a blocking
coalition) S ∈ N for which ∃ u′ ∈ V (S) s.t. u′i > ui ∀ i ∈ S}.
5.1.2 Bargaining Games and the Nash Bargaining Solution
An n-person bargaining game is a tuple (N,U, u∗), where N ≡ {1, . . . , n} is the set
of players, U ⊆ RN is the utility possibility set, and u∗ ∈ U is the status-quo utility
allocation. In the words of Mas-Colell et al. [29], “the set U represents the allocations
of utility that can be settled on if there is cooperation among the different agents.
The point u∗ is the outcome that will occur if there is a breakdown of cooperation.”
Formally, a bargaining game can be considered as a specific NTU game.
Definition An n-person bargaining game in NTU form (with status quo 0 ∈ RN) is an
n-person NTU game (N, V ) satisfying V (S) = {0} ∀ S ∈ N \{N} and 0 ∈ V (N).
Let Bn denote the set of all n-person bargaining games in NTU form (N, V ) satisfying
V (N) ⊆ RN+ is compact, convex, and comprehensive with respect to RN+ ,50
and maxu∈V (N) ui = 1 ∀ i ∈ N .
Note that as far as we restrict our analysis of bargaining games to the Nash Bargaining
Solution concept, which is “independent of utility origins” and “independent of utility
units” as termed by Mas-Colell et al. [29] (Rosenmu¨ller [43] uses the terminology
“covariant with affine transformation of utility”), the formal restriction to bargaining
games with a status quo of 0 and a maximum value of 1 for each player places in fact
only a ‘normalization’ on the set of games under consideration (satisfying ∃ u ∈ V (N)
s.t. ui > u
∗
i ∀ i ∈ N instead).
49Trockel requires a “solution” to be non-empty-valued.
50A set U ⊆ RN+ is comprehensive with respect to RN+ if (u− RN+ ) ∩ RN+ ⊆ U ∀ u ∈ U .
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Definition The Nash Bargaining Solution of (N, V ) ∈ Bn is the set consisting of
the unique utility allocation in the utility possibility set of the grand coalition which
maximizes the product of its coordinates on V (N), i.e.
Nash(V ) := argmaxu∈V (N) u1 · . . . · un.51
5.1.3 Cooperative and Bargaining Games with Physical Outcomes
Definition An n-person cooperative game with physical outcomes is a tuple (N, X¯,
{ui}i∈N), where N ≡ {1, . . . , n} is the set of players, X¯ is a correspondence that
assigns to each coalition S ∈ N a physical outcome possibility set X¯(S), satisfying
∃ Q ∈ N such that X¯(Q) 6= ∅, and
∀ S ∈ N \{N} satisfying X¯(S) 6= ∅, there exists a partition R of N\S
such that X¯(S) 6= ∅ ∀ S ∈ R,
and ui :
⋃
S∈N : i∈S X¯(S)→ R is player i’s utility function.52
Let Cnpo be a nonempty set of n-person cooperative games with physical outcomes all
sharing the same game form (N, X¯).
Definition A solution concept for Cnpo is a correspondence ψ that assigns to each game
Γ ≡ (N, X¯, {ui}i∈N) ∈ Cnpo a (possibly empty) subset ψ(Γ) of its feasible outcomes
Fo (X¯) := {(S, xS)S∈R | R is a partition of N and xS ∈ X¯(S) ∀ S ∈ R}.53
For each game (N, X¯, {ui}i∈N) ∈ Cnpo, let each ui also denote player i’s utility function
over Fo (X¯) induced by ui :
⋃
S∈N : i∈S X¯(S) → R, i.e., let u : Fo (X¯) → RN be defined
by ui((S, x
S)S∈R) := ui(xR(i)) ∀ (i, (S, xS)S∈R) ∈ N × Fo (X¯).
Let ψ and L be a solution concept for Cnpo and Cnntu ⊆ Vn, respectively.
The following definition (as already present in Hahmeier [15]) interprets Dagan and
Serrano: “Solution concepts which are defined for characteristic function games can be
adapted into our framework by assigning to each outcome of the characteristic function
game a nonempty set of outcomes of the coalitional game.”
Definition Solution concept ψ is induced by L if, for each Γ ≡ (N, X¯, {ui}i∈N) ∈ Cnpo,
ψ(Γ) = {(S, xS)S∈R ∈ Fo (X¯) | u((S, xS)S∈R) ∈ L(V Γ)}, where game V Γ ∈ Cnntu ⊆ Vn
is defined by V Γ(S) := {y ∈ RS | ∃ x ∈ X¯(S) s.t. yi = ui(x) ∀ i ∈ S} ∀ S ∈ N .
51For an axiomatic foundation of the Nash Bargaining Solution concept, see, for example,
Rosenmu¨ller [43] (Chapter 8). As for the uniqueness on V (N), note that the mapping u 7→ ∏ni=1 ui
is strictly quasi-concave on {u ∈ Rn | u1 > 0, . . . , un > 0}.
52Dagan and Serrano (and Osborne and Rubinstein [37]) use the term “coalitional game”.
53Dagan and Serrano use the term “pure solution”.
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Let Γ(1) ≡ (N, X¯, {u(1)i }i∈N) and Γ(2) ≡ (N, X¯, {u(2)i }i∈N) be in Cnpo.
Definition Game Γ(2) is an order preserving transformation of Γ(1) if, for all i ∈ N and
each pair x, x′ of physical outcomes in
⋃
S∈N : i∈S X¯(S), u
(2)
i (x) > u
(2)
i (x
′) if and only if
u
(1)
i (x) > u
(1)
i (x
′) (or, equivalently, if, ∀ (i, q, q′) ∈ N×Fo (X¯)×Fo (X¯), u(2)i (q) > u(2)i (q′)
if and only if u
(1)
i (q) > u
(1)
i (q
′)).
Definition Solution concept ψ is ordinally invariant on Cnpo if ψ(Γ(1)) = ψ(Γ(2)) for
each pair Γ(1) ≡ (N, X¯, {u(1)i }i∈N), Γ(2) ≡ (N, X¯, {u(2)i }i∈N) of games in Cnpo such that
Γ(2) is an order preserving transformation of Γ(1).
Dagan and Serrano [9] do not explicitly define bargaining games. The following de-
finition is in accordance with the preceding paragraph (and similar to Osborne and
Rubinstein’s [37] definition of a “bargaining problem”).
Definition An n-person bargaining game with physical outcomes is an n-person coop-
erative game with physical outcomes Γ ≡ (N, X¯, {ui}i∈N) that satisfies V Γ ∈ Bn and
∃ x0 ∈ X¯(N) s.t. ui(x0) = 0 ∀ i ∈ N and X¯(S) = {x0} ∀ S ∈ N \{N}.
In the following, let ψCore denote the solution concept that is induced by the Core con-
cept for Vn, i.e., ψCore(Γ) := {(S, xS)S∈R ∈ Fo (X¯) | ∃ x ∈ X¯(N) s.t. ui((S, xS)S∈R) =
ui(x) ∀ i ∈ N , and @ S ∈ N for which ∃ u′ ∈ V Γ(S) s.t. u′i > ui((S, xS)S∈R) ∀ i ∈ S}
for every cooperative game with physical outcomes Γ ≡ (N, X¯, {ui}i∈N). Correspond-
ingly, let ψNash denote the solution concept that is induced by the Nash Bargaining
Solution concept for Bn, i.e., ψNash(Γ) ≡ {(N, x∗) | x∗ ∈ X¯(N), (u1(x∗), . . . , un(x∗)) ∈
argmaxu∈V Γ(N) u1 · . . . · un} for every bargaining game with physical outcomes Γ ≡
(N, X¯, {ui}i∈N). Dagan and Serrano [9] assert that ψCore is ordinally invariant on
every set of cooperative games with physical outcomes sharing the same game form,
and that ψNash in general is not ordinally invariant. For a proof of their first assertion,
see Hahmeier [15] (pp. 33-34). In Appendix F, adapting two examples in Hahmeier
[15] (pp. 37-39) to our definitions and notation, we define a set of bargaining games
with physical outcomes sharing the same game form on which ψNash is not ordinally
invariant as well as a set on which every solution concept (and, in particular, ψNash)
is ordinally invariant (since there are no two distinct games in this set such that one is
an order preserving transformation of the other).54
54Howard [17] considers a class of games similar to the latter set and shows that the Nash Bargaining
Solution concept is SPNEn-implementable on this class of games (cf. Hahmeier [15], pp. 71-74).
Moulin [34] SPNEn-implements the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution concept in this kind of setting. A
recent reference on the “Subgame-Perfect Implementation of Bargaining Solutions” is Miyagawa [31].
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5.1.4 Ordinally Invariant Noncooperative Equilibrium Concepts
Let Cnnfg be a set of n-person normal form games that share the same game form, and
let EC ∈ {NEnnfg, DSEnnfg}.
Let Γ ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜i}i∈N) and Γ′ ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜′i}i∈N) be in Cnnfg, and define
S := S1 × . . .× Sn.
Definition Game Γ′ is an order preserving transformation of Γ if, ∀ (i, s, sˆ) ∈ N ×
S × S, u˜′i(s) > u˜′i(sˆ) if and only if u˜i(s) > u˜i(sˆ).
Definition Equilibrium concept EC is ordinally invariant on Cnnfg if EC(Γ) = EC(Γ′)
for each pair Γ ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜i}i∈N), Γ′ ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜′i}i∈N) of games in Cnnfg
such that Γ′ is an order preserving transformation of Γ.
We add the analogous definition for extensive form games and SPNEn (as already
present in Hahmeier [15]). Let Cnefg be a set of n-person extensive form games with
perfect information that share the same game form.
Definition Equilibrium concept SPNEn is ordinally invariant on Cnefg if SPNEn(Γ) =
SPNEn(Γ′) for each pair Γ ≡ (N,H, p, {u˜i}i∈N), Γ′ ≡ (N,H, p, {u˜′i}i∈N) of games in
Cnefg such that Γ′ is an order preserving transformation of Γ, i.e., such that, ∀ (i, h, hˆ) ∈
N × ZH × ZH , we have that u˜′i(h) > u˜′i(hˆ) if and only if u˜i(h) > u˜i(hˆ).
Dagan and Serrano [9] assert that “the class of ordinally invariant equilibrium concepts
includes pure strategy Nash equilibrium, pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium
(and its stationary refinements), pure undominated strategies, iterative elimination of
dominated actions, among others.” For a proof that NEnnfg and DSE
n
nfg are both
ordinally invariant on every set of n-person normal form games that share the same
game form, and that SPNEn is ordinally invariant on every set of n-person extensive
form games with perfect information that share the same game form, see Hahmeier
[15], pp. 10-13.
5.2 Implementation of Solution Concepts for NTU Games
5.2.1 Trockel’s “Embedding Principle”
For the implementation via strategic mechanisms, Trockel [52] introduces an “Embed-
ding Principle” which transforms specific “support results” into strong implementation
results. As shown in Hahmeier [15], an ‘equivalent’ principle holds for the implemen-
tation via extensive mechanisms. We outline these results in Proposition 5.1(a) and
5.1(b), and briefly sketch their proofs in Appendix G.
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Let Cnntu ⊆ Vn be a nonempty set of n-person NTU games, and let T : Cnntu → (Cnntu)n
be defined by T (V ) := (V, . . . , V ) ∀ V ∈ Cnntu.
Let L denote the set of single-valued solution concepts for Cnntu, i.e.
L := { l : Cnntu →
⋃
V ∈Cnntu
Fup(V ) | l(V ) ∈ Fup(V ) ∀ V ∈ Cnntu}.
Define the classical n-person environment E ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {u′i}i∈N ,G) by
X := L,
Θi := Cnntu ∀ i ∈ N ,
Θ := T (Cnntu) ≡ {T (V ) | V ∈ Cnntu},
u′i(l, T (V )) := (l(V ))i ∀ (i, l, V ) ∈ N × L× Cnntu,55 and
G is the set of all strategic and extensive mechanisms for (N,L).
For each nonempty-valued solution concept L for Cnntu, let αL : Θ ⇒ L denote the
(social) choice correspondence for environment E defined by
αL(T (V )) :=
⋃
l∈SL
[l]V ∀ V ∈ Cnntu ,56
where [l]V := {l′ ∈ L | l′(V ) = l(V )} ∀ (l, V ) ∈ L × Cnntu, and
SL := {l : Cnntu → RN | l(V ) ∈ L(V ) ∀ V ∈ Cnntu} denotes the set of selections of L.57
In other words, αL(T (V )) is the set of all single-valued solution concepts l
′ for Cnntu for
which there exists a selection l of L that takes the same value on V .
Let L be a nonempty-valued solution concept for Cnntu, and let EC ∈ {DSEnnfg, NEnnfg}.
Proposition 5.1(a) (Trockel’s [52] “Embedding Principle”)
Suppose that there exists a collection of n-person normal form games (all of which
share the same game form) {Γ˜V ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜Vi }i∈N)}V ∈Cnntu such that
(i) {Γ˜V }V ∈Cnntu (strongly) EC-supports solution concept L on Cnntu, i.e.
∀ V ∈ Cnntu, EC(Γ˜V ) 6= ∅ and u˜V (EC(Γ˜V )) ⊆ L(V ) (⊆ RN),58 and
(ii) ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, u˜V (s) ∈ Fup(V ) (⊆ RN) ∀ s ∈ S := S1 × . . .× Sn.
55In the words of Trockel [52], “this definition of utility functions reflects the fact that the players’
subjective evaluations are determined by what they get in the actual game independently of what
players would receive in a different game V ′.”
56In the words of Trockel [52], “this social choice rule reflects the idea that any population of n
players as characterized by V evaluates a solution concept only on the basis of what that solution
allocates to them in the game V . This population does not care about what a solution might give to
other populations’ players characterized by some V ′ 6= V .”
57Note that SL 6= ∅ (since L(V ) 6= ∅ ∀ V ∈ Cnntu), and that, ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, [l]V 6= ∅ ∀ l ∈ SL (since
l ∈ [l]V ). Therefore, αL(θ) 6= ∅ ∀ θ ∈ Θ.
58Trockel requires u˜V (EC(Γ˜V )) = L(V ) ∀ V ∈ Cnntu.
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Then, the strategic n-person mechanism G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) for (N,L) defined by
g : S → L, g(s)(V ) := u˜V (s) (∈ Fup(V )) ∀ s ∈ S
strongly EC-implements αL in environment E, i.e.
EC(ΓE,G,T (V )) 6= ∅ and g(EC(ΓE,G,T (V ))) ⊆ αL(T (V )) ∀ V ∈ Cnntu.
Under the assumptions of Proposition 5.1(a), there exists, for every game V ∈ Cnntu,
at least one equilibrium of the game induced by mechanism G and type profile T (V )
in environment E, and in each such equilibrium s∗ ∈ EC(ΓE,G,T (V )) the players re-
ceive payoffs (u′1(g(s
∗), T (V )), . . . , u′n(g(s
∗), T (V ))) = ((g(s∗)(V ))1, . . . , (g(s∗)(V ))n) as
if they had applied a single-valued solution concept to their game V that takes the same
value on V as some selection of L (g(s∗) ∈ αL(T (V ))).
Proposition 5.1(b) (Hahmeier [15])
Suppose that there exists a collection of n-person extensive form games with perfect
information (all of which share the same game form) {Γ˜V ≡ (N,H, p, {u˜Vi }i∈N)}V ∈Cnntu
such that
(i) {Γ˜V }V ∈Cnntu (strongly) SPNEn-supports solution concept L on Cnntu, i.e.
∀ V ∈ Cnntu, SPNEn(Γ˜V ) 6= ∅ and u˜V (O(SPNEn(Γ˜V ))) ⊆ L(V ), and
(ii) ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, u˜V (x) ∈ Fup(V ) ∀ x ∈ ZH .
Then, the extensive n-person mechanism with perfect information G ≡ (N,H, p, g) for
(N,L) defined by
g : ZH → L, g(x)(V ) := u˜V (x) ∈ (Fup(V )) ∀ x ∈ ZH
strongly SPNEn-implements αL in environment E, i.e.
SPNEn(ΓE,G,T (V )) 6= ∅ and g(O(SPNEn(ΓE,G,T (V )))) ⊆ αL(T (V )) ∀ V ∈ Cnntu.
5.2.2 Implementation of the Core Concept
Suppose that, for each V ∈ Cnntu,
(i) V (N) is comprehensive (i.e., (u− RN+ ) ⊆ V (N) ∀ u ∈ V (N)),
(ii) V ({i}) 6= ∅ and supV ({i}) ∈ (0,∞) ∀ i ∈ N , and
V ({i}) is comprehensive ∀ i ∈ N , and
(iii) the set of efficient Core elements is nonempty, i.e.
EfCore(V ) := {u ∈ Core(V ) | @ u′ ∈ V (N) s.t. u′ ≥ u and u′ 6= u} 6= ∅,
and that solution concept L satisfies L(V ) = Core(V ) ≡ {u ∈ V (N) | @ S ∈ N for
which ∃ u′ ∈ V (S) s.t. u′i > ui ∀ i ∈ S} ∀ V ∈ Cnntu.
We now introduce a collection of n-person normal form games satisfying the assump-
tions of Proposition 5.1(a) for EC = NEnnfg, thereby inducing a result on the Nash-
implementability of the Core concept on Cnntu.
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Consider the collection of n-person normal form games {Γ˜V }V ∈Cntu , where each Γ˜V ≡
(N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜Vi }i∈N) is defined by Si := [0,∞) ∀ i ∈ N and
u˜Vi (s) :=
 si if s ∈ Core(V ) or si < supV ({i})0 otherwise ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × [0,∞)n .59
Then, ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, we have that s ∈ EfCore(V )⇔ s ∈ NEnnfg(Γ˜V ) ∀ s ∈ [0,∞)n:
’⇒’ Let s ∈ EfCore(V ), and assume that there exists an i ∈ N and a strategy
s′i ∈ Si such that u˜Vi (s′i, s−i) > u˜Vi (s). Since s ∈ Core(V ), we have that u˜Vi (s) =
si ≥ supV ({i}). Therefore, u˜Vi (s′i, s−i) > si ≥ supV ({i}) ≥ 0. By definition of
u˜Vi , u˜
V
i (s
′
i, s−i) > si ≥ 0 implies that
s′i > si, and
(s′i, s−i) ∈ Core(V ) or s′i < supV ({i}).
Since s′i > si ≥ supV ({i}), we must have (s′i, s−i) ∈ Core(V ) (⊆ V (N) ).
Now, s′i > si implies a contradiction to s ∈ EfCore(V ).
’⇐’ Let s ∈ [0,∞)n\EfCore(V ).
First, suppose that s ∈ Core(V ):
Since s 6∈ EfCore(V ), there exists an u ∈ V (N) s.t. u ≥ s and u 6= s.
Since V (N) is comprehensive, it follows that there exists an i ∈ N and
an u′ ∈ V (N) s.t. u′i > si and u′j = sj ∀ j ∈ N\{i}. And, s ∈ Core(V )
implies that u′ ∈ Core(V ).60
Thus, u˜Vi (u
′
i, s−i) = u˜
V
i (u
′) = u′i > si = u˜
V
i (s), i.e., s 6∈ NEnnfg(Γ˜V ).
Next, suppose that s 6∈ Core(V ).
Since s 6∈ Core(V ), we have that u˜Vi (s) < supV ({i}) ∀ i ∈ N . Thus,
for each i ∈ N , strategy s′i := u˜Vi (s) + 12 · (supV ({i}) − u˜Vi (s)) satisfies
u˜Vi (s
′
i, s−i) = s
′
i > u˜
V
i (s). In other words, s 6∈ NEnnfg(Γ˜V ).
And, collection {Γ˜V }V ∈Cnntu satisfies the assumptions of Proposition 5.1(a) for EC =
NEnnfg. For each V ∈ Cnntu, we have that
NEnnfg(Γ˜
V ) = EfCore(V ) 6= ∅,
u˜V (NEnnfg(Γ˜
V )) = u˜V (EfCore(V )) = EfCore(V ) ⊆ Core(V ), and
u˜V (s) ∈ Core(V )∪[0, supV ({1}))×. . .×[0, supV ({n})) ⊆ Fup(V ) ∀ s ∈ [0,∞)n,
where the last inclusion follows, in particular, from assumption (ii).
59Note that our definition of each player’s utility function entails a feature that may well be subject
to the same kind of criticism often expressed against ‘integer games’ or ‘modulo games’ or another, in
the words of Jackson [21], “questionable feature of a mechanism”.
60Assume that ∃ S ∈ N for which ∃ u′′ ∈ V (S) s.t. u′′i > u′i ∀ i ∈ S. Then, u′′i > u′i ≥ si ∀ i ∈ S,
contradicting s ∈ Core(V ).
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5.2.3 Implementation of the Nash Bargaining Solution Concept
Suppose that Cnntu ⊆ Bn, and that solution concept L satisfies L(V ) = Nash(V ) ∀ V ∈
Cnntu. Trockel [51] mentions the following collection of normal form games (for the
specific case of n = 2), in the following denoted by {Γ˜V(a)}V ∈Cnntu , which satisfies the
assumptions of Proposition 5.1(a) for EC = DSEnnfg.
(a) For each V ∈ Cnntu, define Γ˜V(a) ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜Vi }i∈N) by
Si := R+ ∀ i ∈ N and u˜Vi (s) :=
 si if s = Nash(V )0 otw. ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × Rn+.
According to Trockel [51], “this game provides support in a dominant strategy equi-
librium for the Nash solution. It fails, however, to be a ‘sensitive strategic model’ as
Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) require it for the Nash program. And it does not sup-
plement the cooperative bargaining game such that, in the words of Nash (1953) ‘each
helps to justify and clarify’ the other. In fact, any arbitrary bargaining solution could
be supported in the same way.”61 The same is true for the following two collections
of normal form games, each again satisfying the assumptions of Proposition 5.1(a) for
EC = DSEnnfg.
(b) For each V ∈ Cnntu, define Γ˜V(b) ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜Vi }i∈N) by Si := [0, 1] ∀ i ∈ N
and u˜Vi (s) :=
 si if si ≤ (Nash(V ))i0 otw. ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × [0, 1]n,
(c) and define Γ˜V(c) ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜Vi }i∈N) by
Si := {1} ∀ i ∈ N and u˜Vi (s) := (Nash(V ))i ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × {1}n.62
In “A Walrasian Approach to Bargaining Games”, Trockel [50] introduces an “alter-
native characterization” of the Nash Bargaining Solution concept,63 resulting in three
different support results (also satisfying assumption (ii) in the respective part of Propo-
sition 5.1) presented in Trockel [51]:64
61As Trockel points out, “a similar point of view is represented by Proposition 1 of Bergin and
Duggan (1999).”
62Note that every game Γ˜V in each of the three preceding collections has a unique DSE sˆV and this
unique DSE satisfies sˆV = Nash(V ).
63In the words of Trockel [51], “there, the Nash solution of any bargaining game is shown to coincide
with the unique Walrasian equilibrium of a naturally induced economy with production and private
ownership. The equilibrium price system evaluates the allocated utilities of players (interpreted as
commodities) such that each player gets the same part of the total utility allocation in terms of value.”
64Trockel [51], Proposition 1, 2, and 3, in Section 3, 4, and 5, respectively. A main part of Section
6 is on Trockel’s [52] “Embedding Principle”.
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(d) A collection of n-person extensive form games with perfect information, in the
following denoted by {Γ˜V(d)}V ∈Cnntu , SPNEn-supports solution concept L ≡ Nash
on every Cnntu ⊆ B¯n, where B¯n denotes the set of all bargaining games (N, V ) ∈
Bn that satisfy
(1) V (N) is strictly convex, and
(2) the mapping g that associates with every vector x ∈ Rn in the efficient
boundary ∂(V (N)) of V (N) the normal vector at x to the efficient bound-
ary ∂(V (N)), normalized by ‖g(x)‖2 = 1, is well defined as a continuously
differentiable mapping g : ∂(V (N))→ Rn++.
(e) A collection of n-person normal form games DSEnnfg-supports solution concept
L ≡ Nash on every Cnntu ⊆ B¯n. And, as is true for collection {Γ˜V(b)}V ∈Cnntu , every
game Γ˜V in this collection allows each utility profile in {u ∈ RN+ | u ≤ Nash(V )}
to be realized.
(f) And, a third collection, again of n-person normal form games, NEnnfg-supports
solution concept L ≡ Nash on every Cnntu ⊆ B¯n. In contrast to the preceding
collection, however, every game Γ˜V in this collection allows each utility profile in
V (N) to be realized. And, according to Trockel [51], “this property which allows
it to realize via coordinated strategic actions any feasible utility allocation of the
cooperative game also in the non-cooperative game provides a good justification
for the implicit assumption made in the support and implementation literature
that players voluntarily participate in the non-cooperative game.”
We denote the latter two collections by {Γ˜V(e)}V ∈Cnntu and {Γ˜V(f)}V ∈Cnntu , respectively. Both
are based on a specific collection of functions {mVi }(i,V )∈N×Cnntu , each mVi : [0, 1] → R
being a continuous function that equals the identity on [0, (Nash(V ))i] and is strictly
decreasing on [(Nash(V ))i, 1]:
65
For each V ∈ Cnntu, Γ˜V(e) ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜Vi }i∈N) satisfies
Si = [0, 1] ∀ i ∈ N and u˜Vi (s) = mVi (si) ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × [0, 1]n,
and Γ˜V(f) ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜Vi }i∈N) satisfies
Si = [0, 1] ∀ i ∈ N and u˜Vi (s) =
 si if s ∈ V (N)mVi (si) otherwise ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × [0, 1]n.
Due to the properties of the functions mVi , every game Γ˜
V in the former collection has
a unique DSE sˆV and this DSE satisfies sˆV = Nash(V ). Similarly, every game Γ˜V in
the latter collection has a unique NE sˆV and this NE satisfies sˆV = Nash(V ).
65Note that, since V (N) is strictly convex, (Nash(V ))i < 1 ∀ i ∈ N .
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The details of these two collections are summarized in Appendix H, together with a
brief description of collection {Γ˜V(d)}V ∈Cnntu and some modifications leading to a fourth
collection, in the following denoted by {Γ˜V(d′)}V ∈Cnntu . Collection {Γ˜V(d′)}V ∈Cnntu also satis-
fies the assumptions of Proposition 5.1(b) and is, in parts, similar to an earlier working
paper version of collection {Γ˜V(d)}V ∈Cnntu in Trockel [53].
5.3 LE Implementation of Solution Concepts for NTU Games
5.3.1 The “Embedding Principle” in Environments with Limited
Enforcement Power
Proposition 5.2 extends Trockel’s [52] “Embedding Principle” to environments with
limited enforcement power, in which the designer has no enforcement power on single-
valued solution concepts.
Let Cnntu ⊆ Vn be a nonempty set of n-person NTU games such that either
(i) ]{V ({i})} ≥ 2 ∀ (i, V ) ∈ N × Cnntu, or
(ii) each V ∈ Cnntu is a bargaining game in NTU form.
Let T : Cnntu → (Cnntu)n be defined by T (V ) := (V, . . . , V ) ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, and let L denote
the set of single-valued solution concepts for Cnntu, i.e.
L := { l : Cnntu →
⋃
V ∈Cnntu
Fup(V ) | l(V ) ∈ Fup(V ) ∀ V ∈ Cnntu}.
Let E ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {ui}i∈N ,G, R, e) be an an n-person environment with lim-
ited enforcement power such that
X = L,
Θi = Cnntu ∀ i ∈ N ,
Θ = T (Cnntu) ≡ {T (V ) | V ∈ Cnntu},
ui((l, 1), T (V )) = (l(V ))i ∀ (i, l, V ) ∈ N × L× Cnntu,
G is the set of all strategic and extensive mechanisms for (N,L), and
e ≡ ec in case (i) and e ≡ eb in case (ii),
where ec and eb denote the two enforcement structures for (N,L) that satisfy
ec(S) =
 L if S = N or S = N+∅ otw. ∀ S ∈ N+ and
eb(S) =

L if S = N or S = N+
∅ if S = {0}
{l(0)} otw.
∀ S ∈ N+,
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and l(0) ∈ L denotes the solution concept that satisfies l(0)(V ) = (0, . . . , 0) ∀ V ∈ Cnntu.
For each nonempty-valued solution concept L for Cnntu, let αL : Θ ⇒ L denote the
(social) choice correspondence for environment E defined by
αL(T (V )) :=
⋃
l∈SL
[l]V ∀ V ∈ Cnntu ,
where [l]V := {l′ ∈ L | l′(V ) = l(V )} ∀ (l, V ) ∈ L × Cnntu, and
SL := {l : Cnntu → RN | l(V ) ∈ L(V ) ∀ V ∈ Cnntu} denotes the set of selections of L.
Let L be a nonempty-valued solution concept for Cnntu, and let EC ∈ {DSEnnfg, NEnnfg}.
Proposition 5.2
(a) Suppose that there exists a collection of n-person normal form games (sharing
the same game form) {Γ˜V ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜Vi }i∈N)}V ∈Cnntu such that
(i) {ΓˆV }V ∈Cnntu (strongly) EC-supports solution concept L on Cnntu, i.e.
∀ V ∈ Cnntu, EC(ΓˆV ) 6= ∅ and uˆV (EC(ΓˆV )) ⊆ L(V ) (⊆ RN),
(ii) ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, u˜V (s) ∈ Fup(V ) (⊆ RN) ∀ s ∈ S := S1 × . . .× Sn, and
(iii) ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, R(g(s), T (V )) = (g(s), 1) ∀ s ∈ EC(ΓˆV ),
where, ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, game ΓˆV ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {uˆVi }i∈N) is defined by
uˆVi (s) := ui(R(g(s), T (V )), T (V )) ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × S,
and g : S → L is defined by g(s)(V ) := u˜V (s) (∈ Fup(V )) ∀ (s, V ) ∈ S × Cnntu.
Then, the strategic n-person mechanism G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) strongly EC-
implements αL in environment E, i.e., ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, we have that
EC(ΓE
∗,G∗,T (V )) 6= ∅ and
R(g(EC(ΓE
∗,G∗,T (V ))), T (V )) ⊆ {(x, 1) | x ∈ αL(T (V ))}.
(b) Suppose that there exists a collection of n-person extensive form games with per-
fect information (sharing the same game form) {Γ˜V ≡ (N,H, p, {u˜Vi }i∈N)}V ∈Cnntu
such that
(i) {ΓˆV }V ∈Cnntu (strongly) SPNEn-supports solution concept L on Cnntu, i.e.
∀ V ∈ Cnntu, SPNEn(ΓˆV ) 6= ∅ and uˆV (O(SPNEn(ΓˆV ))) ⊆ L(V ),
(ii) ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, u˜V (x) ∈ Fup(V ) ∀ x ∈ ZH , and
(iii) ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, R(g(x), T (V )) = (g(x), 1) ∀ x ∈ O(SPNEn(ΓˆV )),
where, ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, game ΓˆV ≡ (N,H, p, {uˆVi }i∈N) is defined by
uˆVi (x) := ui(R(g(x), T (V )), T (V )) ∀ (i, x) ∈ N × ZH ,
and g : ZH → L is defined by g(x)(V ) := u˜V (x) (∈ Fup(V )) ∀ (x, V ) ∈ ZH×Cnntu.
Then, the extensive n-person mechanism with perfect information G ≡
(N,H, p, g) strongly SPNEn-implements αL in environment E, i.e., ∀ V ∈ Cnntu,
we have that
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SPNEn(ΓE
∗,G∗,T (V )) 6= ∅ and
R(g(O(SPNEn(ΓE
∗,G∗,T (V )))), T (V )) ⊆ {(x, 1) | x ∈ αL(T (V ))}.
Proof
(a) Consider an arbitrary V ∈ Cnntu.
Since ui(R(g(s), T (V )), T (V )) = uˆ
V
i (s) ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × S, we have that
ΓE
∗,G∗,T (V ) ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui(R(g(·), T (V )), T (V ))}i∈N) = ΓˆV .
Thus, EC(ΓE
∗,G∗,T (V )) = EC(ΓˆV ) 6= ∅, and it remains to show that
R(g(EC(ΓˆV )), T (V )) ⊆ {(x, 1) | x ∈ αL(T (V ))}.
Consider an arbitrary s ∈ EC(ΓˆV ).
By assumption (iii), it is sufficient to show that g(s) ∈ αL(T (V )).
Since uˆV (EC(ΓˆV )) ⊆ L(V ), we have that uˆV (s) ∈ L(V ).
Therefore, there exists a selection l∗ ∈ SL of L such that l∗(V ) = uˆV (s).
By definition of uˆ and by assumption (iii), it follows that l∗(V ) = uˆV (s) =
u(R(g(s), T (V )), T (V )) = u((g(s), 1), T (V )) = g(s)(V ).
In other words, g(s) ∈ [l∗]V (= {l′ ∈ L | l′(V ) = l∗(V )} ).
Since l∗ ∈ SL, it follows that g(s) ∈ [l∗]V ⊆
⋃
l∈SL [l]V = αL(T (V )).
(b) Consider an arbitrary V ∈ Cnntu.
Since ui(R(g(x), T (V )), T (V )) = uˆ
V
i (x) ∀ (i, x) ∈ N × ZH , we have that
ΓE
∗,G∗,T (V ) ≡ (N,H, p, {ui(R(g(·), T (V )), T (V ))}i∈N) = ΓˆV .
Thus, SPNEn(ΓE
∗,G∗,T (V )) = SPNEn(ΓˆV ) 6= ∅, and it remains to show that
R(g(O(SPNEn(ΓˆV ))), T (V )) ⊆ {(x, 1) | x ∈ αL(T (V ))}.
Consider an arbitrary x ∈ O(SPNEn(ΓˆV )).
By assumption (iii), it is sufficient to show that g(x) ∈ αL(T (V )).
Since uˆV (O(SPNEn(ΓˆV ))) ⊆ L(V ), we have that uˆV (x) ∈ L(V ).
Therefore, there exists a selection l∗ ∈ SL of L such that l∗(V ) = uˆV (x).
By definition of uˆ and by assumption (iii), it follows that l∗(V ) = uˆV (x) =
u(R(g(x), T (V )), T (V )) = u((g(x), 1), T (V )) = g(x)(V ).
In other words, g(x) ∈ [l∗]V (= {l′ ∈ L | l′(V ) = l∗(V )} ).
Since l∗ ∈ SL, it follows that g(x) ∈ [l∗]V ⊆
⋃
l∈SL [l]V = αL(T (V )).
2
The following corollary covers the case that the supporting collection allows every out-
come in the image of the corresponding mechanism’s outcome function to be realized.
Corollary 5.2
(a) Suppose that there exists a collection of n-person normal form games (sharing
the same game form) {Γ˜V ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜Vi }i∈N)}V ∈Cnntu such that
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(i) {Γ˜V }V ∈Cnntu (strongly) EC-supports solution concept L on Cnntu, i.e.
∀ V ∈ Cnntu, EC(Γ˜V ) 6= ∅ and u˜V (EC(Γ˜V )) ⊆ L(V ) (⊆ RN),
(ii) ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, u˜V (s) ∈ Fup(V ) (⊆ RN) ∀ s ∈ S := S1 × . . .× Sn, and
(iii) ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, R(g(s), T (V )) = (g(s), 1) ∀ s ∈ S,
where g : S → L is defined by g(s)(V ) := u˜V (s) ∀ (s, V ) ∈ S × Cnntu.
Then, the strategic n-person mechanism G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) strongly EC-
implements αL in environment E.
(b) Suppose that there exists a collection of n-person extensive form games with per-
fect information (sharing the same game form) {Γ˜V ≡ (N,H, p, {u˜Vi }i∈N)}V ∈Cnntu
such that
(i) {Γ˜V }V ∈Cnntu (strongly) SPNEn-supports solution concept L on Cnntu, i.e.
∀ V ∈ Cnntu, SPNEn(Γ˜V ) 6= ∅ and u˜V (O(SPNEn(Γ˜V ))) ⊆ L(V ),
(ii) ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, u˜V (x) ∈ Fup(V ) ∀ x ∈ ZH , and
(iii) ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, R(g(x), T (V )) = (g(x), 1) ∀ x ∈ ZH ,
where g : ZH → L is defined by g(x)(V ) := u˜V (x) (∈ Fup(V )) ∀ (x, V ) ∈
ZH × Cnntu. Then, the extensive n-person mechanism with perfect information
G ≡ (N,H, p, g) strongly SPNEn-implements αL in environment E.
Proof
(a) For each V ∈ Cnntu, let ΓˆV ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {uˆVi }i∈N) be defined by
uˆVi (s) := ui(R(g(s), T (V )), T (V )) ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × S.
Consider an arbitrary V ∈ Cnntu.
Then, uˆVi (s) = ui((g(s), 1), T (V )) = (g(s)(V ))i = u˜
V
i (s) ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × S, and
thus ΓˆV = Γ˜V .
It follows that EC(ΓˆV ) = EC(Γ˜V ) 6= ∅, and that
uˆV (EC(ΓˆV )) = u˜V (EC(Γ˜V )) ⊆ L(V ).
(b) For each V ∈ Cnntu, let ΓˆV ≡ (N,H, p, {uˆVi }i∈N) be defined by
uˆVi (x) := ui(R(g(x), T (V )), T (V )) ∀ (i, x) ∈ N × ZH .
Consider an arbitrary V ∈ Cnntu.
Then, uˆVi (s) = ui((g(x), 1), T (V )) = (g(x)(V ))i = u˜
V
i (x) ∀ (i, x) ∈ N ×ZH , and
thus ΓˆV = Γ˜V .
It follows that SPNEn(ΓˆV ) = SPNEn(Γ˜V ) 6= ∅, and that
uˆV (O(SPNEn(ΓˆV ))) = u˜V (O(SPNEn(Γ˜V ))) ⊆ L(V ).
2
Remark 5.2 Note that condition (iii) of Corollary 5.2 is satisfied, in particular, if
agents have weak pessimistic beliefs in environment E.
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In the following two paragraphs, we re-consider the support results for the Nash Bar-
gaining Solution concept and the Core concept outlined in the preceding section. As-
suming that agents’ beliefs can be justified by outcome-independent prediction func-
tions, we approach the question to what extent these support results can be adjusted
in order to imply implementation results by the application of Proposition 5.2.
5.3.2 LE Implementation of the Nash Bargaining Solution Concept
Suppose that Cnntu ⊆ Bn, that e ≡ eb, and that solution concept L satisfies L(V ) =
Nash(V ) ∀ V ∈ Cnntu.66 Furthermore, suppose that agents’ beliefs can be justified by
prediction functions {bi}i∈N for (L, T (V )), i.e.
ui((l, 0), T (V )) = ui((bi1((l, 0), T (V )), 1), T (V )) ∀ (i, V, l) ∈ N × Cnntu × L,
and that these prediction functions are outcome-independent,i.e.
bi((l, 0), T (V )) = bi((l
′, 0), T (V )) ∀ (i, l, l′, V ) ∈ N × L× L× Cntu.
Define, ∀ (i, V ) ∈ N × Cntu,
bi,V ∈ RN by bi,V := (bi1((l, 0), T (V )))(V ) for some l ∈ L,
i.e., bi,V reflects agent i′s prediction for the final utility allocation in state
T (V ) if the outcome suggested by the mechanism is not being implemented by
a coalition that is able to do so,
bVi ∈ R by bVi := (bi,V )i, and
nVi ∈ R by nVi := (Nash(V ))i,
and note that, in particular, ui((l, 0), T (V )) = ui((bi1((l, 0), T (V )), 1), T (V ))
= (bi1((l, 0), T (V ))(V ))i
= bVi ∀ (i, V, l) ∈ N × Cnntu × L, and
R(l, T (V )) =

(l, 1) if ∃ S ∈ N+ s.t. l ∈ e(S) and
ui((l, 1), T (V )) ≥ ui((l, 0), T (V )) ∀ i ∈ S ∩N
(l, 0) otherwise
=

(l, 1) if ∃ S ∈ N+ s.t. l ∈ e(S) and
(l(V ))i ≥ bVi ∀ i ∈ S ∩N
(l, 0) otherwise
on L ×Θ.
Remember, that both collection {Γ˜V(e)}V ∈Cnntu and collection {Γ˜V(f)}V ∈Cnntu are based on
a collection of functions {mVi }(i,V )∈N×Cnntu , each mVi : [0, 1] → R being a continuous
function that equals the identity on [0, nVi ] and is strictly decreasing on [n
V
i , 1].
67 Now,
66Note that, since αL(T (V )) ≡
⋃
l∈SL [l]V = [Nash]V = {Nash} ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, strong implementation
of αL is equivalent to full implementation of αL in environment E.
67See Paragraph 5.2.3 and Appendix H.
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for each V ∈ Cnntu satisfying bV ≤ nV , define
qVi :=
 sup{ui ∈ (nVi , 1] | mVi (ui) > bVi } if bVi < nVibVi if bVi = nVi ∀ i ∈ N .
Figure 5.1 illustrates the notation.
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Figure 5.1
If agents’ beliefs are such that 0 ≤ bV ≤ nV ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, i.e., each agent i’s prediction
for his final utility level (in case that the outcome suggested by the mechanism is not
being implemented) is no higher than his Nash coordinate, then collection {Γ˜V(c)}V ∈Cnntu
satisfies the assumptions of Corollary 5.2(a) for EC = DSEnnfg.
If agents’ beliefs are such that 0 ≤ bVi < nVi ∀ (i, V ) ∈ N × Cnntu, then the following
modifications of collection {Γ˜V(a)}V ∈Cnntu and {Γ˜V(b)}V ∈Cnntu also satisfy the assumptions of
Corollary 5.2(a) for EC = DSEnnfg.
68
(a) For each V ∈ Cnntu, define Γ˜V ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜Vi }i∈N) by
Si := R+ ∀ i ∈ N and u˜Vi (s) :=
 si if s = Nash(V )bVi otw. ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × Rn+.
68In our modification of collection {Γ˜V(a)}V ∈Cnntu , we merely substitute 0 by bVi .
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(b) For each V ∈ Cnntu, define Γ˜V ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜Vi }i∈N) by
Si := [0, 1] ∀ i ∈ N and
u˜Vi (s) :=
 si if bVi ≤ si ≤ (Nash(V ))ibVi otw. ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × [0, 1]n.69
If, as before, agents’ beliefs are such that 0 ≤ bVi < nVi ∀ (i, V ) ∈ N×Cnntu, and if, in ad-
dition, Cnntu ⊆ B¯n, then the following two modifications of {Γ˜V(e)}V ∈Cnntu and {Γ˜V(f)}V ∈Cnntu
satisfy the assumptions of Corollary 5.2(a) for EC = DSEnnfg and EC = NE
n
nfg, re-
spectively. In Appendix H, we provide a modification of collection {Γ˜V(d)}V ∈Cnntu (and
{Γ˜V(d′)}V ∈Cnntu) which satisfies the assumptions of Corollary 5.2(b).
(e) For each V ∈ Cnntu, define Γ˜V ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜Vi }i∈N) by
Si := [0, 1] ∀ i ∈ N and u˜Vi (s) := mVi (fVi (si)) ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × [0, 1]n,
where fVi : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is defined by fVi (si) := bVi + si · (qVi − bVi ) ∀ si ∈ [0, 1].70
In other words, the argument si ∈ [0, 1] in the definition of collection {Γ˜V(e)}V ∈Cnntu
is substituted by its projection on the interval [bVi , q
V
i ].
(f) For each V ∈ Cnntu, define Γ˜V ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜Vi }i∈N) by
Si := [0, 1] ∀ i ∈ N and
u˜Vi (s) :=
 fVi (si) if fV (s) ∈ V (N)mVi (fVi (si)) otw. ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × [0, 1]n,
where fVi : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is defined by fVi (si) := bVi + si · (qVi − bVi ) ∀ si ∈ [0, 1].
If agents’ beliefs are such that 0 < bVi < n
V
i ∀ (i, V ) ∈ N × Cnntu, i.e., each agent i’s
prediction lies strictly between 0 and his Nash coordinate, then each of the following
four collections from Paragraph 5.2.3 satisfies the assumptions of Proposition 5.2(a)
for EC = DSEnnfg, where again Cnntu ⊆ B¯n is required in case (e):
(a) If, ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, Γ˜V ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜Vi }i∈N) = Γ˜V(a), i.e.
Si = R+ ∀ i ∈ N and u˜Vi (s) =
 si if s = Nash(V )0 otw. ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × Rn+,
then, ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, ΓˆV ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {uˆVi }i∈N) defined by
uˆVi (s) :=
 si if s = Nash(V )bVi otw. ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × Rn+
69Note that in both case (a) and (b), ∀ (s, V ) ∈ S1 × . . .× Sn × Cnntu,
R(g(s), T (V )) =
 (g(s), 1) if ∃ S ∈ N s.t. g(s) ∈ e(S) and u˜Vi (s) ≥ bVi ∀ i ∈ S(g(s), 0) otherwise = (g(s), 1).
70Note that u˜V ([0, 1]n) ⊆ {u ∈ RN+ | u ≤ nV }, and thus u˜V (s) ∈ V (N) ∀ (s, V ) ∈ [0, 1]n × Cnntu.
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satisfies
R(g(s), T (V )) =

(g(s), 1) if ∃ S ∈ N s.t. g(s) ∈ e(S) and
u˜Vi (s) (= (g(s)(V ))i) ≥ bVi ∀ i ∈ S
(g(s), 0) otherwise
=
 (g(s), 1) if s = Nash(V )(g(s), 0) otherwise ∀ s ∈ Rn+,
and thus
ui(R(g(s), T (V )), T (V )) =
 ui((g(s), 1), T (V )) if s = Nash(V )ui((g(s), 0), T (V )) otw.
=
 (g(s)(V ))i if s = Nash(V )bVi otw.
=
 u˜Vi (s) if s = Nash(V )bVi otw.
=
 si if s = Nash(V )bVi otw.
= uˆVi (s) ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × Rn+,
where g : Rn+ → L is defined by g(s)(V ) := u˜V (s) ∀ (s, V ) ∈ Rn+ × Cnntu. And,
collection {ΓˆV }V ∈Cnntu satisfies assumption (i) and (iii) of Proposition 5.2(a).
(b) If, ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, Γ˜V ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜Vi }i∈N) = Γ˜V(b), i.e., Si = [0, 1] ∀ i ∈ N and
u˜Vi (s) =
 si if si ≤ (Nash(V ))i0 otw. ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × [0, 1]n,
then, ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, ΓˆV ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {uˆVi }i∈N) defined by
uˆVi (s) :=
 si if bV ≤ s ≤ Nash(V )bVi otw. ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × [0, 1]n
satisfies
R(g(s), T (V )) =

(g(s), 1) if ∃ S ∈ N s.t. g(s) ∈ e(S) and
u˜Vi (s) (= (g(s)(V ))i) ≥ bVi ∀ i ∈ S
(g(s), 0) otherwise
=

(g(s), 1) if g(s) 6= l(0) and u˜Vi (s) ≥ bVi ∀ i ∈ N
(g(s), 1) if g(s) = l(0) and u˜Vi (s) ≥ bVi for some i ∈ N
(g(s), 0) otherwise
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=

(g(s), 1) if g(s) 6= l(0) and u˜Vi (s) ≥ bVi ∀ i ∈ N
(g(s), 1) if g(s) = l(0) and u˜Vi (s) ≥ bVi ∀ i ∈ N
(g(s), 0) otherwise
=

(g(s), 1) if g(s) 6= l(0) and bV ≤ s ≤ nV
(g(s), 1) if g(s) = l(0) and bV ≤ s ≤ nV
(g(s), 0) otherwise
=
 (g(s), 1) if bV ≤ s ≤ nV(g(s), 0) otherwise ∀ s ∈ [0, 1]n, 71
and thus
ui(R(g(s), T (V )), T (V )) =
 ui((g(s), 1), T (V )) if bV ≤ s ≤ nVui((g(s), 0), T (V )) otw.
=
 u˜Vi (s) if bV ≤ s ≤ nVbVi otw.
=
 si if bV ≤ s ≤ nVbVi otw.
= uˆVi (s) ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × [0, 1]n,
where g : [0, 1]n → L is defined by g(s)(V ) := u˜V (s) ∀ (s, V ) ∈ [0, 1]n × Cnntu.
And, collection {ΓˆV }V ∈Cnntu satisfies assumption (i) and (iii) of Proposition 5.2(a).
(c) If, ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, Γ˜V ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜Vi }i∈N) = Γ˜V(c), i.e.
Si = {1} ∀ i ∈ N and u˜Vi (s) = (Nash(V ))i ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × {1}n,
then, ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, ΓˆV ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {uˆVi }i∈N) defined by
uˆVi (s) := (Nash(V ))i ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × {1}n satisfies
R(g(s), T (V )) =

(g(s), 1) if ∃ S ∈ N s.t. g(s) ∈ e(S) and
u˜Vi (s) (= (g(s)(V ))i) ≥ bVi ∀ i ∈ S
(g(s), 0) otherwise
=

(g(s), 1) if ∃ S ∈ N s.t. g(s) ∈ e(S) and
nVi ≥ bVi ∀ i ∈ S
(g(s), 0) otherwise
= (g(s), 1) ∀ s ∈ {1}n,
and thus
71As for the third equality, note that, if g(s) = l(0), then g(s)(V ) = (0, . . . , 0) = u˜V (s) (by definition
of l(0) and g : [0, 1]n → L below), and thus u˜Vi (s) = 0 < bVi ∀ i ∈ N .
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ui(R(g(s), T (V )), T (V )) = u˜
V
i (s) = n
V
i = uˆ
V
i (s) ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × {1}n,
where g : [0, 1]n → L is defined by g(s)(V ) := u˜V (s) ∀ (s, V ) ∈ [0, 1]n×Cnntu. And,
collection {ΓˆV }V ∈Cnntu satisfies assumption (i) and (iii) of Proposition 5.2(a).72
(e) If, ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, Γ˜V ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜Vi }i∈N) = Γ˜V(e), i.e.
Si = [0, 1] ∀ i ∈ N and u˜Vi (s) = mVi (si) ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × [0, 1]n,
then, ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, ΓˆV ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {uˆVi }i∈N) defined by
uˆVi (s) :=
 mVi (si) if mVj (sj) ≥ bVj ∀ j ∈ NbVi otw. ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × [0, 1]n
satisfies
R(g(s), T (V )) =

(g(s), 1) if ∃ S ∈ N s.t. g(s) ∈ e(S) and
u˜Vi (s) (= (g(s)(V ))i) ≥ bVi ∀ i ∈ S
(g(s), 0) otherwise
=

(g(s), 1) if g(s) 6= l(0) and u˜Vi (s) ≥ bVi ∀ i ∈ N
(g(s), 1) if g(s) = l(0) and u˜Vi (s) ≥ bVi for some i ∈ N
(g(s), 0) otherwise
=

(g(s), 1) if g(s) 6= l(0) and u˜Vi (s) ≥ bVi ∀ i ∈ N
(g(s), 1) if g(s) = l(0) and u˜Vi (s) ≥ bVi ∀ i ∈ N
(g(s), 0) otherwise
=
 (g(s), 1) if mVi (si) ≥ bVi ∀ i ∈ N(g(s), 0) otherwise ∀ s ∈ [0, 1]n, 73
and thus
ui(R(g(s), T (V )), T (V )) =
 ui((g(s), 1), T (V )) if mVj (sj) ≥ bVj ∀ j ∈ Nui((g(s), 0), T (V )) otw.
=
 u˜Vi (s) if mVj (sj) ≥ bVj ∀ j ∈ NbVi otw.
=
 mVi (si) if mVj (sj) ≥ bVj ∀ j ∈ NbVi otw.
= uˆVi (s) ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × [0, 1]n,
where g : [0, 1]n → L is defined by g(s)(V ) := u˜V (s) ∀ (s, V ) ∈ [0, 1]n × Cnntu.
And, collection {ΓˆV }V ∈Cnntu satisfies assumption (i) and (iii) of Proposition 5.2(a).
72Note that, for collection {Γ˜V(c)}i∈N , it is sufficient to require 0 ≤ bV ≤ nV ∀ V ∈ Cnntu.
73As for the third equality, note that, if g(s) = l(0), then g(s)(V ) = (0, . . . , 0) = u˜V (s) (by definition
of l(0) and g : [0, 1]n → L below), and thus u˜Vi (s) = 0 < bVi ∀ i ∈ N .
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Up to this point, we have assumed that 0 ≤ bV ≤ nV ∀ V ∈ Cnntu (and, sometimes,
even 0 ≤ bVi < nVi ∀ (i, V ) ∈ N × Cnntu or 0 < bVi < nVi ∀ (i, V ) ∈ N × Cnntu).
A point made by Maskin and Moore [27], to justify “the ‘point expectation’ assump-
tion” implicit in their definition of a “renegotiation process” as a function into out-
comes, is the following: “. . . uncertainty about the realization . . .may actually facilitate
implementation rather than impede it. This is because even though . . . each realiza-
tion . . . is Pareto optimal . . . the expected utilities . . . (which correspond to a convex
combination of the utilities from each realization) may lie in the interior of the utility
possibility set.” Applied to our context, if each agent’s beliefs reflect the expected
value of some non-trivial probability distribution over the efficient utility allocations,
and if each agent’s probability distribution is ‘sufficiently pessimistic’, then we may
well expect each bVi to lie between 0 and n
V
i .
If, however, there exists a tuple (i, V ) ∈ N × Cnntu such that bVi > nVi , then, for each
EC ∈ {DSEnnfg, NEnnfg, SPNEn}, we have that αL is not strongly (⇔ fully) EC-
implementable in environment E.
Assume, to the contrary, that αL is EC-implementable in E.
Since Nash 6= l(0) (on Cnntu ⊆ Bn), and, ∀ (l, V ) ∈ L × Cnntu,
R(l, T (V )) =

(l, 1) if l 6= l(0) and ui((l, 1), T (V )) ≥ ui((l, 0), T (V )) ∀ i ∈ N
(l, 1) if l = l(0) and ∃ i ∈ N s.t. ui((l, 1), T (V )) ≥ ui((l, 0), T (V ))
(l, 0) otw.
,
consistency of αL in environment E requires
u((Nash, 1), T (V )) ≥ u((Nash, 0), T (V )) ∀ V ∈ Cnntu.
However, since u((Nash, 1), T (V )) = Nash(V ) = nV and u((Nash, 0), T (V )) = bV for
all V ∈ Cnntu, this implies that nV ≥ bV ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, contradicting that there exists a
tuple (i, V ) ∈ N × Cnntu such that bVi > nVi .
5.3.3 LE Implementation of the Core Concept
Suppose that Cnntu satisfies
V (N) is comprehensive ∀ V ∈ Cnntu and
]{V ({i})} ≥ 2 ∀ (i, V ) ∈ N × Cnntu,
that e ≡ ec, and that, ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, solution concept L satisfies
L(V ) = Core(V ) ≡ {u ∈ V (N) | @ S ∈ N for which ∃ u′ ∈ V (S) s.t. u′i > ui ∀ i ∈ S}.
Furthermore, suppose that agents’ beliefs can be justified by prediction functions
{bi}i∈N for (L, T (V )), i.e.,
ui((l, 0), T (V )) = ui((bi1((l, 0), T (V )), 1), T (V )) ∀ (i, V, l) ∈ N × Cnntu × L,
92 Classical and LE Implementation of Cooperative Solution Concepts
and that these prediction functions are outcome-independent, i.e.,
bi((l, 0), T (V )) = bi((l
′, 0), T (V )) ∀ (i, l, l′, V ) ∈ N × L× L× Cnntu.
Define, ∀ (i, V ) ∈ N ×Cnntu, bi,V ∈ RN and bVi ∈ R as in the preceding paragraph. And,
suppose that, ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, the set of efficient Core elements above bV is nonempty, i.e.
ÊfCore(V, bV ) := {u ∈ Core(V ) | u ≥ bV ,@ u′ ∈ V (N) s.t. u′ ≥ u and u′ 6= u}
6= ∅,
and satisfies ÊfCore(V, bV ) ∩ {u ∈ RN | ui > bVi ∀ i ∈ N} 6= ∅.
We now introduce a collection of n-person normal form games {Γ˜V }V ∈Cnntu satisfying
the assumptions of Corollary 5.2(a) for EC = N̂E
n
nfg, where N̂E
n
nfg(Γ) denotes the
payoff-dominant Nash Equilibria of game Γ, i.e.
N̂E
n
nfg(Γ) := {s ∈ S1 × . . .× Sn | s ∈ NEnnfg(Γ) and @ s′ ∈ NEnnfg(Γ)
such that u˜i(s
′) > u˜i(s) ∀ i ∈ N}
for all n-person normal form games Γ ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜i}i∈N).
The concept of “payoff-dominance” as an equilibrium selection criterion was introduced
by Harsanyi and Selten [16], and is discussed, for example, by Van Huyck, Battalio,
and Beil [54a, 54b, 54c], and Fudenberg and Tirole [12] (Paragraph 1.2.4).
For each V ∈ Cnntu, define Γ˜V ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜Vi }i∈N) by Si := [0,∞) ∀ i ∈ N and
u˜Vi (s) :=
 si if s ∈ Core(V ) and s ≥ bVbVi otw. ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × [0,∞)n.
Then, ∀ V ∈ Cnntu, s ∈ ÊfCore(V, bV )⇔ s ∈ N̂E
n
nfg(Γ˜
V ) ∀ s ∈ [0,∞)n:
’⇒’ Let s ∈ ÊfCore(V, bV ), and assume that there exists an i ∈ N and a strategy
s′i ∈ Si s.t. u˜Vi (s′i, s−i) > u˜Vi (s).
Since s ∈ Core(V ) and s ≥ bV , we have that u˜Vi (s) = si ≥ bVi .
By definition of u˜Vi , u˜
V
i (s
′
i, s−i) > si ≥ bVi implies that
(s′i, s−i) ∈ Core(V ), (s′i, s−i) ≥ bV , and s′i > si,
contradicting s ∈ ÊfCore(V, bV ).
Thus, s ∈ NEnnfg(Γ˜V ).
Now, assume ∃ s′ ∈ NEnnfg(Γ˜V ) such that u˜Vi (s′) > u˜Vi (s) ∀ i ∈ N .
Since s ∈ Core(V ) and s ≥ bV , we have that u˜Vi (s) = si ≥ bVi ∀ i ∈ N .
Therefore, u˜Vi (s
′) > si ≥ bVi ∀ i ∈ N , and, by definition of u˜Vi , we have that
s′ ∈ Core(V ), s′ ≥ bV , and u˜Vi (s′) = s′i ∀ i ∈ N .
Thus, s′ ∈ Core(V ) ⊆ V (N) and s′i = u˜Vi (s′) > u˜Vi (s) = si ∀ i ∈ N ,
contradicting s ∈ Core(V ).
It follows that s ∈ N̂Ennfg(Γ˜V ).
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’⇐’ Let s ∈ [0,∞)n\ÊfCore(V, bV ).
First, suppose that s ∈ Core(V ) and s ≥ bV :
Since s 6∈ ÊfCore(V, bV ), there exists an u ∈ V (N) s.t. u ≥ s and u 6= s.
Since V (N) is comprehensive, it follows that there exists an i ∈ N and
an u′ ∈ V (N) s.t. u′i > si and u′j = sj ∀ j ∈ N\{i}.
And, s ∈ Core(V ) implies that u′ ∈ Core(V ).74
Thus, u˜Vi (u
′
i, s−i) = u˜
V
i (u
′) = u′i > si = u˜
V
i (s), i.e., s 6∈ NEnnfg(Γ˜V ).
In particular, s 6∈ N̂Ennfg(Γ˜V ).
Next, suppose that s 6∈ Core(V ) or s 6≥ bV :
By definiton of u˜Vi , we have that u˜
V
i (s) = b
V
i ∀ i ∈ N .
Let s∗ ∈ ÊfCore(V, bV ) ∩ {u ∈ RN | ui > bVi ∀ i ∈ N} (6= ∅ by assump-
tion). According to ‘⇒’, we have that s∗ ∈ N̂Ennfg(Γ˜V ).
Since u˜Vi (s
∗) = s∗i > b
V
i = u˜
V
i (s) ∀ i ∈ N , we have that s 6∈ N̂E
n
nfg(Γ˜
V ).
And, collection {Γ˜V }V ∈Cnntu satisfies the assumptions of Corollary 5.2(a) for EC =
N̂E
n
nfg:
For each V ∈ Cnntu, we have that
N̂E
n
nfg(Γ˜
V ) 6= ∅ (since N̂Ennfg(Γ˜V ) = ÊfCore(V, bV ) 6= ∅),
u˜V (N̂E
n
nfg(Γ˜
V )) = u˜V (ÊfCore(V, bV )) = ÊfCore(V, bV ) ⊆ Core(V ) = L(V ),
u˜V (s) =
 s if s ∈ Core(V ) and s ≥ bVbV otw. ∈
 Core(V )V (N)
⊆ V (N) ⊆ Fup(V ) ∀ s ∈ [0,∞)n,75 and
R(g(s), T (V )) =

(g(s), 1) if ∃ S ∈ N+ s.t. g(s) ∈ e(s) and
ui((g(s), 1), T (V )) ≥ ui((g(s), 0), T (V ))
∀ i ∈ S ∩N
(g(s), 0) otw.
= (g(s), 1) ∀ s ∈ [0,∞)n
(since, ∀ i ∈ N , ui((g(s), 1), T (V )) = (g(s)(V ))i = u˜Vi (s)
≥ bVi = ui((g(s), 0), T (V )) ),
where g : [0,∞)n → L is defined by g(s)(V ) := u˜V (s) ∀ s ∈ [0,∞)n.
74Assume that ∃ S ∈ N for which ∃ u′′ ∈ V (S) s.t. u′′i > u′i ∀ i ∈ S. Then, u′′i > u′i ≥ si ∀ i ∈ S,
contradicting s ∈ Core(V ).
75Note that, since ̂EfCore(V, bV ) 6= ∅, there exists an u ∈ Core(V ) ⊆ V (N) such that u ≥ bV .
Since V (N) is comprehensive, we have that bV ∈ V (N).
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5.4 Classical and LE Implementation of Solution Concepts for
Cooperative Games with Physical Outcomes
5.4.1 Classical Implementation
The following approach is due to Dagan and Serrano [9]. Proposition 5.3 reflects their
assertion that every solution concept which is fully implementable by an ordinally
invariant equilibrium concept must be ordinally invariant (Dagan and Serrano [9],
Result 2). Adapting the proof in Hahmeier [15] to our definitions and notation, we
briefly sketch a proof in Appendix G.
Let Cnpo ≡ {Γθ ≡ (N, X¯, {uθii }i∈N)}θ∈Θ be a nonempty set of n-person cooperative
games with physical outcomes (all sharing the same game form (N, X¯)), where,
∀ i ∈ N , Θi is the set of possible types for agent i, and
Θ ⊆ Θ1 × . . .×Θn is the set of possible type profiles / states.
Define the classical n-person environment E ≡ E(Cnpo) ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {u′i}i∈N ,G)
by X := Fo(X¯),
u′i(q, θ) := u
θi
i (q) ∀ (i, q, θ) ∈ N × Fo(X¯)×Θ, and
G is the set of all strategic and extensive mechanisms for (N,Fo(X¯)).
For each nonempty-valued solution concept ψ for Cnpo, let αψ : Θ ⇒ Fo(X¯) denote the
(social) choice correspondence for environment E defined by αψ(θ) := ψ(Γ
θ) ∀ θ ∈ Θ.
Let ψ be a nonempty-valued solution concept for Cnpo, and let EC ∈ {NEnnfg, DSEnnfg}.
Proposition 5.3 (Dagan and Serrano [9])
(i) If there exists a strategic n-person mechanism G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) ∈ G that
fully EC-implements αψ in environment E, then ψ is ordinally invariant on
Cnpo, i.e., ψ(Γθ′) = ψ(Γθ) ∀ (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ × Θ such that Γθ′ is an order preserving
transformation of Γθ.76
(ii) If there exists an n-person extensive form mechanism with perfect information
G ≡ (N,H, p, g) ∈ G that fully SPNEn-implements αψ in environment E, then
ψ is ordinally invariant on Cnpo, i.e., ψ(Γθ′) = ψ(Γθ) ∀ (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ× Θ such that
Γθ
′
is an order preserving transformation of Γθ.
In contrast to solution concept ψCore, which is ordinally invariant on every set of coop-
erative games with physical outcomes (sharing the same game form), ψNash might not
be ordinally invariant on Cnpo.77 Thus, Proposition 5.3 represents a necessary condition
76I.e. ψ(Γθ
′
) = ψ(Γθ) ∀ (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ×Θ satisfying u′i(q, θ′) > u′i(qˆ, θ′)⇔ u′i(q, θ) > u′i(qˆ, θ) ∀ (i, q, qˆ) ∈
N × Fo(X¯)× Fo(X¯).
77Remember our discussion in Paragraph 5.1.3.
Classical and LE Implementation of Cooperative Solution Concepts 95
for the implementation of αψNash .
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Remark 5.3 follows from the proof of the preceding proposition. However, this ‘version’
of Proposition 5.3 allows for an extension to environments with limited enforcement
power, which will be presented in the following paragraph.
Remark 5.3
(i) If there exists a strategic n-person mechanism G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) ∈ G that fully
EC-implements αψ in environment E, then ψ(Γ
θ) = ψ(Γθ
′
) ∀ (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ×Θ such
that ΓE,G,θ
′
is an order preserving transformation of ΓE,G,θ, i.e. ∀ (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ×Θ
satisfying u′i(g(s), θ
′) > u′i(g(sˆ), θ
′) ⇔ u′i(g(s), θ) > u′i(g(sˆ), θ) ∀ (i, s, sˆ) ∈ N ×
S × S, where S := S1 × . . .× Sn.
(ii) If there exists an n-person extensive form mechanism with perfect information
G ≡ (N,H, p, g) ∈ G that fully SPNEn-implements αψ in environment E, then
ψ(Γθ) = ψ(Γθ
′
) ∀ (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ×Θ such that ΓE,G,θ′ is an order preserving trans-
formation of ΓE,G,θ, i.e. ∀ (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ×Θ satisfying u′i(g(h), θ′) > u′i(g(hˆ), θ′)⇔
u′i(g(h), θ) > u
′
i(g(hˆ), θ) ∀ (i, h, hˆ) ∈ N × ZH × ZH .
5.4.2 LE Implementation
Let Cnpo ≡ {Γθ ≡ (N, X¯, {uθii }i∈N)}θ∈Θ be a nonempty set of n-person cooperative
games with physical outcomes (all sharing the same game form (N, X¯)), where,
∀ i ∈ N , Θi is the set of possible types for agent i, and
Θ ⊆ Θ1 × . . .×Θn is the set of possible type profiles / states,
such that either
(i) ]{X¯({i})} ≥ 2 ∀ i ∈ N , or
(ii) each Γθ ∈ Cnpo is a bargaining game with physical outcomes.
Let E ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {ui}i∈N ,G, R, e) be an an n-person environment with lim-
ited enforcement power such that
X = Fo(X¯),
ui((q, 1), θ) = u
θi
i (q) ∀ (i, q, θ) ∈ N × Fo(X¯)×Θ,
G is the set of all strategic and extensive mechanisms for (N,Fo(X¯)), and
e ≡ ec in case (i) and e ≡ eb in case (ii),
78Note that ordinally invariance of ψNash does not necessarily imply Maskin-monotonicity of αψNash .
In Appendix F, adapting an example in Hahmeier [15] to our definitions and notation, we define a
set Cnpo of bargaining games with physical outcomes (sharing the same game form) on which ψNash
is ordinally invariant but αψNash is not Maskin-monotonic in environment E(Cnpo). Our example is
based on a similar example / comparable result by Howard [17].
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where ec and eb denote the two enforcement structures for (N,Fo(X¯)) that satisfy
ec(S) =
 Fo(X¯) if S = N or S = N+∅ otw. ∀ S ∈ N+ and
eb(S) =

Fo(X¯) if S = N or S = N
+
∅ if S = {0}
{(N, x0)} otw.
∀ S ∈ N+,
and x0 ∈ X¯(N) denotes the outcome that satisfies X¯(S) = {x0} ∀ S ∈ N\{N}.
For each nonempty-valued solution concept ψ for Cnpo, let αψ : Θ ⇒ Fo(X¯) denote the
(social) choice correspondence for environment E defined by αψ(θ) := ψ(Γ
θ) ∀ θ ∈ Θ.
Proposition 5.4 indicates that a (social) choice correspondence αψ might be imple-
mentable in an environment with limited enforcement power without ψ being ordinally
invariant. In contrast to Proposition 5.3, our extension to environments with limited
enforcement power represents a necessary condition for both αψNash and αψCore .
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Let ψ be a nonempty-valued solution concept for Cnpo, and let EC ∈ {NEnnfg, DSEnnfg}.
Proposition 5.4
(i) If there exists a strategic n-person mechanism G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) ∈ G that fully
EC-implements αψ in environment E, then ψ(Γ
θ) = ψ(Γθ
′
) ∀ (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ×Θ such
that ΓE
∗,G∗,θ′ is an order preserving transformation of ΓE
∗,G∗,θ, i.e., ∀ (θ, θ′) ∈
Θ × Θ satisfying ui(R(g(s), θ′), θ′) > ui(R(g(sˆ), θ′), θ′) ⇔ ui(R(g(s), θ), θ) >
ui(R(g(sˆ), θ), θ) ∀ (i, s, sˆ) ∈ N × S × S, where S := S1 × . . .× Sn.80
(ii) If there exists an n-person extensive form mechanism with perfect information
G ≡ (N,H, p, g) ∈ G that fully SPNEn-implements αψ in environment E, then
ψ(Γθ) = ψ(Γθ
′
) ∀ (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ × Θ such that ΓE∗,G∗,θ′ is an order preserving
transformation of ΓE
∗,G∗,θ, i.e., ∀ (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ× Θ satisfying ui(R(g(h), θ′), θ′) >
ui(R(g(hˆ), θ
′), θ′)⇔ ui(R(g(h), θ), θ) > ui(R(g(hˆ), θ), θ) ∀ (i, h, hˆ) ∈ N × (ZH)2.
Proof
(i) Consider a tuple (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ × Θ such that ΓE∗,G∗,θ′ is an order preserving
transformation of ΓE
∗,G∗,θ.
Since EC is ordinally invariant (on every set of n-person normal form games
that share the same game form), we have that EC(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ′) = EC(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ).
79Note that, in general, our necessary condition depends on the environment via its realization
function and also on the mechanism’s outcome function.
80Remember that, ∀ θ ∈ Θ, ΓE∗,G∗,θ ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui(R(g(·), θ), θ)}i∈N ) denotes the game in-
duced by mechanism G∗ and state θ in environment E∗.
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Thus, g(EC(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ′)) = g(EC(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ)).
Since mechanism G fully EC-implements αψ in environment E, we have that
{(q, 1) | q ∈ αψ(θ′)} = R(g(EC(ΓE∗,G∗,θ′)), θ′), and
{(q, 1) | q ∈ αψ(θ)} = R(g(EC(ΓE∗,G∗,θ)), θ).
In particular, R(g(EC(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ′)), θ′) = {(q, 1) | q ∈ g(EC(ΓE∗,G∗,θ′))}, and
R(g(EC(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ)), θ) = {(q, 1) | q ∈ g(EC(ΓE∗,G∗,θ))}.
It follows from the preceding that
{(q, 1) | q ∈ ψ(Γθ′)} = {(q, 1) | q ∈ αψ(θ′)}
= R(g(EC(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ′)), θ′)
= {(q, 1) | q ∈ g(EC(ΓE∗,G∗,θ′))}
= {(q, 1) | q ∈ g(EC(ΓE∗,G∗,θ))}
= R(g(EC(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ)), θ)
= {(q, 1) | q ∈ αψ(θ)}
= {(q, 1) | q ∈ ψ(Γθ)}.
(ii) Consider a tuple (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ × Θ such that ΓE∗,G∗,θ′ is an order preserving
transformation of ΓE
∗,G∗,θ.
Since SPNEn is ordinally invariant (on every set of n-person extensive form
games with perfect information that share the same game form), we have that
SPNEn(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ′) = SPNEn(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ).
Thus, g(O(SPNEn(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ′))) = g(O(SPNEn(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ))).
Since mechanism G fully SPNEn-implements αψ in environment E, we have
that {(q, 1) | q ∈ αψ(θ′)} = R(g(O(SPNEn(ΓE∗,G∗,θ′))), θ′), and
{(q, 1) | q ∈ αψ(θ)} = R(g(O(SPNEn(ΓE∗,G∗,θ))), θ).
In particular,
R(g(O(SPNEn(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ′))), θ′) = {(q, 1) | q ∈ g(O(SPNEn(ΓE∗,G∗,θ′)))}, and
R(g(O(SPNEn(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ))), θ) = {(q, 1) | q ∈ g(O(SPNEn(ΓE∗,G∗,θ)))}.
It follows from the preceding that
{(q, 1) | q ∈ ψ(Γθ′)} = {(q, 1) | q ∈ αψ(θ′)}
= R(g(O(SPNEn(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ′))), θ′)
= {(q, 1) | q ∈ g(O(SPNEn(ΓE∗,G∗,θ′)))}
= {(q, 1) | q ∈ g(O(SPNEn(ΓE∗,G∗,θ)))}
= R(g(O(SPNEn(ΓE
∗,G∗,θ))), θ)
= {(q, 1) | q ∈ αψ(θ)}
= {(q, 1) | q ∈ ψ(Γθ)}.
2
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6 Concluding Remarks
As stated at the beginning of this paper, implementation theory is concerned with the
question of which (social) choice correspondences can be implemented by the use of
certain mechanisms in certain environments. The standard theory’s assumptions on
the enforcement structure, however, are too restrictive for many applications. Our ap-
proach (of implementation in environments with limited enforcement power) accounts
for this by explicitly introducing a ‘variable’ enforcement structure describing the en-
forcement capabilities on outcomes as a function of all coalitions of individuals. The
future is thereby not explicitly modeled but implicitly summarized in each agent’s be-
liefs about what will happen if an outcome suggested by a mechanism is not being
implemented.
Throughout the preceding chapters, we have assumed that the designer knows these
beliefs in dependence upon the state of the environment, that is, the designer knows
the realization function. And, although this might be a reasonable assumption for a
variety of situations, it might not cover others.
Amoro´s [2] “studies Nash implementation when the outcomes of the mechanism can be
renegotiated among the agents but the planner does not know the renegotiation func-
tion that they will use.” Amoro´s assumes “that there exists a set of admissible rene-
gotiation functions” (such that “(1) renegotiated outcomes are always Pareto-efficient
and, (2) no agent ends up worse off after renegotiating”) and proposes “a new form
of implementation where the same mechanism must work for every admissible rene-
gotiation function.”81 In particular, he extends Jackson and Palfrey’s [24a] results on
sufficient and necessary conditions for the implementation in Nash Equilibrium to his
setting.
Analogously, in our approach, instead of assuming that the designer knows the realiza-
tion function, a set of possible beliefs for each player in each state of the environment
would imply a set of possible realization functions and would allow for an extension of
Amoro´s’s results to environments with limited enforcement power.82 An analysis into
81As Amoro´s notes, “alternatively, this could be interpreted as an enlargement of the set of possible
states. As Maskin and Moore (1999) argue, two states s and s′ might be identical in preferences and
differ only in terms of how renegotiation would proceed. We prefer to model the set of admissible
renegotiation functions seperately in order to illustrate its effect on the set of implementable social
choice rules.”
82This is in line with Amoro´s’s concluding remark: “Another line of research could involve to extend
our analysis to the case in which the no enforcement of the mechanism is due to individual rationality
constraints.”
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this direction could result in a classification of mechanisms/support results according
to the set of agents’ beliefs for which they work.
Amoro´s sees “some scope for further development and extension” of his model: “One
line of research could involve to study the case in which the true renegotiation function
is unknown not only to the planner, but also to the agents . . .”. Correspondingly,
we could extend our approach by deviating from the assumption that all agents are
completely informed about the actual state of the environment. Whereas the complete
information (between the agents) assumption might be a good starting point for re-
search in this area, in specific applications it may be unrealistic, for example, to assume
that every agent knows all other agents’ beliefs.83
Another important question not answered in the present paper is the following: what
are reasonable beliefs? Probably, an answer to this question can only be based on
more information about the specific environment under consideration. An interesting
aspect, however, is present in Jackson and Palfrey [24a], who “endogenize the gener-
alized reversion function” by analysing a model that allows each individual to either
accept the outcome suggested by a strategic mechanism or to veto and thereby forc-
ing the mechanism to be replayed. Similarly, in our model (of LE implementation),
agents’ beliefs could be endogenized by analysing such a mechanism with respect to
certain assumptions on the behaviour of the agents (e.g., in the form of an equilibrium
concept).
Jackson and Palfrey [24a] note that, “more generally, a veto might trigger an alternative
mechanism which is played.” Following this direction, one could analyse mechanisms
that allow agents to actually implement an outcome and that always continue or that
might continue if this opportunity is not taken. Such an analysis could extend our
implementation results in both environments with limited and with delegative enforce-
ment power, thereby covering applications in which the enforcement capabilities of the
designer allow for such active mechanisms.84 And, in the words of Jackson and Palfrey,
“there is a rich array of applications where dynamics is a crucial element, ranging from
the operation of continuous trading institutions to the rules governing electoral and
legislative institutions.”
83There is an extensive literature on the implementation of (social) choice correspondences in clas-
sical environments with incomplete information. Cf. Jackson [22], pp. 691-693.
84Note that this kind of mechanism requires outcomes to be verifiable.
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Appendix
A Proof for Lemma 2.3
For each (i, x) ∈ N ×X and every %i ∈ RX , define L(x,%i) := {y ∈ X | x %i y}.
(i) We have that f(%) = f(%′) ∀ (%,%′) ∈ P × P satisfying
∃ h ∈ N s.t. %−h=%′−h and L(f(%),%h) ⊆ L(f(%),%′h):85
Suppose not, i.e., suppose that there are (%,%′) ∈ P × P such that
f(%) 6= f(%′), and
∃ h ∈ N s.t. %−h=%′−h and L(f(%),%h) ⊆ L(f(%),%′h).
Define x := f(%) and y := f(%′).
Since x 6= y, and since no two distinct alternatives are indifferent, we have that
either y h x or x %h y.
Assumption (b) implies that x = f(%h,%−h) %h f(%′h,%−h) = f(%′) = y, con-
tradicting the first alternative.
If x %h y, then, since L(f(%),%h) ⊆ L(f(%),%′h), we have that x %′h y. Fur-
thermore, since x 6= y, and since no two distinct alternatives are indifferent, it
follows that x ′h y. However, assumption (b) implies that y = f(%′h,%′−h) %′h
f(%h,%′−h) = f(%h,%−h) = x, a contradiction.
(ii) We have that f is “monotonic” (Mas-Colell et al. [29], Definition 21.E.4), i.e.,
f(%) = f(%′) ∀ (%,%′) ∈ P×P satisfying L(f(%),%i) ⊆ L(f(%),%′i) ∀ i ∈ N :86
Let (%,%′) ∈ P × P satisfy L(f(%),%i) ⊆ L(f(%),%′i) ∀ i ∈ N .
Since L(f(%),%1) ⊆ L(f(%),%′1), (i) implies that f(%) = f(%′1,%2, . . . ,%N).
It follows that L(f(%′1,%−1),%2) = L(f(%),%2)
⊆ L(f(%),%′2) = L(f(%′1,%−1),%′2),
and, again, (i) implies that f(%′1,%2, . . . ,%N) = f(%′1,%′2,%3, . . . ,%N).
An iteration of this process leads to the result that
f(%) = f(%′1,%2, . . . ,%N) = . . . = f(%′1, . . . ,%′N−1,%N) = f(%′).
(iii) We have that f is “weakly Paretian” (Mas-Colell et al. [29], Definition 21.E.2),
i.e. ∀ %∈ P @ x ∈ X s.t. x i f(%) ∀ i ∈ N :87
Suppose not, i.e., suppose that there exists a tuple (%, x) ∈ P × X such that
x i f(%) ∀ i ∈ N .
Assumption (a) implies that there exists a profile %′∈ P such that f(%′) = x.
85Cf. Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green [29], proof of Proposition 21.E.2
86Cf. Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green [29], proof of Proposition 23.C.3 (Step 1).
87Cf. Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green [29], proof of Proposition 23.C.3 (Step 2).
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Since P = (RX)N , there exists a profile %′′∈ P such that, for every i ∈ N ,
x ′′i f(%) ′′i z ∀ z ∈ X\{f(%), x}.
Since L(x,%′i) ⊆ X = L(x,%′′i ) ∀ i ∈ N , monotonicity of f implies that
f(%′) = f(%′′), i.e., that x = f(%′′).
Since L(f(%),%i) ⊆ X = L(f(%),%′′i ) ∀ i ∈ N , monotonicity of f implies that
f(%) = f(%′′).
Thus, f(%) = f(%′′) = x — a contradiction to x i f(%) ∀ i ∈ N .
(iv) Mas-Colell et al. [29], Proposition 21.E.1, implies that f is “dictatorial”, i.e.
∃ j ∈ N such that ∀ %∈ P we have that f(%) %j x′ ∀ x′ ∈ X.
B Proofs for Proposition 2.2 and 3.3, and Lemma 3.3
B.1 Proof for Proposition 2.2
Consider the strategic n-person mechanism G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) defined as follows.
Define Si := {(ti, xi,mi) | ti ∈ Θ, xi ∈ X,mi ∈ N0} ∀ i ∈ N .
For all ((t1, x1,m1), . . . , (tn, xn,mn)) ∈ (Θ×X × N0)n that satisfy
∃ (j, θ, x,m) ∈ N ×Θ×X × N0 s.t.
x ∈ α(θ) and (ti, xi,mi) = (θ, x,m) ∀ i ∈ N\{j},
define
g((t1, x1,m1), . . . , (tn, xn,mn)) :=
 xj if u′j(x, θ) ≥ u′j(xj, θ)x otw. .
For all other ((t1, x1,m1), . . . , (tn, xn,mn)) ∈ (Θ×X × N0)n, define
g((t1, x1,m1), . . . , (tn, xn,mn)) := xk, where k ∈ N satisfies mk ≥ mi ∀ i ∈ N .
To see that mechanism G fully NEnnfg-implements α in environment E, i.e., to see that
g(NEnnfg(Γ
E,G,θ)) = α(θ) ∀ θ ∈ Θ, consider an arbitrary θ ∈ Θ.
’⊇’
Let x ∈ α(θ), let si := (θ, x, 0) ∀ i ∈ N , and s := (s1, . . . , sn). Then, g(s) = x.
To see that s constitutes a Nash Equilibrium of the game induced by mechanism G and
type profile θ in environment E (i.e., that s ∈ NEnnfg(ΓE,G,θ)), consider an arbitrary
deviation by an arbitrary player j ∈ N , say to s′j := (θ′, x′,m′):
Since
u′j(g(s
′
j, s−j), θ) =
 u′j(x′, θ) if u′j(x, θ) ≥ u′j(x′, θ)u′j(x, θ) otw. ≤ u′j(x, θ) = u′j(g(s), θ),
player j’s deviation is not profitable.
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’⊆’
Let s∗ ≡ (s∗1, . . . , s∗n) ∈ NEnnfg(ΓE,G,θ), and define x∗ := g(s∗). To see that x∗ ∈ α(θ),
consider the following four cases.
(a) Suppose that ∃ (θ′, x′,m′) ∈ Θ×X × N0 such that s∗i = (θ′, x′,m′) ∀ i ∈ N .
This implies that x∗ ≡ g(s∗) = x′, i.e., that s∗i = (θ′, x∗,m′).
(a.1) Suppose that θ′ = θ.
Assume that x∗ 6∈ α(θ) and that there exists a tuple (i, x′′) ∈ N ×X such that
u′i(x
′′, θ) > u′i(x
∗, θ).
To see that s∗ does not constitute a NE of the game induced by mechanism G
and type profile θ in environment E (implying a contradiction), consider player
i’s deviation to si := (θ, x
′′,m′′) for some m′′ > m′:
Since g(si, s
∗
−i) = x
′′, we have that
u′i(g(s
∗), θ) = u′i(x
∗, θ) < u′i(x
′′, θ) = u′i(g(si, s
∗
−i), θ),
i.e., player i can profitably deviate.
Thus, x∗ ∈ α(θ) or u′i(x∗, θ) ≥ u′i(x′′, θ) ∀ (i, x′′) ∈ N ×X. Since α satisfies no-
veto-power in environment E, also the latter condition implies that x∗ ∈ α(θ).
(a.2) Suppose that θ′ 6= θ and that x∗ ∈ α(θ′).
Assume that x∗ 6∈ α(θ). Maskin-monotonicity of α implies that there exists a
tuple (i, y) ∈ N ×X such that u′i(x∗, θ′) ≥ u′i(y, θ′) and u′i(x∗, θ) < u′i(y, θ).
To see that s∗ does not constitute a NE of the game induced by mechanism G
and type profile θ in environment E (implying a contradiction), consider player
i’s deviation to si := (θ, y, 0):
Since
g(si, s
∗
−i) =
 y if u′i(x∗, θ′) ≥ u′i(y, θ′)x∗ otw. = y,
we have that u′i(g(s
∗), θ) = u′i(x
∗, θ) < u′i(y, θ) = u
′
i(g(si, s
∗
−i), θ),
i.e., player i can profitably deviate.
(a.3) Suppose that θ′ 6= θ and that x∗ 6∈ α(θ′).
Assume that ∃ (i, x′′) ∈ N ×X such that u′i(x′′, θ) > u′i(x∗, θ).
To see that s∗ does not constitute a NE of the game induced by mechanism G
and type profile θ in environment E (implying a contradiction), consider player
i’s deviation to si := (θ
′, x′′,m′′) for some m′′ > m′:
Since g(si, s
∗
−i) = x
′′, we have that
u′i(g(s
∗), θ) = u′i(x
∗, θ) < u′i(x
′′, θ) = u′i(g(si, s
∗
−i), θ),
i.e., player i can profitably deviate.
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Thus, u′i(x
∗, θ) ≥ u′i(x′′, θ) ∀ (i, x′′) ∈ N ×X.
Since α satisfies no-veto-power in E, this implies that x∗ ∈ α(θ).
(b) Suppose that s∗i 6= s∗j for some i, j ∈ N .
Since ]N ≥ 3, ∃ h ∈ N\{i, j}. Since s∗i 6= s∗j , we have that s∗h 6= s∗i or s∗h 6= s∗j .
Without loss of generality, suppose that s∗h 6= s∗i .
Assume that ∃ (k, x′) ∈ N\{i} ×X such that u′k(x′, θ) > u′k(x∗, θ).
To see that s∗ does not constitute a NE of the game induced by mechanism G
and type profile θ in environment E (implying a contradiction), consider player
k’s deviation to sk := (θ
′, x′,m′) for some m′ that satisfies m′ > ml ∀ l ∈ N\{k}
(where s∗i = (ti, xi,mi) ∀ i ∈ N) and for some θ′ ∈ Θ:
Since g(sk, s
∗
−k) = x
′,88 we have that
u′k(g(s
∗), θ) = u′k(x
∗, θ) < u′k(x
′, θ) = u′k(g(sk, s
∗
−k), θ),
i.e., player k can profitably deviate.
Thus, u′k(x
∗, θ) ≥ u′k(x′, θ) ∀ (k, x′) ∈ N\{i} ×X.
Since α satisfies no-veto-power in E, this implies that x∗ ∈ α(θ).
B.2 Proof for Lemma 3.3
Consider the strategic n-person mechanism G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) defined as follows.
Define Si := {(ti, xi,mi) | ti ∈ Θ, xi ∈ X,mi ∈ N0} ∀ i ∈ N .
For all ((t1, x1,m1), . . . , (tn, xn,mn)) ∈ (Θ×X × N0)n that satisfy
∃ (j, θ, x,m) ∈ N ×Θ×X × N0 s.t.
R(x, θ) ∈ α(θ)× {1} and
(ti, xi,mi) = (θ, x,m) ∀ i ∈ N\{j} and
∀ θ′ ∈ Θ s.t. R(x, θ′) 6∈ α(θ′)× {1} ∃ (i, y) ∈ N ×X s.t.
ui(R(x, θ), θ) ≥ ui(R(y, θ), θ) and ui(R(x, θ′), θ′) < ui(R(y, θ′), θ′),
define
g((t1, x1,m1), . . . , (tn, xn,mn)) :=
 xj if uj(R(x, θ), θ) ≥ uj(R(xj, θ), θ)x otw. .
For all other ((t1, x1,m1), . . . , (tn, xn,mn)) ∈ (Θ×X × N0)n, define
g((t1, x1,m1), . . . , (tn, xn,mn)) := xk, where k ∈ N satisfies mk ≥ mi ∀ i ∈ N .
To see that mechanism G fully NEnnfg-implements α in environment E, i.e., to see that
R(g(NEnnfg(Γ
E∗,G∗,θ)), θ) = {(y, 1) | y ∈ α(θ)} ∀ θ ∈ Θ, consider an arbitrary θ ∈ Θ.
88Note that if k 6= j, then i 6= j 6= k 6= i and s∗i 6= s∗j 6= sk 6= s∗i . If k = j, then i 6= j = k 6= h 6= i
and s∗i 6= sk 6= s∗h 6= s∗i .
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’⊇’
Let x ∈ α(θ). Then, by assumption (i), there exists an x′ ∈ X such that
R(x′, θ) = (x, 1) and
∀ θ′ ∈ Θ s.t. R(x′, θ′) 6∈ α(θ′)× {1} there exists a tuple (i, y) ∈ N ×X s.t.
ui(R(y, θ
′), θ′) > ui(R(x′, θ′), θ′) and ui(R(y, θ), θ) ≤ ui(R(x′, θ), θ).
Let ai := (θ, x
′, 0) ∀ i ∈ N , and a := (a1, . . . , an). Then, g(a) = x′ and R(g(a), θ) =
R(x′, θ) = (x, 1).
To see that a constitutes a NE of the game induced by mechanism G∗ and type profile
θ in environment E∗ (i.e., that a ∈ NEnnfg(ΓE∗,G∗,θ)), consider an arbitrary deviation
by an arbitrary player j ∈ N , say to a′j := (θ′, x′′,m′):
Since
uj(R(g(a
′
j, a−j), θ), θ) =
 uj(R(x′′, θ), θ) if uj(R(x′, θ), θ) ≥ uj(R(x′′, θ), θ)uj(R(x′, θ), θ) otw.
≤ uj(R(x′, θ), θ) = uj(R(g(a), θ), θ),
player j’s deviation is not profitable.
’⊆’
Let a∗ ≡ (a∗1, . . . , a∗n) ∈ NEnnfg(ΓE∗,G∗,θ), define x := g(a∗) and x∗ := R(g(a∗), θ) =
R(x, θ). To see that x∗ ∈ α(θ)× {1}, consider the following four cases.
(a) Suppose that ∃ (θ′, x′,m′) ∈ Θ×X × N0 such that a∗i = (θ′, x′,m′) ∀ i ∈ N .
This implies that x ≡ g(a∗) = x′, i.e., that a∗i = (θ′, x,m′).
(a.1) Suppose that θ′ = θ.
Assume that x∗ = R(x, θ) 6∈ α(θ) × {1} and that there exists a tuple (i, x′′) ∈
N ×X such that ui(R(x′′, θ), θ) > ui(R(x, θ), θ).
To see that a∗ does not constitute a NE of the game induced by mechanism G∗
and type profile θ in environment E∗ (implying a contradiction), consider player
i’s deviation to ai := (θ, x
′′,m′′) for some m′′ > m′:
Since R(g(ai, a
∗
−i), θ) = R(x
′′, θ) and R(g(a∗), θ) = R(x, θ), we have that
ui(R(g(a
∗), θ), θ) = ui(R(x, θ), θ) < ui(R(x′′, θ), θ) = ui(R(g(ai, a∗−i), θ), θ),
i.e., player i can profitably deviate.
Thus, R(x, θ) ∈ α(θ)× {1} or ui(R(x, θ), θ) ≥ ui(R(x′′, θ), θ) ∀ (i, x′′) ∈ N ×X.
By assumption (ii), also the latter condition implies that R(x, θ) ∈ α(θ)× {1}.
(a.2) Suppose that θ′ 6= θ and that
R(x, θ′) ∈ α(θ′)× {1} and
∀ θ′′ ∈ Θ s.t. R(x, θ′′) 6∈ α(θ′′)× {1} ∃ (i, y) ∈ N ×X s.t.
ui(R(x, θ
′), θ′) ≥ ui(R(y, θ′), θ′) and ui(R(x, θ′′), θ′′) < ui(R(y, θ′′), θ′′).
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Assume that x∗ = R(x, θ) 6∈ α(θ)×{1}. Then, there exists a tuple (i, y) ∈ N×X
s.t. ui(R(y, θ), θ) > ui(R(x, θ), θ) and ui(R(y, θ
′), θ′) ≤ ui(R(x, θ′), θ′).
To see that a∗ does not constitute a NE of the game induced by mechanism G∗
and type profile θ in environment E∗ (implying a contradiction), consider player
i’s deviation to ai := (θ, y,m
′′) for some m′′ > m:
Since R(g(ai, a
∗
−i), θ) = R(y, θ) and R(g(a
∗), θ) = R(x, θ), we have that
ui(R(g(a
∗), θ), θ) = ui(R(x, θ), θ) < ui(R(y, θ), θ) = ui(R(g(ai, a∗−i), θ), θ),
i.e., player i can profitably deviate.
(a.3) Suppose that θ′ 6= θ and that
R(x, θ′) 6∈ α(θ′)× {1} or
∃ θ′′ ∈ Θ s.t. R(x, θ′′) 6∈ α(θ′′)× {1} and @ (i, y) ∈ N ×X s.t.
ui(R(x, θ
′), θ′) ≥ ui(R(y, θ′), θ′) and ui(R(x, θ′′), θ′′) < ui(R(y, θ′′), θ′′).
Assume that ∃ (i, x′′) ∈ N ×X such that ui(R(x′′, θ), θ) > ui(R(x, θ), θ).
To see that a∗ does not constitute a NE of the game induced by mechanism G∗
and type profile θ in environment E∗ (implying a contradiction), consider player
i’s deviation to ai := (θ
′, x′′,m′′) for some m′′ > m′:
Since R(g(ai, a
∗
−i), θ) = R(x
′′, θ) and R(g(a∗), θ) = R(x, θ), we have that
ui(R(g(a
∗), θ), θ) = ui(R(x, θ), θ) < ui(R(x′′, θ), θ) = ui(R(g(ai, a∗−i), θ), θ),
i.e., player i can profitably deviate.
Thus, ui(R(x, θ), θ) ≥ ui(R(x′′, θ), θ) ∀ (i, x′′) ∈ N ×X.
By assumption (ii), this implies that R(x, θ) ∈ α(θ)× {1}.
(b) Suppose that a∗i 6= a∗j for some i, j ∈ N .
Since ]N ≥ 3, ∃ h ∈ N\{i, j}. Since a∗i 6= a∗j , we have that a∗h 6= a∗i or a∗h 6= a∗j .
Without loss of generality, suppose that a∗h 6= a∗i .
Assume that ∃ (k, x′) ∈ N\{i} ×X such that uk(R(x′, θ), θ) > uk(R(x, θ), θ).
To see that a∗ 6∈ NEnnfg(ΓE∗,G∗,θ) (implying a contradiction), consider player k’s
deviation to ak := (θ
′, x′,m′) for some m′ that satisfies m′ > ml ∀ l ∈ N\{k}
(where a∗i = (ti, xi,mi) ∀ i ∈ N) and for some θ′ ∈ Θ:
Since R(g(ak, a
∗
−k), θ) = R(x
′, θ),89 and R(g(a∗), θ) = R(x, θ), we have that
uk(R(g(a
∗), θ), θ) = uk(R(x, θ), θ) < uk(R(x′, θ), θ) = uk(R(g(ak, a∗−k), θ), θ),
i.e., player k can profitably deviate.
Thus, uk(R(x, θ), θ) ≥ uk(R(x′, θ), θ) ∀ (k, x′) ∈ N\{i} ×X.
By assumption (ii), this implies that R(x, θ) ∈ α(θ)× {1}.
89Note that if k 6= j, then i 6= j 6= k 6= i and a∗i 6= a∗j 6= ak 6= a∗i . If k = j, then i 6= j = k 6= h 6= i
and a∗i 6= ak 6= a∗h 6= a∗i .
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B.3 Proof for Proposition 3.3
Consider the strategic n-person mechanism G ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , g) defined as follows.
Define Si := {(ti, xi,mi) | ti ∈ Θ, xi ∈ X,mi ∈ N0} ∀ i ∈ N .
For all ((t1, x1,m1), . . . , (tn, xn,mn)) ∈ (Θ×X × N0)n that satisfy
∃ (j, θ, x,m) ∈ N ×Θ×X × N0 s.t.
x ∈ α(θ) and (ti, xi,mi) = (θ, x,m) ∀ i ∈ N\{j},
define
g((t1, x1,m1), . . . , (tn, xn,mn)) :=
 xj if uj(R(x, θ), θ) ≥ uj(R(xj, θ), θ)x otw. .
For all other ((t1, x1,m1), . . . , (tn, xn,mn)) ∈ (Θ×X × N0)n, define
g((t1, x1,m1), . . . , (tn, xn,mn)) := xk, where k ∈ N satisfies mk ≥ mi ∀ i ∈ N .
To see that mechanism G fully NEnnfg-implements α in environment E, i.e., to see that
R(g(NEnnfg(Γ
E∗,G∗,θ)), θ) = {(y, 1) | y ∈ α(θ)} ∀ θ ∈ Θ, consider an arbitrary θ ∈ Θ.
’⊆’
Let a∗ ≡ (a∗1, . . . , a∗n) ∈ NEnnfg(ΓE∗,G∗,θ), define x := g(a∗) and x∗ := R(g(a∗), θ) =
R(x, θ) ∈ {(x, 1), (x, 0)}. To see that x∗ ∈ α(θ) × {1}, consider the following four
cases.
(a) Suppose that ∃ (θ′, x′,m′) ∈ Θ×X × N0 such that a∗i = (θ′, x′,m′) ∀ i ∈ N .
This implies that x ≡ g(a∗) = x′, i.e., that a∗i = (θ′, x,m′).
(a.1) Suppose that θ′ = θ.
Assume that x 6∈ α(θ) and that there exists a tuple (i, x′′) ∈ N × X s.t.
ui(R(x
′′, θ), θ) > ui(R(x, θ), θ).
To see that a∗ does not constitute a NE of the game induced by mechanism G∗
and type profile θ in environment E∗ (implying a contradiction), consider player
i’s deviation to ai := (θ, x
′′,m′′) for some m′′ > m′:
Since R(g(ai, a
∗
−i), θ) = R(x
′′, θ) and R(g(a∗), θ) = R(x, θ), we have that
ui(R(g(a
∗), θ), θ) = ui(R(x, θ), θ) < ui(R(x′′, θ), θ) = ui(R(g(ai, a∗−i), θ), θ),
i.e., player i can profitably deviate.
Thus, x ∈ α(θ) or ui(R(x, θ), θ) ≥ ui(R(x′′, θ), θ) ∀ (i, x′′) ∈ N ×X. By assump-
tions (i) and (ii), respectively, both alternatives imply that R(x, θ) ∈ α(θ)×{1}.
(a.2) Suppose that θ′ 6= θ and x ∈ α(θ′). See part (a.2) in the proof for Lemma 3.3.
(a.3) Suppose that θ′ 6= θ and x 6∈ α(θ′). See part (a.3) in the proof for Lemma 3.3.
(b) Suppose that a∗i 6= a∗j for some i, j ∈ N . See part (b) in the proof for Lemma
3.3.
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’⊇’
Let x ∈ α(θ), let ai := (θ, x, 0) ∀ i ∈ N , and a := (a1, . . . , an). Then, g(a) = x.
To see that a constitutes a Nash Equilibrium of the game induced by mechanism G∗
and type profile θ in environment E∗ (i.e., that a ∈ NEnnfg(ΓE∗,G∗,θ)), consider an
arbitrary deviation by an arbitrary player j ∈ N , say to a′j := (θ′, x′,m′):
Since
uj(R(g(a
′
j, a−j), θ), θ) =
 uj(R(x′, θ), θ) if uj(R(x, θ), θ) ≥ uj(R(x′, θ), θ)uj(R(x, θ), θ) otw.
≤ uj(R(x, θ), θ) = uj(R(g(a), θ), θ),
player j’s deviation is not profitable.
It follows, as we have already shown (by ‘⊆’), that R(g(a), θ) ∈ α(θ)×{1} ⊆ X ×{1}.
Since R(g(a), θ) ∈ {(g(a), 1), (g(a), 0)}, it follows that R(g(a), θ) = (g(a), 1) = (x, 1).
C An Exchange Economy Example 90
Let E ≡ (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {ui}i∈N ,G, R, e) be the n-person environment with limited
enforcement power, where
N = {1, 2},
X = {((x11, x12), (x21, x22)) ∈ (R2)2 | x11 + x21 = 6, x12 + x22 = 6},
x¯ = ((1, 5), (5, 1)) ∈ X (is the initial endowment),
Θi = {θˆi, θ˜i} ∀ i ∈ N ,
Θ = {θˆ ≡ (θˆ1, θˆ2), θ˜ ≡ (θ˜1, θ˜2)},
G is the set of strategic n-person mechanisms for (N,X),
each agent i’s utility function satisfies
ui((x, 1), θ) =
 xi1 · xi2 if θ = θˆmin{xi1, xi2} if θ = θ˜ ∀ (i, x, θ) ∈ N ×X ×Θ,91 and
ui((x, 0), θ) = ui((x¯, 1), θ) ∀ (i, x, θ) ∈ N ×X ×Θ, and
e is the bargaining game enforcement structure defined by
e(S) =

X if S = N or S = N+
∅ if S = {0}
{x¯} otw.
∀ S ∈ N+.
90This example is adapted from Jackson and Palfrey [24a]. Cf. Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green
[29], Example 23.BB.1.
91I.e., in state θˆ both agents have Cobb-Douglas preferences, and in state θ˜ both agents have Leontief
preferences.
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Thus, realization function R satisfies
R(x, θ) =

(x¯, 1) if x = x¯, and ui((x, 1), θ) ≥ ui((x, 0), θ) for some i ∈ N
(x, 1) if x 6= x¯, and ui((x, 1), θ) ≥ ui((x, 0), θ) ∀ i ∈ N
(x, 0) otw.
=
 (x, 1) if ui((x, 1), θ) ≥ ui((x¯, 1), θ) ∀ i ∈ N(x, 0) otw. .
Note that agents do not have weak pessimistic beliefs in environment E. For example,
x′ := ((0, 0), (6, 6)) satisfies R(x′, θˆ) = (x′, 0).
Let EC = (N,X, {Θi}i∈N ,Θ, {u′i}i∈N ,G) denote E’s corresponding classical environ-
ment, i.e., u′i(x, θ) = ui((x, 1), θ) ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X×Θ, and let α be the SCC for environment
E defined by
α(θ) =
 {xˆ := ((3, 3), (3, 3))} if θ = θˆ{x˜ := ((2, 2), (4, 4))} if θ = θ˜ .
In particular, since R(xˆ, θˆ) = (xˆ, 1) and R(x˜, θ˜) = (x˜, 1), (social) choice correspondence
α is consistent with environment E.
Note that agents’ beliefs can be justified by outcome-independent prediction functions
{bi}i∈N , where each bi is defined by bi((x, 0), θ) = (x¯, 2) ∀ (x, θ) ∈ X ×Θ.
SCC α is fully NEnnfg-implementable in environment E.
To see this, consider the strategic mechanism G in which player 2 chooses between xˆ
and x˜, which is then the outcome suggested by the mechanism. The game induced
by G∗ and θˆ in E∗ has exactly one Nash Equilibrium. In this Nash Equilibrium,
player 2 chooses xˆ, since u2(R(xˆ, θˆ), θˆ) = u2((xˆ, 1), θˆ) = 9 > 5 = u2((x¯, 1), θˆ) =
u2((x˜, 0), θˆ) = u2(R(x˜, θˆ), θˆ). The game induced by G
∗ and θ˜ in E∗ has also ex-
actly one Nash Equilibrium. In this Nash Equilibrium, player 2 chooses x˜, since
u2(R(x˜, θ˜), θ˜) = u2((x˜, 1), θ˜) = 4 > 3 = u2((xˆ, 1), θ˜) = u2(R(xˆ, θ˜), θ˜).
However, (social) choice correspondence α is not fully NEnnfg-implementable in envi-
ronment EC , since α is not Maskin-monotonic in EC . To see this, note that xˆ ∈ α(θˆ),
xˆ 6∈ α(θ˜), and that there does not exist a tuple (i, x′) ∈ N ×X s.t. u′i(xˆ, θˆ) ≥ u′i(x′, θˆ)
and u′i(xˆ, θ˜) < u
′
i(x
′, θ˜): Assume that there exists such a tuple (i, x′). Then, 3 =
u′i(xˆ, θ˜) < u
′
i(x
′, θ˜) = min{x′i1, x′i2} implies that x′i1 > 3 and x′i2 > 3, which contradicts
9 = u′i(xˆ, θˆ) ≥ u′i(x′, θˆ) = x′i1 · x′i2.
Figure C.1 illustrates the setting (Cf. Jackson and Palfrey [24a], Figure 1).
Appendix 113
1
2
3
4
5
6
1 2 3 4 5 61
2
s
s
s
x¯
x˜
xˆ
R(x, θˆ) = (x, 1)
R(x, θˆ) = (x, 0)
1
2
3
4
5
6
1 2 3 4 5 61
2
s
s
s
x¯
x˜
xˆ
R(x, θ˜) = (x, 1)
R(x, θ˜) = (x, 0)
θˆ θ˜
Figure C.1
D ‘Equivalence’ between EDS and CVDS Assignments
Let A ≡ (e, d) be an EDS assignment , and define vA : N ⇒ X by
∀ (x, S) ∈ e({0})×N : x 6∈ vA(S), and
∀ (x, S) ∈ X\e({0})×N : x ∈ vA(S)⇔ S ∩ S ′ 6= ∅ ∀ S ′ ∈ N s.t. x ∈ e(S ′).
Then, X\vA(N) = e({0}), and vA(S ′) ⊇ vA(S) ∀ (S, S ′) ∈ N × N satisfying S ′ ⊇ S
(implying that (vA, d) is a CVDS assignment):
Let (x, S, S ′) ∈ X\e({0}) × N × N s.t. x ∈ vA(S) and S ′ ⊇ S. Since x ∈ vA(S),
we have that S ∩ S ′′ 6= ∅ ∀ S ′′ ∈ N s.t. x ∈ e(S ′′). Since S ′ ⊇ S, this implies that
S ′ ∩ S ′′ 6= ∅ ∀ S ′′ ∈ N s.t. x ∈ e(S ′′). Thus, x ∈ vA(S ′).
Let A ≡ (v, d) be a CVDS assignment, and define eA : N+ ⇒ X by
∀ (x, S) ∈ v(N)×N : x 6∈ eA(S)⇔ ∃ S ′ ∈ N s.t. S ∩ S ′ = ∅ and x ∈ v(S ′),
x 6∈ eA(S) ∀ (x, S) ∈ X\v(N)×N ,
x ∈ eA({0}) ∀ x ∈ X\v(N), x 6∈ eA({0}) ∀ x ∈ v(N), and
eA(S ∪ {0}) = eA(S) ∪ eA({0}) ∀ S ∈ N .
Then, X\v(N) = eA({0}), and
(i) eA(N) ∪ eA({0}) = X and eA(N) ∩ eA({0}) = ∅:
Let x ∈ X. If x ∈ v(N), then x ∈ eA(N) (since @ S ′ ∈ N s.t. N ∩ S ′ = ∅) and
x 6∈ eA({0}). If x 6∈ v(N), then x ∈ eA({0}) and x 6∈ eA(N).
Thus, eA(N) ∩ eA({0}) = ∅, and X = X\v(N) ∪ v(N) ⊆ eA({0}) ∪ eA(N) ⊆ X.
114 Appendix
(ii) eA(S ′) ⊇ eA(S) ∀ (S, S ′) ∈ N ×N s.t. S ′ ⊇ S:
Let (x, S, S ′) ∈ X × N × N s.t. x ∈ eA(S) and S ′ ⊇ S. Then, in particular,
x ∈ v(N).
Since x ∈ eA(S), we have that @ S ′′ ∈ N s.t. S ∩ S ′′ = ∅ and x ∈ v(S ′′).
Since S ′ ⊇ S, this implies that @ S ′′ ∈ N s.t. S ′ ∩ S ′′ = ∅ and x ∈ v(S ′′).
Thus, x ∈ eA(S ′).
(ii) eA(S ′) ⊇ eA(S) ∀ (S, S ′) ∈ N+ ×N+ s.t. S ′ ⊇ S:
If S ′ ∈ N , then eA(S ′) ⊇ eA(S) follows from (ii).
If S ′ = {0}, then S = {0} and eA(S ′) = eA(S).
If S ′ = S∗ ∪ {0} for some S∗ ∈ N , and if S ⊆ S∗, then (iii) implies eA(S∗) ⊇
eA(S), and thus eA(S ′) = eA(S∗) ∪ eA({0}) ⊇ eA(S) ∪ eA({0}) ⊇ eA(S).
If S ′ = S∗ ∪ {0} for some S∗ ∈ N , and if S = {0}, then
eA(S ′) = eA(S∗) ∪ eA({0}) ⊇ eA({0}) = eA(S).
If S ′ = S∗ ∪ {0} for some S∗ ∈ N , and if S = S˜ ∪ {0} for some S˜ ∈ N , S˜ ⊆ S∗,
then eA(S ′) = eA(S∗) ∪ eA({0}) ⊇ eA(S˜) ∪ eA({0}) = eA(S).
Conditions (i) and (iii) imply that (eA, d) is an EDS assignment.
The following table lists all possible CVDS and EDS assignments for the case of N = 3
agents and ]X = 1 outcome. The letters to the left enumerate the assignments, the let-
ters to the right point to the respective corresponding assignment as considered above.
v({1}) v({2}) v({3}) v({1, 2}) v({2, 3}) v({1, 3}) v({1, 2, 3})
e({1}) e({2}) e({3}) e({1, 2}) e({2, 3}) e({1, 3}) e({1, 2, 3}) e({0})
(a) x (a)
(b) x x x x (b)
(c) x x x x (c)
(d) x x x x x x (i)
(e) x x x x (e)
(f) x x x x x x (n)
(g) x x x x x x (k)
(h) x x x x x x x (s)
(i) x x (d)
(j) x x x x x (q)
(k) x x (g)
(l) x x x (o)
(m) x x x x x (p)
(n) x x (f)
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v({1}) v({2}) v({3}) v({1, 2}) v({2, 3}) v({1, 3}) v({1, 2, 3})
e({1}) e({2}) e({3}) e({1, 2}) e({2, 3}) e({1, 3}) e({1, 2, 3}) e({0})
(o) x x x x x (l)
(p) x x x (m)
(q) x x x (j)
(r) x x x x (r)
(s) x (h)
E Proof for Lemma 4.6
Assignment (e, d) has to match one of the following 400 cases (I.1.A to IV.25.D):
(I) e({0}) = ∅
(II) e({0}) = {x}
(III) e({0}) = {y}
(IV) e({0}) = {x, y}
(1) e({1}) = ∅, e({2}) = ∅, and e({1, 2}) = ∅
(2) e({1}) = ∅, e({2}) = ∅, and e({1, 2}) = {x}
(3) e({1}) = ∅, e({2}) = ∅, and e({1, 2}) = {y}
(4) e({1}) = ∅, e({2}) = ∅, and e({1, 2}) = {x, y}
(5) e({1}) = ∅, e({2}) = {x}, and e({1, 2}) = {x}
(6) e({1}) = ∅, e({2}) = {x}, and e({1, 2}) = {x, y}
(7) e({1}) = ∅, e({2}) = {y}, and e({1, 2}) = {y}
(8) e({1}) = ∅, e({2}) = {y}, and e({1, 2}) = {x, y}
(9) e({1}) = ∅, e({2}) = {x, y}, and e({1, 2}) = {x, y}
(10) e({1}) = {x}, e({2}) = ∅, and e({1, 2}) = {x}
(11) e({1}) = {x}, e({2}) = ∅, and e({1, 2}) = {x, y}
(12) e({1}) = {x}, e({2}) = {x}, and e({1, 2}) = {x}
(13) e({1}) = {x}, e({2}) = {x}, and e({1, 2}) = {x, y}
(14) e({1}) = {x}, e({2}) = {y}, and e({1, 2}) = {x, y}
(15) e({1}) = {x}, e({2}) = {x, y}, and e({1, 2}) = {x, y}
(16) e({1}) = {y}, e({2}) = ∅, and e({1, 2}) = {y}
(17) e({1}) = {y}, e({2}) = ∅, and e({1, 2}) = {x, y}
(18) e({1}) = {y}, e({2}) = {x}, and e({1, 2}) = {x, y}
(19) e({1}) = {y}, e({2}) = {y}, and e({1, 2}) = {y}
(20) e({1}) = {y}, e({2}) = {y}, and e({1, 2}) = {x, y}
(21) e({1}) = {y}, e({2}) = {x, y}, and e({1, 2}) = {x, y}
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(22) e({1}) = {x, y}, e({2}) = ∅, and e({1, 2}) = {x, y}
(23) e({1}) = {x, y}, e({2}) = {x}, and e({1, 2}) = {x, y}
(24) e({1}) = {x, y}, e({2}) = {y}, and e({1, 2}) = {x, y}
(25) e({1}) = {x, y}, e({2}) = {x, y}, and e({1, 2}) = {x, y}
(A) d(x, 0) = (x, 2) and d(y, 0) = (y, 2)
(B) d(x, 0) = (x, 2) and d(y, 0) = (x, 2)
(C) d(x, 0) = (y, 2) and d(y, 0) = (y, 2)
(D) d(x, 0) = (y, 2) and d(y, 0) = (x, 2)
Cases IV.·.·
Full enforcement power on the side of the designer implies condition (iv).
Cases I.·.A, II.·.A, and III.·.A
R(e,d)(y, θ) =

(y, 1) if ∃ S ∈ N+ s.t. y ∈ e(S) and
ui((y, 1), θ) ≥ ui(d(y, 0), θ) ∀ i ∈ S ∩N
d(y, 0) otw.
=

(y, 1) if ∃ S ∈ N+ s.t. y ∈ e(S) and
ui((y, 1), θ) ≥ ui((y, 2), θ) = ui((y, 1), θ)− l ∀ i ∈ S ∩N
d(y, 0) otw.
=
 (y, 1) if ∃ S ∈ N+ s.t. y ∈ e(S)d(y, 0) otw.
= (y, 1),
since R(e,d)(y, θ′) = (y, 1) implies that ∃ S ∈ N+ s.t. y ∈ e(S).
R(e,d)(x, θ′) =

(x, 1) if ∃ S ∈ N+ s.t. x ∈ e(S) and
ui((x, 1), θ
′) ≥ ui(d(x, 0), θ′) ∀ i ∈ S ∩N
d(x, 0) otw.
=

(x, 1) if ∃ S ∈ N+ s.t. x ∈ e(S) and
ui((x, 1), θ
′) ≥ ui((x, 2), θ′) = ui((x, 1), θ′)− l ∀ i ∈ S ∩N
d(x, 0) otw.
=
 (x, 1) if ∃ S ∈ N+ s.t. x ∈ e(S)d(x, 0) otw.
= (x, 1),
since R(e,d)(x, θ) = (x, 1) implies that ∃ S ∈ N+ s.t. x ∈ e(S).
Thus, condition (iv) is satisfied.
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Cases I.·.B
Following the same steps as in cases I.·.A, we obtain R(e,d)(x, θ′) = (x, 1).
Assume that condition (iv) is not satisfied, i.e., that R(e,d)(y, θ) = (x, 2).
Since e({0}) = ∅, we have that e({1, 2}) = {x, y}.
Since e({1, 2}) = {x, y} and R(e,d)(y, θ) = (x, 2), we have that
u1((y, 1), θ) < u1(d(y, 0), θ) = u1((x, 2), θ) = u1((x, 1), θ)− l or
u2((y, 1), θ) < u2(d(y, 0), θ) = u2((x, 2), θ) = u2((x, 1), θ)− l.
If l ≥ 1, then this implies that
1 ≤ u1((y, 1), θ) < u1((x, 1), θ)− l ≤ 2− 1 = 1 or
1 ≤ u2((y, 1), θ) < u2((x, 1), θ)− l ≤ 2− 1 = 1,
a contradiction.
If l = 0 and y ∈ α(θ), then condition (v) is satisfied.
If l = 0 and y 6∈ α(θ), then R(e,d)(y, θ) 6∈ α(θ)× {1},
u1(R
(e,d)(x, θ), θ) = u1((x, 1), θ) ≤ u1((x, 1), θ)− l = u1(R(e,d)(y, θ), θ), and
u2(R
(e,d)(x, θ), θ) = u2((x, 1), θ) ≤ u2((x, 1), θ)− l = u2(R(e,d)(y, θ), θ),
i.e., condition (vii) is satisfied.
If l ∈ (0, 1) and y ∈ α(θ), then condition (v) is satisfied.
Cases I.·.C
Following the same steps as in cases I.·.A, we obtain R(e,d)(y, θ) = (y, 1).
Assume that condition (iv) is not satisfied, i.e., that R(e,d)(x, θ′) = (y, 2).
Since e({0}) = ∅, we have that e({1, 2}) = {x, y}.
Since e({1, 2}) = {x, y} and R(e,d)(x, θ′) = (y, 2), we have that
u1((x, 1), θ
′) < u1(d(x, 0), θ′) = u1((y, 2), θ′) = u1((y, 1), θ′)− l or
u2((x, 1), θ
′) < u2(d(x, 0), θ′) = u2((y, 2), θ′) = u2((y, 1), θ′)− l.
If l ≥ 1, then this implies that
1 ≤ u1((x, 1), θ′) < u1((y, 1), θ′)− l ≤ 2− 1 = 1 or
1 ≤ u2((x, 1), θ′) < u2((y, 1), θ′)− l ≤ 2− 1 = 1,
a contradiction.
If l = 0, then condition (vi) is satisfied:
u1(R
(e,d)(y, θ′), θ′) = u1((y, 1), θ′) ≤ u1((y, 1), θ′)− l = u1(R(e,d)(x, θ′), θ′), and
u2(R
(e,d)(y, θ′), θ′) = u2((y, 1), θ′) ≤ u2((y, 1), θ′)− l = u2(R(e,d)(x, θ′), θ′).
If l ∈ (0, 1) and y ∈ α(θ), then,
• in cases I.4.C, I.8.C, I.17.C, and I.20.C (x 6∈ e({1}), x 6∈ e({2})):
R(e,d)(x, θ) = (x, 1) implies that
u1((x, 1), θ) ≥ u1(d(x, 0), θ) = u1((y, 2), θ) = u1((y, 1), θ)− l and
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u2((x, 1), θ) ≥ u2(d(x, 0), θ) = u2((y, 2), θ) = u2((y, 1), θ)− l.
Since all utility levels are by assumption integer values and since l ∈ (0, 1), this
implies that u1((x, 1), θ) ≥ u1((y, 1), θ) and u2((x, 1), θ) ≥ u2((y, 1), θ).
By assumption (ii) and (iii), it follows that
u1((y, 1), θ
′) ≤ u1((x, 1), θ′) and u2((y, 1), θ′) ≤ u2((x, 1), θ′).
On the other hand, R(e,d)(x, θ′) = (y, 2) implies that
u1((x, 1), θ
′) < u1(d(x, 0), θ′) = u1((y, 2), θ′) = u1((y, 1), θ′)− l or
u2((x, 1), θ
′) < u2(d(x, 0), θ′) = u2((y, 2), θ′) = u2((y, 1), θ′)− l,
i.e., u1((x, 1), θ
′) < u1((y, 1), θ′) or u2((x, 1), θ′) < u2((y, 1), θ′),
a contradiction.
• in cases I.6.C, I.9.C, I.18.C, and I.21.C (x 6∈ e({1}), x ∈ e({2})):
R(e,d)(x, θ) = (x, 1) implies that u2((x, 1), θ) ≥ u2((y, 1), θ).
By assumption (iii), it follows that u2((y, 1), θ
′) ≤ u2((x, 1), θ′).
On the other hand, R(e,d)(x, θ′) = (y, 2) implies that u2((x, 1), θ′) < u2((y, 1), θ′),
a contradiction.
• in cases I.11.C, I.14.C, I.22.C, and I.24.C (x ∈ e({1}), x 6∈ e({2})):
R(e,d)(x, θ) = (x, 1) implies that u1((x, 1), θ) ≥ u1((y, 1), θ).
By assumption (ii), it follows that u1((y, 1), θ
′) ≤ u1((x, 1), θ′).
On the other hand, R(e,d)(x, θ′) = (y, 2) implies that u1((x, 1), θ′) < u1((y, 1), θ′),
a contradiction.
• in cases I.13.C, I.15.C, I.23.C, and I.25.C (x ∈ e({1}), x ∈ e({2})):
R(e,d)(x, θ) = (x, 1) implies that
u1((x, 1), θ) ≥ u1((y, 1), θ) or u2((x, 1), θ) ≥ u2((y, 1), θ).
By assumption (ii) and (iii), it follows that
u1((y, 1), θ
′) ≤ u1((x, 1), θ′) or u2((y, 1), θ′) ≤ u2((x, 1), θ′).
On the other hand, R(e,d)(x, θ′) = (y, 2) implies that
u1((x, 1), θ
′) < u1((y, 1), θ′) and u2((x, 1), θ′) < u2((y, 1), θ′),
a contradiction.
Cases I.·.D
If we assume that R(e,d)(y, θ) = (x, 2), then, following the same steps as in cases I.·.B,
we obtain our assertion for the cases ‘l = 0’ and ‘l ∈ (0, 1) and y ∈ α(θ)’, and obtain a
contradiction for the case ‘l ≥ 1’.
If we assume that R(e,d)(x, θ′) = (y, 2), then, following the same steps as in cases I.·.C,
we obtain our assertion for the case ‘l = 0’, and obtain a contradiction for the cases
‘l ≥ 1’ and ‘l ∈ (0, 1) and y ∈ α(θ)’.
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Thus, for the case ‘l = 0’, we obtain our assertion.
And, for the case ‘l ≥ 1’, condition (iv) is satisfied.
Finally, consider the case ‘l ∈ (0, 1) and y ∈ α(θ)’.
First, we obtain R(e,d)(x, θ′) = (x, 1).
Second, if R(e,d)(y, θ) = (x, 2), then we obtain our assertion, otherwise condition (iv)
is satisfied.
Cases II.·.B and II.·.D
Since x ∈ e({0}), we have that R(e,d)(x, θ′) = (x, 1).
Assume that condition (iv) is not satisfied, i.e., that R(e,d)(y, θ) = (x, 2).
Since y 6∈ e({0}) and R(e,d)(y, θ′) = (y, 1), we have that y ∈ e({1, 2}).
Since y ∈ e({1, 2}) and R(e,d)(y, θ) = (x, 2), we have that
u1((y, 1), θ) < u1(d(y, 0), θ) = u1((x, 2), θ) = u1((x, 1), θ)− l or
u2((y, 1), θ) < u2(d(y, 0), θ) = u2((x, 2), θ) = u2((x, 1), θ)− l.
If l ≥ 1, then this implies that
1 ≤ u1((y, 1), θ) < u1((x, 1), θ)− l ≤ 2− 1 = 1 or
1 ≤ u2((y, 1), θ) < u2((x, 1), θ)− l ≤ 2− 1 = 1,
a contradiction.
If l = 0 and y ∈ α(θ), then condition (v) is satisfied.
If l = 0 and y 6∈ α(θ), then R(e,d)(y, θ) 6∈ α(θ)× {1},
u1(R
(e,d)(x, θ), θ) = u1((x, 1), θ) ≤ u1((x, 1), θ)− l = u1(R(e,d)(y, θ), θ), and
u2(R
(e,d)(x, θ), θ) = u2((x, 1), θ) ≤ u2((x, 1), θ)− l = u2(R(e,d)(y, θ), θ),
i.e., condition (vii) is satisfied.
If l ∈ (0, 1) and y ∈ α(θ), then condition (v) is satisfied.
Cases II.·.C
Following the same steps as in cases I.·.A, we obtain R(e,d)(y, θ) = (y, 1). Since x ∈
e({0}), we have that R(e,d)(x, θ′) = (x, 1). Thus, condition (iv) is satisfied.
Cases III.·.B
Following the same steps as in cases I.·.A, we obtain R(e,d)(x, θ′) = (x, 1). Since y ∈
e({0}), we have that R(e,d)(y, θ) = (y, 1). Thus, condition (iv) is satisfied.
Cases III.·.C and III.·.D
Since y ∈ e({0}), we have that R(e,d)(y, θ) = (y, 1).
Assume that condition (iv) is not satisfied, i.e., that R(e,d)(x, θ′) = (y, 2).
Since x 6∈ e({0}) and R(e,d)(x, θ) = (x, 1), we have that x ∈ e({1, 2}).
Since x ∈ e({1, 2}) and R(e,d)(x, θ′) = (y, 2), we have that
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u1((x, 1), θ
′) < u1(d(x, 0), θ′) = u1((y, 2), θ′) = u1((y, 1), θ′)− l or
u2((x, 1), θ
′) < u2(d(x, 0), θ′) = u2((y, 2), θ′) = u2((y, 1), θ′)− l.
If l ≥ 1, then this implies that
1 ≤ u1((x, 1), θ′) < u1((y, 1), θ′)− l ≤ 2− 1 = 1 or
1 ≤ u2((x, 1), θ′) < u2((y, 1), θ′)− l ≤ 2− 1 = 1,
a contradiction.
If l = 0, then condition (vi) is satisfied:
u1(R
(e,d)(y, θ′), θ′) = u1((y, 1), θ′) ≤ u1((y, 1), θ′)− l = u1(R(e,d)(x, θ′), θ′), and
u2(R
(e,d)(y, θ′), θ′) = u2((y, 1), θ′) ≤ u2((y, 1), θ′)− l = u2(R(e,d)(x, θ′), θ′).
If l ∈ (0, 1) and y ∈ α(θ), then,
• in case I.2.C:
R(e,d)(x, θ) = (x, 1) implies that
u1((x, 1), θ) ≥ u1(d(x, 0), θ) = u1((y, 2), θ) = u1((y, 1), θ)− l and
u2((x, 1), θ) ≥ u2(d(x, 0), θ) = u2((y, 2), θ) = u2((y, 1), θ)− l.
Since all utility levels are by assumption integer values and since l ∈ (0, 1), this
implies that u1((x, 1), θ) ≥ u1((y, 1), θ) and u2((x, 1), θ) ≥ u2((y, 1), θ).
By assumption (ii) and (iii), it follows that
u1((y, 1), θ
′) ≤ u1((x, 1), θ′) and u2((y, 1), θ′) ≤ u2((x, 1), θ′).
On the other hand, R(e,d)(x, θ′) = (y, 2) implies that
u1((x, 1), θ
′) < u1(d(x, 0), θ′) = u1((y, 2), θ′) = u1((y, 1), θ′)− l or
u2((x, 1), θ
′) < u2(d(x, 0), θ′) = u2((y, 2), θ′) = u2((y, 1), θ′)− l,
i.e., u1((x, 1), θ
′) < u1((y, 1), θ′) or u2((x, 1), θ′) < u2((y, 1), θ′),
a contradiction.
• in case I.5.C:
R(e,d)(x, θ) = (x, 1) implies that u2((x, 1), θ) ≥ u2((y, 1), θ).
By assumption (iii), it follows that u2((y, 1), θ
′) ≤ u2((x, 1), θ′).
On the other hand, R(e,d)(x, θ′) = (y, 2) implies that u2((x, 1), θ′) < u2((y, 1), θ′),
a contradiction.
• in case I.10.C:
R(e,d)(x, θ) = (x, 1) implies that u1((x, 1), θ) ≥ u1((y, 1), θ).
By assumption (ii), it follows that u1((y, 1), θ
′) ≤ u1((x, 1), θ′).
On the other hand, R(e,d)(x, θ′) = (y, 2) implies that u1((x, 1), θ′) < u1((y, 1), θ′),
a contradiction.
• in case I.12.C:
R(e,d)(x, θ) = (x, 1) implies that
u1((x, 1), θ) ≥ u1((y, 1), θ) or u2((x, 1), θ) ≥ u2((y, 1), θ).
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By assumption (ii) and (iii), it follows that
u1((y, 1), θ
′) ≤ u1((x, 1), θ′) or u2((y, 1), θ′) ≤ u2((x, 1), θ′).
On the other hand, R(e,d)(x, θ′) = (y, 2) implies that
u1((x, 1), θ
′) < u1((y, 1), θ′) and u2((x, 1), θ′) < u2((y, 1), θ′),
a contradiction.
F Three Sets of Bargaining Games with Physical Outcomes
F.1 A set on which ψNash is not ordinally invariant
Define X := {x ∈ R2 | ∃ α ∈ R4+ such that
∑4
i=1 αi = 1 and
x = α2 · (1, 0) + α3 · (0, 1) + α4 · (15 , 1− 125)}, and
D := 0 ∈ X.
Let Cnpo be the set of all two-person bargaining games with physical outcomes Γ ≡
(N, X¯, {uΓi }i∈N) such that X¯({1, 2}) = X and X¯({i}) = {D} ∀ i ∈ N ≡ {1, 2}.
Let Γ ≡ (N, X¯, {uΓi }i∈N) ∈ Cnpo and Γ′ ≡ (N, X¯, {uΓ′i }i∈N) ∈ Cnpo be defined by
uΓi : X → R, uΓi (x) := xi ∀ (i, x) ∈ N ×X, and
uΓ
′
i : X → R, uΓ′2 (x) := x2 ∀ x ∈ X and
uΓ
′
1 (x) :=
 4 · x1 ∀ x ∈ X s.t. x1 ≤ 151
4
· (x1 − 15) + 45 ∀ x ∈ X s.t. x1 > 15
,
and note that Γ′ is an order preserving transformation of game Γ.
Figure F.1 illustrates the two games.
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Let x¯ denote the unique element of X that satisfies uΓ1 (x¯) · uΓ2 (x¯) = x¯1 · x¯2 ≥ x1 · x2 =
uΓ1 (x) · uΓ2 (x) ∀ x ∈ X, and note that uΓ1 (x¯) = x¯1 > 15 .
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Let x¯′ denote the unique element ofX that satisfies uΓ
′
1 (x¯
′)·uΓ′2 (x¯′) ≥ uΓ′1 (x)·uΓ′2 (x) ∀ x ∈
X, and note that (uΓ
′
1 (x¯
′), uΓ
′
2 (x¯
′)) = (4
5
, 1− 1
25
) and x¯′ = (1
5
, 1− 1
25
).
In particular, x¯′ 6= x¯, and thus ψNash(Γ) = {(N, x¯)} 6= {(N, x¯′)} = ψNash(Γ′).
It follows that ψNash is not ordinally invariant on Cnpo.
F.2 A set on which every solution concept is ordinally invariant
Let m ∈ N, m ≥ 2, and define game form (N, X¯) by N := {1, 2} and
X¯({1, 2}) := X := {(x0, . . . , xm) ∈ Rm+1+ |
∑m
k=0 xk = 1} and
X¯({i}) := {D} ∀ i ∈ N , where D := e0 := (1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ X.
Let Cnpo be the set of all two-person bargaining games with physical outcomes Γ ≡
(N, X¯, {uΓi }i∈N) such that each uΓi : X → R satisfies
∃ α(Γ,i) ∈ Rm+ such that uΓi (x0, . . . , xm) =
∑m
k=1 α
(Γ,i)
k · xk ∀ (x0, . . . , xm) ∈ X.92
Let Γ ≡ (N, X¯, {uΓi }i∈N) and Γ′ ≡ (N, X¯, {uΓ′i }i∈N) be bargaining games in Cnpo such
that Γ′ is an order preserving transformation of game Γ.
Then, ∀ (i, x, x′) ∈ N ×X ×X, uΓi (x) > uΓi (x′)⇔ uΓ′i (x) > uΓ′i (x′).
This implies that, ∀ (i, x, x′) ∈ N × X × X, uΓi (x) = uΓi (x′) ⇔ uΓ′i (x) = uΓ′i (x′), and
thus, uΓi (x) ≥ uΓi (x′)⇔ uΓ′i (x) ≥ uΓ′i (x′).
Without loss of generality, let e1 := (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ X and e2 := (0, 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ X
satisfy (uΓ1 (e1), u
Γ
2 (e1)) = (1, 0) and (u
Γ
1 (e2), u
Γ
2 (e2)) = (0, 1).
Let (i, j) ∈ N × Nm, and define el := (δ0l, . . . , δml) ∈ X, where δij := 1 for i = j and
δij := 0 for i 6= j.
If uΓi (el) = 0, then u
Γ
i (el) ≤ uΓi (x) ∀ x ∈ X. Since Γ′ is an order preserving transfor-
mation of Γ, this implies that uΓ
′
i (el) ≤ uΓ′i (x) ∀ x ∈ X. Thus, uΓ′i (el) = 0.
If uΓi (el) = 1, then u
Γ
i (el) ≥ uΓi (x) ∀ x ∈ X. Since Γ′ is an order preserving transfor-
mation of Γ, this implies that uΓ
′
i (el) ≥ uΓ′i (x) ∀ x ∈ X. Thus, uΓ′i (el) = 1.
In particular, (uΓ
′
1 (e1), u
Γ′
2 (e1)) = (1, 0) and (u
Γ′
1 (e2), u
Γ′
2 (e2)) = (0, 1).
We now proof that uΓi (el) = u
Γ′
i (el) ∀ (i, j) ∈ N × {3, . . . ,m} such that uΓi (el) ∈ (0, 1).
Without loss of generality, suppose that i = 2.
Define Xˆ := {x ∈ X | uΓ′2 (x) = cˆ := α(Γ,2)l (= uΓ2 (el))}
= {x ∈ X | x2 + α(Γ
′,2)
3 · x3 + . . .+ α(Γ
′,2)
m · xm = cˆ}.
Let x′ ∈ X satisfy uΓ′2 (x′) = cˆ ∈ (0, 1), and
define X˜ := {x ∈ X | uΓ2 (x) = c˜ := uΓ2 (x′)}
= {x ∈ X | x2 + α(Γ,2)3 · x3 + . . .+ α(Γ,2)m · xm = c˜}.
92If, for example, each ui : X → R satisfies ui(x0, . . . , xm) =
∑m
k=1 α
i
k ·xk on X, αik ∈ [0, 1] ∀ (i, k) ∈
N × Nm, (α11, α21) = (1, 0), and (α12, α22) = (0, 1), then (N, X¯, {ui}i∈N ) is an element of Cnpo.
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Since Γ′ is an order preserving transformation of Γ, we have that Xˆ = X˜.
Therefore, (1− uΓ2 (el), 0, uΓ2 (el), 0 . . . , 0) ∈ Xˆ has to be an element of X˜, which implies
that c˜ = uΓ2 (el) (= α
(Γ,2)
l ).
This implies, in particular, that el is an element of X˜, and thus has to be an element
of Xˆ. The latter property implies that α
(Γ′,2)
l = cˆ , and we obtain
uΓ
′
2 (el) = α
(Γ′,2)
l = cˆ ≡ α(Γ,2)l = uΓ2 (el).
By now, we have shown that uΓ
′
i (el) = α
(Γ′,i)
l = α
(Γ,i)
l = u
Γ
i (el) ∀ (i, l) ∈ N × Nm,
which implies that uΓi ≡ uΓ′i . It follows that Γ = Γ′, and thus every solution concept is
ordinally invariant on Cnpo.
F.3 A set Cnpo of bargaining games on which ψNash is ordinally invariant
but αψNash is not Maskin-monotonic in environment E(Cnpo)
Consider the set Cnpo as defined in the preceding paragraph for m = 4.
Let Cˆnpo ≡ {(N, X¯, {uθii }i∈N)}θ∈Θ be a subset of Cnpo that contains the two games Γθ ≡
(N, X¯, {uθii }i∈N) and Γθ′ ≡ (N, X¯, {uθ
′
i
i }i∈N) defined by
uθ11 (e1) = 1, u
θ′1
1 (e1) = 1, u
θ2
2 (e1) = 0, u
θ′2
2 (e1) = 0,
uθ11 (e2) = 0, u
θ′1
1 (e2) = 0, u
θ2
2 (e2) = 1, u
θ′2
2 (e2) = 1,
uθ11 (e3) =
1
2
, u
θ′1
1 (e3) =
7
8
, uθ22 (e3) = 1, u
θ′2
2 (e3) = 1,
uθ11 (e4) = 1, u
θ′1
1 (e4) = 1, u
θ2
2 (e4) =
3
4
, u
θ′2
2 (e4) =
3
4
.
Then, αψNash(θ) = {(N, e4)}, αψNash(θ′) = {(N, e3)}, and αψNash is not Maskin-
monotonic in environment E(Cˆnpo).93 Figure F.2 illustrates the two games.
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93For x¯ := (N, e4) we have that x¯ ∈ αψNash(θ), x¯ 6∈ αψNash(θ′), and there does not exist a tuple
(i, x′) ∈ N ×X such that uθii (e4) ≥ uθii (x′) and uθ
′
i
i (e4) < u
θ′i
i (x
′). Assume, to the contrary, that there
exists such a tuple. If i = 1, then uθ
′
i
i (e4) = 1 < u
θ′i
i (x
′) ≤ 1 provides a contradiction. If i = 2, then
uθii ≡ uθ
′
i
i provides a contradiction.
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G Proofs for Proposition 5.1(a), 5.1(b), and Proposition 5.3
G.1 Proof for Proposition 5.1(a)
Consider an arbitrary V ∈ Cnntu.
Since u′i(g(s), T (V )) = (g(s)(V ))i = (u˜
V (s))i = u˜
V
i (s) ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × S, we have that
ΓE,G,T (V ) = (N, {Si}i∈N , {u′i(g(·), T (V ))}i∈N) = (N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜Vi }i∈N) = Γ˜V . Thus,
EC(ΓE,G,T (V )) = EC(Γ˜V ) 6= ∅, and it remains to show that g(EC(Γ˜V )) ⊆ αL(T (V )).
Consider an arbitrary s ∈ EC(Γ˜V ).
Since u˜V (EC(Γ˜V )) ⊆ L(V ), we have that u˜V (s) ∈ L(V ). Therefore, there exists a
selection l∗ ∈ SL of L such that l∗(V ) = u˜V (s). By definition of g, it follows that
l∗(V ) = u˜V (s) = g(s)(V ). In other words, g(s) ∈ [l∗]V (= {l′ ∈ L | l′(V ) = l∗(V )} ).
Since l∗ ∈ SL, it follows that g(s) ∈ [l∗]V ⊆
⋃
l∈SL [l]V = αL(T (V )).
G.2 Proof for Proposition 5.1(b)
Consider an arbitrary V ∈ Cnntu.
Since u′i(g(x), T (V )) = (g(x)(V ))i = (u˜
V (x))i = u˜
V
i (x) ∀ (i, x) ∈ N ×ZH , we have that
ΓE,G,T (V ) = (N, {Si}i∈N , {u′i(g(·), T (V ))}i∈N) = (N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜Vi }i∈N) = Γ˜V .
Thus, SPNEn(ΓE,G,T (V )) = SPNEn(Γ˜V ) 6= ∅,
and it remains to show that g(O(SPNEn(Γ˜V ))) ⊆ αL(T (V )).
Consider an arbitrary x ∈ O(SPNEn(Γ˜V )).
Since u˜V (O(SPNEn(Γ˜V ))) ⊆ L(V ), we have that u˜V (x) ∈ L(V ). Therefore, there
exists a selection l∗ ∈ SL of L such that l∗(V ) = u˜V (x). By definition of g, it follows that
l∗(V ) = u˜V (x) = g(x)(V ). In other words, g(x) ∈ [l∗]V (= {l′ ∈ L | l′(V ) = l∗(V )} ).
Since l∗ ∈ SL, it follows that g(x) ∈ [l∗]V ⊆
⋃
l∈SL [l]V = αL(T (V )).
G.3 Proof for Proposition 5.3
(i) Consider a tuple (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ × Θ such that Γθ′ is an order preserving transfor-
mation of Γθ. Then, ∀ (i, q, q′) ∈ N × Fo(X¯)× Fo(X¯),
u′i(q, θ
′) > u′i(q
′, θ′) if and only if u′i(q, θ) > u
′
i(q
′, θ).
It follows that, ∀ (i, s, sˆ) ∈ N × S × S, where S := S1 × . . .× Sn,
u′i(g(s), θ
′) > u′i(g(sˆ), θ
′) if and only if u′i(g(s), θ) > u
′
i(g(sˆ), θ).
In other words, ΓE,G,θ
′
is an order preserving transformation of ΓE,G,θ.
Since EC is ordinally invariant, we have that EC(ΓE,G,θ
′
) = EC(ΓE,G,θ).
Thus, g(EC(ΓE,G,θ
′
)) = g(EC(ΓE,G,θ)).
Since mechanism G fully EC-implements αψ in environment E, we have that
g(EC(ΓE,G,θ
′
)) = αψ(θ
′) and g(EC(ΓE,G,θ
′
)) = αψ(θ).
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It follows from the preceding that ψ(Γθ
′
) ≡ αψ(θ′) = αψ(θ) ≡ ψ(Γθ).
(ii) Consider a tuple (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ × Θ such that Γθ′ is an order preserving transfor-
mation of Γθ. Then, ∀ (i, q, q′) ∈ N × Fo(X¯)× Fo(X¯),
u′i(q, θ
′) > u′i(q
′, θ′) if and only if u′i(q, θ) > u
′
i(q
′, θ).
It follows that, ∀ (i, h, hˆ) ∈ N × ZH × ZH ,
u′i(g(h), θ
′) > u′i(g(hˆ), θ
′) if and only if u′i(g(h), θ) > u
′
i(g(hˆ), θ).
In other words, ΓE,G,θ
′
is an order preserving transformation of ΓE,G,θ.
Since SPNEn is ordinally invariant, we have that
SPNEn(ΓE,G,θ
′
) = SPNEn(ΓE,G,θ).
Thus, g(O(SPNEn(ΓE,G,θ
′
))) = g(O(SPNEn(ΓE,G,θ))).
Since mechanism G fully SPNEn-implements αψ in environment E, we have
that g(O(SPNEn(ΓE,G,θ
′
))) = αψ(θ
′) and g(O(SPNEn(ΓE,G,θ))) = αψ(θ).
It follows from the preceding that ψ(Γθ
′
) ≡ αψ(θ′) = αψ(θ) ≡ ψ(Γθ).
H Collections of Games Supporting the Nash Bargaining So-
lution Concept
Collections {Γ˜V(f)}V ∈Cnntu , {Γ˜V(e)}V ∈Cnntu , and {Γ˜V(d)}V ∈Cnntu are due to Trockel [51].94 Col-
lection {Γ˜V(d′)}V ∈Cnntu is a slight modification of the latter one, and is, in parts, similar
to an earlier working paper version of collection {Γ˜V(d)}V ∈Cnntu in Trockel [53].
H.1 Definition of {Γ˜V(f)}V ∈Cnntu, Cnntu ⊆ B¯n
Consider a game V ∈ Cnntu, and let U denote the set V (N) of utility allocations feasible
for the grand coalition.
For each k ∈ Nn, define
Mk(U) := { (i1, . . . , ik, u¯i1 , . . . , u¯ik) | {i1, . . . , ik} ⊆ N , ]{i1, . . . , ik} = k,
and ∃ u ∈ U s.t. uil = u¯il ∀ l ∈ Nk}.
For each k ∈ {2, . . . , n}, ∀ mk−1 ≡ (i1, . . . , ik−1, u¯i1 , . . . , u¯ik−1) ∈ Mk−1(U), ∀ ik ∈
N\{i1, . . . , ik−1}, define
Dik(U,mk−1) := {uik ∈ R | (i1, . . . , ik, u¯i1 , . . . , u¯ik−1 , uik) ∈Mk(U)}.
If n ≥ 3, then, for each k ∈ Nn−2, bargaining game (N,U, 0) combined with a tuple
mk ≡ (i1, . . . , ik, u¯i1 , . . . , u¯ik) ∈ Mk(U) induces an (n − k)-person bargaining game
(Nmk , U(U,mk), 0) via
Nmk := N\{i1, . . . , ik} and
94Our presentation of collection {Γ˜V(d)}V ∈Cnntu to {Γ˜V(f)}V ∈Cnntu is similar to that in Hahmeier [15].
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U(U,mk) := {y ∈ RNmk | ∃ u ∈ U s.t. uil = u¯il ∀ l ∈ Nk and yi = ui ∀ i ∈ Nmk}.
Trockel [50] shows that, for each k ∈ {0, . . . , n−2}, and, if k 6= 0, for each mk ∈Mk(U)
such that U(U,mk) 6= {0}, the bargaining economy induced by the (n − k)-person
bargaining game
G ≡ (NG, UG, 0) :=
 (N,U, 0) if k = 0(Nmk , U(U,mk), 0) if k > 0 , 95
which is defined as the tuple EG ≡ (NG, (i, ei, θi)i∈NG , Y ), where
Y := UG is the production possibility set,
θi :=
1
n−k is agent i’s share in Y ,
ei := 0 ∈ RNG is agent i’s initial endowment, and
i is agent i’s preference relation over the consumption set RNG+ , which is
assumed to be representable by the function ui : RNG+ → R defined by
ui(x) := xi ∀ x ∈ RNG+ ,
has a unique Walrasian equilibrium, and that the equilibrium allocation x∗(G) coincides
with the Nash Bargaining Solution of bargaining game G.
For each k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 2}, and, if k 6= 0, for each mk ∈Mk(U), consider the (n− k)-
person bargaining game G ≡ (NG, UG, 0) as defined above, and, ∀ ik+1 ∈ NG, define
dGik+1 : Dik+1 → R as follows:
• If UG = {0}, define Dik+1 := {0} ⊆ R and dGik+1({0}) := 0.
• If UG 6= {0}, define
Dik+1 :=
 [0, 1] if k = 0Dik+1(U,mk) if k > 0 ,
and, for each u¯ik+1 ∈ Dik+1 , define dGik+1(u¯ik+1) ∈ R as agent ik+1’s demand for
commodity ik+1 in bargaining economy EG at the (normalized) price system
g′(sG(ik+1, u¯ik+1)) and income
1
n− k ·
∑
i∈NG
(g′(sG(ik+1, u¯ik+1)))i · (sG(ik+1, u¯ik+1))i ,
95Trockel [50] uses the terminology “associated bargaining economy”. In the words of Trockel [51],
“the set of feasible utility allocations of the players in a bargaining game is interpreted as a production
possibility set describing all technologically possible ways of producing joint utility vectors. All players
have equal shares in this technology set and, hence, in any resulting profit from production. The
different players’ utilities are the commodities. Each player, as an agent of the economy, is only
interested in ‘his’ commodity, namely his utility. Endowments are zero for each player to guarantee
that the only source of income is the profit earned from production of joint utilities.”
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where g′ denotes the mapping that associates with every vector x ∈ ∂UG
the normal vector at x to ∂UG normalized by ‖g′(x)‖2 = 1,96
and sG(ik+1, u¯ik+1) ∈ ∂UG denotes the utility (commodity) allocation of EG in
which agent ik+1 gets u¯ik+1 and each agent i ∈ NG\{ik+1} gets
max{y ∈ R | ∃ u ∈ UG s.t. (uik+1 , ui) = (u¯ik+1 , y)} if n− k = 2
and
 0 if UG′ = {0}(x∗(G′))i if UG′ 6= {0} if n− k ≥ 3,
G′ ≡ (NG′ , UG′ , 0) denoting the (n−(k+1))-person bargaining game that is
induced by game (N,U, 0) and mk+1 ≡ (i1, . . . , ik+1, u¯i1 , . . . , u¯ik+1).
The (so defined) function dGik+1 : Dik+1 → R is strictly decreasing and continuous
on Dik+1 , has a unique fixed point, and this unique fixed point is at (x
∗(G))ik+1 . The
function min{·, dGik+1(·)} : Dik+1 → R is continuous and attains its maximum (x∗(G))ik+1
(which coincides with the Nash Bargaining Solution of G evaluated at ik+1) in and only
in (x∗(G))ik+1 (which lies in the interior of Dik+1).
For each V ∈ Cnntu, define the normal form game Γ˜V(f) ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜Vi }i∈N) by
Si := [0, 1] ∀ i ∈ N and
u˜Vi (s) :=
 si if s ∈ V (N)min{si, d(N,V (N),0)i (si)} otherwise ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × [0, 1]n.97
Then, for each V ∈ Cnntu, game Γ˜V(f) has a unique NE sˆV and this unique NE satisfies
u˜V (sˆV ) = sˆV = Nash(V ) (Trockel [51], Proposition 1).
H.2 Definition of {Γ˜V(e)}V ∈Cnntu, Cnntu ⊆ B¯n
For each V ∈ Cnntu, define the normal form game Γ˜V(e) ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {u˜Vi }i∈N) by
96Note that, due to the assumptions on bargaining games in B¯n, UG is strictly convex and mapping
g′ is a continuously differentiable mapping g′ : ∂UG → RNG++. Since (g′(sG(ik+1, u¯ik+1)))i 6= 0 ∀ i ∈ NG,
agent ik+1’s demand dGik+1(u¯ik+1) is well defined as an element of R. Note that, due to her preferences
in EG, agent ik+1’s demand for commodity j 6= ik+1 is 0.
97In the words of Trockel [51], “the effect of this payoff rule, reflecting a Walrasian evaluation of
utility allocations, is an ‘adequate’ claim of each player. A very modest utility claim of player 1 results
in . . . a high level of his demand for commodity one, which turns out to be in excess to x1. So he
gets only his modest claim. A very high utility claim . . . results . . . in a low level of his resulting
demand. Then he receives only this small demand. For all players together it is strategically optimal
to claim ‘adequate’ utility levels, i.e. those which coincide with the derived demands. If all players
act accordingly, there is no need for the hypothetical market system, as the resulting utility allocation
is feasible in V .”
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Si := [0, 1] ∀ i ∈ N and
u˜Vi (s) := min{si, d(N,V (N),0)i (si)} ∀ (i, s) ∈ N × [0, 1]n.
For each V ∈ Cnntu, game Γ˜V(e) has a unique DSE sˆV and this unique DSE satisfies
u˜V (sˆV ) = sˆV = Nash(V ) (Trockel [51], Proposition 2).
H.3 Definition of {Γ˜V(d)}V ∈Cnntu, Cnntu ⊆ B¯n
For each game V ∈ Cnntu, define the n-person extensive form game with perfect infor-
mation Γ˜V(d) ≡ (N,H, p, {u˜Vi }i∈N) as follows.
In stage 1, player 1 chooses an element from the set [0, 1].
If, in stage i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 2}, player i has chosen an element from the set [0, 1), then,
in stage i+ 1, player i+ 1 chooses an element from the set [0, 1].
If, in stage n− 2, player n− 2 has choosen an element from the set [0, 1),then, in stage
n − 1, player n − 1 chooses an element from the set [0, 1], and, in stage n, player n
chooses an element from the set { ’left’,’right’}.
In other words, if n ≥ 3, then
ZH = [0, 1)
n−2 × [0, 1]× { ’left’,’right’} ∪ {(1)}
∪ {(a1, . . . , ak−1, 1) ∈ [0, 1)k−1 × {1} | k ∈ {2, . . . , n− 2}}, and
H = {∅} ∪ ZH ∪ {(a1, . . . , ak) ∈ [0, 1)k | k ∈ Nn−2} ∪ [0, 1)n−2 × [0, 1],
and, if n = 2, then
ZH = [0, 1]× { ’left’,’right’}, and
H = {∅} ∪ ZH ∪ [0, 1].
In both cases,
p : H\ZH ⇒ N is defined by p(∅) := {1} and
p(a1, . . . , ak) := {k + 1} ∀ k ∈ Nn−1,∀ (a1, . . . , ak) ∈ H\ZH .
Let U denote the set V (N).
For all i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}, ∀ (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∈ H\ZH , ∀ ai ∈ [0, 1], define (recursively)
Ai(a1, . . . , ai) := ai · max{ y ∈ [0, 1] | y ∈ Di(U,mi−1)},
where mi−1 ≡ (1, . . . , i− 1, a1, A2(a1, a2), . . . , Ai−1(a1, . . . , ai−1)).
If n ≥ 3, then, ∀ i ∈ Nn, player i’s utility function u˜Vi : ZH → R is defined by
u˜V1 (a1, . . . , an) := min{a1, d(N,U,0)1 (a1)},
u˜Vi (a1, . . . , an) := min{Ai(a1, . . . , ai), d(N\{1,...,i−1},U(U,mi−1),0)i (Ai(a1, . . . , ai))}
∀ i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 2},
u˜Vi (a1, . . . , an) :=
 l
(a1,...,an−1)
i if an = ’left’
r
(a1,...,an−1)
i if an = ’right’
∀ i ∈ {n−1, n},
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u˜V1 (a1, . . . , ak−1, 1) := min{a1, d(N,U,0)1 (a1)} ∀ k ∈ {2, . . . , n− 2},
u˜Vi (a1, . . . , ak−1, 1) := min{Ai(a1, . . . , ai), d(N\{1,...,i−1},U(U,mi−1),0)i (Ai(a1, . . . , ai))}
∀ k ∈ {2, . . . , n− 2} and ∀ i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 3} such that i < k,
u˜Vi (a1, . . . , ai−1, 1) := 0 ∀ i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 2},98
u˜Vi (a1, . . . , ak−1, 1) := 0 ∀ k ∈ {2, . . . , n− 2} and ∀ i ∈ {3, . . . , n} s.t. i > k,
u˜V1 (1) := 0,
99 and u˜Vi (1) := 0 ∀ i ∈ {2, . . . , n},
where l(a1,...,an−1) denotes the efficient element of U(U,mn−2) ⊆ R{n−1,n} that satisfies
l
(a1,...,an−1)
n−1 = An−1(a1, . . . , an−1),
r(a1,...,an−1) denotes the efficient element of U(U,mn−2) ⊆ R{n−1,n} that satisfies
r
(a1,...,an−1)
n−1 = min{d(N\{1,...,n−2},U(U,mn−2),0)n−1 (An−1(a1, . . . , an−1)), max
y∈Dn−1(U,mn−2)
y },
and mi−1 denotes the respective (1, . . . , i− 1, a1, A2(a1, a2), . . . , Ai−1(a1, . . . , ai−1)).
If n = 2, then, ∀ i ∈ {1, 2}, player i’s utility function u˜Vi : ZH → R is defined by
u˜Vi (a1, a2) :=
 l
(a1)
i if a2 = ’left’
r
(a1)
i if a2 = ’right’
∀ i ∈ {1, 2},
where l(a1) denotes the efficient element of U that satisfies l
(a1)
1 = a1, and r
(a1) denotes
the efficient element of U that satisfies r
(a1)
1 = min{d(N,U,0)1 (a1), 1}.
Then, for each V ∈ Cnntu, the extensive form game Γ˜V(d) ≡ (N,H, p, {u˜Vi }i∈N) has a
SPNE, and u˜V (O(SPNEn(Γ˜V(d)))) = Nash(V ) (Trockel [51], Proposition 3).
100
H.4 Definition of {Γ˜V(d′)}V ∈Cnntu, Cnntu ⊆ B¯n
For each game V ∈ Cnntu, consider the following modification Γ˜V(d′) ≡ (N,H, p, {u˜Vi }i∈N)
of game Γ˜V(d).
In stage 1, player 1 chooses an element from the set [0, 1]. If, in stage i ∈ {1, . . . , n−2},
player i has chosen an element from the set [0, 1), then, in stage i + 1, player i + 1
98Trockel [51] defines u˜Vi (a1, . . . , ai−1, 1) :=
1
n−i ·max{y | y ∈ Di(U,mi−1)}.
99Trockel [51] defines u˜V1 (1) :=
1
n−1 ·max{y | y ∈ [0, 1]} = 1n−1 .
100The idea is the following: if player n− 1 is able, given the choices of player 1 to n− 2, to choose
his Nash coordinate (by ‘playing’ an appropriate action an−1), he will do so in every SPNE, taking
into account player n’s optimal response to his choice. If player i ∈ {2, . . . , n − 2} is able, given the
choices of player 1 to i − 1, to choose his Nash coordinate, he will do so in every SPNE, taking into
account his preferences. And, player 1 can and will choose his Nash coordinate in every SPNE, taking
into account his preferences. Player 1’s choice (of his Nash coordinate) now allows player 2 to choose
his Nash coordinate. Player 2’s choice allows player 3 to choose his Nash coordinate, and so on.
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chooses an element from the set [0, 1].
In other words, if n ≥ 3, then
ZH = {(a1, . . . , an−1) | ai ∈ [0, 1) ∀ i ∈ Nn−2, an−1 ∈ [0, 1]}
∪ {(1)} ∪ {(a1, . . . , ak−1, 1) ∈ [0, 1)k−1 × {1} | k ∈ {2, . . . , n− 2}}, and
H = {∅} ∪ ZH ∪ {(a1, . . . , ak) ∈ [0, 1)k | k ∈ Nn−2},
and, if n = 2, then
ZH = [0, 1], and
H = {∅} ∪ ZH .
In both cases,
p : H\ZH ⇒ N is defined by p(∅) := {1} and
p(a1, . . . , ak) := {k + 1} ∀ k ∈ Nn−2,∀ (a1, . . . , ak) ∈ H\ZH .
Let U denote the set V (N).
Define A1(a1) := a1 ∀ a1 ∈ [0, 1], and,
∀ i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}, ∀ (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∈ H\ZH , ∀ ai ∈ [0, 1], define (recursively)
Ai(a1, . . . , ai) := ai · max{ y ∈ [0, 1] | y ∈ Di(U,mi−1)},
where mi−1 ≡ (1, . . . , i− 1, A1(a1), A2(a1, a2), . . . , Ai−1(a1, . . . , ai−1)).
If n ≥ 3, then, ∀ i ∈ Nn, player i’s utility function u˜Vi : ZH → R is defined by
u˜V1 (a1, . . . , an−1) := min{A1(a1), d(N,U,0)1 (A1(a1))},
u˜Vi (a1, . . . , an−1) := min{Ai(a1, . . . , ai), d(N\{1,...,i−1},U(U,mi−1),0)i (Ai(a1, . . . , ai))}
∀ i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1},
u˜Vn (a1, . . . , an−1) :=
 f
(a1,...,an−1)
n if an−1 6= 1
0 if an−1 = 1
,
u˜V1 (a1, . . . , ak−1, 1) := min{A1(a1), d(N,U,0)1 (A1(a1))} ∀ k ∈ {2, . . . , n− 2},
u˜Vi (a1, . . . , ak−1, 1) := min{Ai(a1, . . . , ai), d(N\{1,...,i−1},U(U,mi−1),0)i (Ai(a1, . . . , ai))}
∀ k ∈ {2, . . . , n− 2} and ∀ i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 3} such that i < k,
u˜Vi (a1, . . . , ai−1, 1) :=
min{Ai(a1, . . . , ai−1, 1), d(N\{1,...,i−1},U(U,mi−1),0)i (Ai(a1, . . . , ai−1, 1))}
∀ i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 2},
u˜Vi (a1, . . . , ak−1, 1) := 0 ∀ k ∈ {2, . . . , n− 2} and ∀ i ∈ {2, . . . , n} s.t. i > k,
u˜V1 (1) := min{A1(1), d(N,U,0)1 (A1(1))}, and
u˜Vi (1) := 0 ∀ i ∈ {2, . . . , n},
where f (a1,...,an−1) denotes the efficient element of U(U,mn−2) ⊆ R{n−1,n} that satisfies
f
(a1,...,an−1)
n−1 =min{An−1(a1, . . . , an−1), d(N\{1,...,n−2},U(U,mn−2),0)n−1 (An−1(a1, . . . , an−1))},
and mi−1 denotes the respective (1, . . . , i−1, A1(a1), A2(a1, a2), . . . , Ai−1(a1, . . . , ai−1)).
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If n = 2, then, ∀ i ∈ {1, 2}, player i’s utility function u˜Vi : ZH → R is defined by
u˜V1 (a1) := min{A1(a1), d(N,U,0)1 (A1(a1))}, and
u˜V2 (a1) :=
 f
(a1)
2 if a1 ∈ [0, 1)
0 if a1 = 1
,
where f (a1) denotes the efficient element of U that satisfies
f
(a1)
1 = min{A1(a1), d(N,U,0)1 (A1(a1))}.
Then, for each V ∈ Cnntu, the extensive form game Γ˜V(d′) ≡ (N,H, p, {u˜Vi }i∈N) has a
SPNE, and u˜V (O(SPNEn(Γ˜V(d′)))) = Nash(V ).
101
H.5 A Collection of Games Satisfying the Assumptions of Corollary 5.2(b)
For each game V ∈ Cnntu, define the n-person extensive form game with perfect infor-
mation Γ˜V ≡ (N,H, p, {u˜Vi }i∈N) as follows.
In stage i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, player i chooses an element from the set [0, 1].
In other words,
ZH = {(a1, . . . , an−1) | ai ∈ [0, 1] ∀ i ∈ Nn−1},
H = {∅} ∪ ZH ∪ {(a1, . . . , ak) ∈ [0, 1]k | k ∈ Nn−2}, and
p : H\ZH ⇒ N is defined by p(∅) := {1} and
p(a1, . . . , ak) := {k + 1} ∀ k ∈ Nn−2,∀ (a1, . . . , ak) ∈ H\ZH .
Let U denote the set V (N), and define
A˜1(a1) := b
V
1 + a1 · (qV1 − bV1 ),
A1(a1) := min{A˜1(a1), d(N,U,0)1 (A˜1(a1))} ∀ a1 ∈ [0, 1],
and, ∀ i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}, ∀ (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∈ H\ZH , ∀ ai ∈ [0, 1], define (recursively)
A˜i(a1, . . . , ai) := b
V
i + ai · (min{max{ y ∈ [0, 1] | y ∈ Di(U,mi−1)}, qVi } − bVi ),
Ai(a1, . . . , ai) := min{A˜i(a1, . . . , ai), d(N\{1,...,i−1},U(U,mi−1),0)i (A˜i(a1, . . . , ai))},
where mi−1 ≡ (1, . . . , i− 1, a1, A2(a1, a2), . . . , Ai−1(a1, . . . , ai−1)).
If n ≥ 3, then, ∀ i ∈ Nn, player i’s utility function u˜Vi : ZH → R is defined by
u˜Vi (a1, . . . , an−1) := Ai(a1, . . . , ai) ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1},
u˜Vn (a1, . . . , an−1) := f
(a1,...,an−1)
n ,
101The idea is almost the same as for the preceding collection: if player i ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1} is able,
given the choices of player 1 to i − 1, to choose his Nash coordinate (by ‘playing’ an appropriate
action ai), he will do so in every SPNE, taking into account his preferences. And, player 1 can and
will choose his Nash coordinate in every SPNE, taking into account his preferences. Player 1’s choice
(of his Nash coordinate) now allows player 2 to choose his Nash coordinate. Player 2’s choice allows
player 3 to choose his Nash coordinate, and so on.
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where f (a1,...,an−1) denotes the efficient element of U(U,mn−2) ⊆ R{n−1,n} that satisfies
f
(a1,...,an−1)
n−1 = An−1(a1, . . . , an−1), where mn−2 denotes
mn−2 ≡ (1, . . . , n− 2, A1(a1), A2(a1, a2), . . . , An−2(a1, . . . , an−2)).
If n = 2, then, ∀ i ∈ {1, 2}, player i’s utility function u˜Vi : ZH → R is defined by
u˜V1 (a1) := A1(a1) and u˜
V
2 (a1) := f
(a1)
2 ,
where f (a1) denotes the efficient element of U that satisfies f
(a1)
1 = A1(a1).
Then, for each V ∈ Cnntu, game Γ˜V has a SPNE, u˜V (O(SPNEn(Γ˜V ))) = Nash(V ),102
u˜V (x) ∈ V (N) ⊆ Fup(V ) ∀ x ∈ ZH , and R(g(x), T (V )) = (g(x), 1) ∀ x ∈ ZH (since
u˜Vi (x) ≥ bVi ∀ i ∈ N).
J Time Schedule
Time Entry Conditions Actions Possible Results
Period and Parameters and Interpretation
T1 — mechanism is x ∈ X outcome x is
‘played’ suggested by mechanism
T2 x ∈ X implementation (x, 0) outcome x is not imple-
of x mented in T2 (‘right
is considered after the mechanism has
and possibly
realized
been played’)
(x, 1) outcome x is implemented
in T2 (‘right after the
mechanism has been
played’)
T3 T2 results in implementation (y, 2) outcome y ∈ X\{x¯} is
(x, 0), x ∈ X problem is re- implemented in T3
considered; an
implementation
is possibly
(x¯, 2) outcome x¯ is
realized
implemented in T3
or outcome x¯ prevails
since no other
outcome is
implemented in T3
102The idea is the following: each player i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} is able, given the choices of player 1 to
i− 1, to choose his Nash coordinate (by ‘playing’ ai ∈ [0, 1] such that A˜i(a1, . . . , ai) = (Nash(V ))i).
And, taking into account his preferences, he will do so in every SPNE.
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K Abstract Relationship between the Environments
Classical n-person environments
Abstract n-person environments with
state contingent mechanisms
n-person environments
with limited
enforcement power
n-person environments
with delegative
enforcement power
Jackson and Palfrey’s
n-person environments
with a “generalized
reversion function”
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pppppppp
ppppn-person environments
with delegative
enforcement power
having only one EDS
assignment and this
does not satisfy satisfies
e({0}) = X
Abstract n-person environments with an unrestricted realization function
?
’⊆’
? ?
’Corresponding classical environments’
6
’⊆’ : R generated from
an enforcement structure;
in particular, R(x, θ)
∈ {(x, 1), (x, 0)} on X ×Θ
6
’⊆’ : R(X ×Θ)
⊆ X × {1}
HH
HH
HY




>
‘divided into’
.......
6
’⊆’ (identifying X × {0} with X × {2}) :
R generated from an EDS assignment; in
particular, R(x, θ) ∈ {(x, 1), (x, 0)} on X ×Θ
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